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This dissertation exposes the significance of ‘self-disruption’ in ethical development (the 
process of understanding how to flourish), especially as incited through conversation. By 
‘self-disruption’, I mean the experience of being torn away from self-concern (which is a 
self-reflective enterprise) by something other. ‘Self-concern’ here refers to one’s 
attachment to one’s projects and plans—including the future self that one seeks to 
produce (qua preservation of its current identity). This study engages the history of 
ethical thinking, but it is not antiquarian. To make my case, I primarily rely on Emmanuel 
Levinas’s ethical metaphysics and critically interpret and draw from insights within 1) 
Kant’s account of the moral self, 2) Aristotle’s account of the virtuous soul, and 3) the 
teleological account of the self that we find in contemporary virtue ethics. My claim is 
that what is latent in each of these accounts is the pivotal role of having one’s attention 
arrested by ‘the other’, and that fostering this phenomenon belongs to the work of moral 
philosophy understood as moral cultivation. This research homes in on key discussions 
within Anglo-American ethics, particularly those that stem from the reevaluation of the 
nature and task of moral philosophy in the 20th-century. I am skeptical as to whether the 
resulting Aristotelian virtue ethics is as radical as its advocates claim, and I challenge its 
reliance on narrative coherence. I do not seek to deny the narrative dimensions of self-
understanding, but I do want to underscore the ethical importance of welcoming their 
disruption.  
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This project is motivated by two distinct, albeit related movements in 20th-century ethics: 
1) the turn to Aristotelian virtue ethics in the Anglo-American tradition; and 2) the radical 
reclamation of ethics that we find in the ethical-metaphysics of the Continental thinker, 
Emmanuel Levinas. Despite emerging from different traditions, these movements are 
both responses to the dire state of ‘Western’ moral philosophy. As a survivor of the 
Holocaust, Levinas is also explicitly responding to the atrocities of the 20th-century, 
understanding them as a testimony to the West’s loss of moral sense—the fear of death 
and drive toward self-preservation clearly overshadowing the fear of war. What interests 
me is that the former turns to Aristotle to recover sense in ethics, while the latter’s 
recovery of ethics  (hearkening to the ‘Platonic Good’) critiques phenomenology, which 
is itself born out of a revived interest in Aristotle.  
As the title suggests, this project is broadly a study on the limits of self-
legislation. ‘Self-legislation’ refers to the distinctly Kantian notion of autonomy (of the 
will); ‘limits’ refers to the question of whether or not moral sense is something that we 
can theoretically ascertain and autonomously will into being; or put differently, whether 
moral sense is the product of reflective self-consciousness. I am engaging with Kant 
because Kant marks a crucial shift in ethics—arguably representing the ethos of modern 
moral philosophy, and depicting the autonomous, self-determining sense of self that, for 
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the most part, reigns in the Anglo-American West—and his hyper-rationalistic vision of 
morality is a standard point of critique within contemporary ethics in general (even 
within contemporary deontology). This is to say that post-Kantian moral philosophy 
cannot help but contend with Kant’s staunch moral law, although critiques almost 
unanimously agree that despite its provocation, Kant’s project (at least to some extent) 
fails. Although utilitarianism (the other pole of the reigning theoretical binary in moral 
philosophy: Kantianism-deontology or utilitarianism-consequentialism) and its ostensible 
reduction of ethics to economics is also an obvious point of critique within contemporary 
ethics, I do not explicitly address the theory or its inception, as this would vastly exceed 
the scope of this project. 
Four of the five chapters will probe phenomenologies of the self and their relation 
to goodness, as I am analyzing self-legislation. Goodness is here loosely understood as 
ethics, morality, virtue, eudaimonia, living well, though I will attempt to refine that 
definition (as self-disruption) in the last two chapters of the project. Part I (Ch. 1, 2) will 
turn back to key moments within the history of ethics. Part II  (Ch. 3, 4, 5) will focus on 
the contemporary scene in light of Part I’s conclusions.  
Since Kant often serves as a springboard for contemporary ethical theory—
primarily as an obvious point of critique—I begin by analyzing Kantian morality by way 
of Kant’s understanding of who we are, investigating whether there is more to Kant than 
meets the eye. Chapter 1, “The moral self,” claims that, mirroring the motivations we find 
within contemporary virtue ethics, Kant’s project can be understood as a response to the 
then-dire state of moral philosophy, and a concomitant radical retrieval of an essential 
dimension of who we are. In this chapter, I argue that for Kant, we are more than 
	 3	
production-oriented patterns of behavior (solely motivated by pleasure and pain), and are 
in fact constituted by the capacity to bring new and unexpected things into the world—
defined by an intrinsic (moral) desire for justice. Crucial to Kant’s account is that our 
desire for justice is experienced as a disruption of self-conceit by the other.  
Because I am addressing the retrieval of Aristotle within contemporary Anglo-
American ethics, Chapter 2, “The virtuous soul,” probes the roots of the movement by 
examining Aristotle’s seminal ethical texts with an eye toward Aristotle’s understanding 
of who we are. In this chapter, I argue that the most crucial insight we find within 
Aristotle’s account is that the condition for the possibility of happiness (eudaimonia)—
which involves embracing what is good in itself, and embodying confidence while 
navigating through the world of coming-to-be—is excellent moral education (virtuous 
others), which ought to be understood as the most important form of justice. Given the 
role Aristotelian virtue ethics has played as an alternative of sorts to deontology and 
utilitarianism-consequentialism, this chapter also underlines the sense in which 
Aristotle’s account is by no means incompatible with Kant’s, though their respective 
emphases, approaches, and epochs are obviously distinct. My claim is that there is an 
important sense in which Kant’s moral project can be understood as grounding 
Aristotle’s ethical project by establishing the condition for the possibility of virtue and 
virtuous relations. What is important here is that virtue involves the disruption of a 
certain mode of means-ends projection (as this heeds unimpeded activity), as well as 
disruption qua intervention by virtuous others.  
Chapter 3, “Recollecting the teleological self,” fast-forwards to the ways in which 
Aristotelian approaches have been employed to address the stifled state of contemporary 
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moral philosophy. The chapter begins with a description of the crisis in 20th-century 
moral philosophy as rendered by seminal texts in the Anglo-American tradition, 
underscoring 1) the problematic conception of the self (as predominantly production-
oriented) that undergirds and fosters the perpetuation of that crisis, and 2) the movement 
to reclaim Aristotelian virtue ethics as a response. I then critically interpret two 
Aristotelian-inspired approaches to reimagining the task of moral philosophy and the 
moral philosopher—one at the inception of the movement (Alasdair Macintyre), and the 
other within the last decade (Talbot Brewer). I conclude by identifying the major insights 
to build from in these exemplary cases, especially their recovery of our intrinsic desire to 
immerse ourselves in activities for their own sake, that is, our desire to lose or disrupt 
ourselves. I end by returning to Macintyre’s infamous claim that Aristotle and Nietzsche 
are the only viable theoretical alternatives in our disordered contemporary context, 
proposing that Levinas’s unique reclamation of moral sense and the ethical ‘self’ may, in 
fact, be a viable ‘third way’, especially when understood through, and combined with, the 
motivations, critiques, and reclamations showcased in this chapter.   
The conclusion to Chapter 3 serves as a bridge to Chapter 4, “The disrupted self,” 
which provides an interpretation of Levinas’s radical account of the self (with a special 
emphasis on Levinas’s metaphysics of communication and conversation, and 
conversation’s relation to justice), ultimately suggesting that Levinas represents a 
different ethical tradition that does not fall prey to Nietzsche’s indictment or the woes of 
emotivism. In this chapter, I argue that in addition to providing an innovative approach to 
the problems we face in moral philosophy—particularly, the question of how we ground 
morality—Levinas’s vindication of ethics exudes the spirit of Kant (as portrayed in 
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Chapter 1), while expressing key insights from Aristotle, especially as retrieved in 
contemporary Aristotelian ethics.  
My ultimate claim is that, despite various dimensions of contemporary 
Aristotelian virtue ethics resonating with what we find in Levinas, Levinas’s conception 
of the self as disrupted (being-for-the-other) goes further than contemporary 
Neoaristotelian retrievals of the good by insisting on a deposed rather than self-governing 
understanding of who we are. This is to say that Levinas seeks to offer a distinctly ethical 
sense of the self that is neither primarily self-legislating (autonomous), nor unified by a 
coherent quest for the good (teleological). For Levinas, the self, even prior to its face-to-
face encounter with the other, was not, is not, and never will be an island unto itself. 
Although autonomy (the self understood as a self-legislator) and narrative coherence (the 
self understood as an individual on a unique, unified quest for the good) are incontestable 
modes of being, for Levinas, they are antithetical to ethics insofar as they are self-
interested—motivated by self-preservation and self-determination.  
The aim of Chapter 5, “Self-disruption,” is threefold: first, I address two salient 
critiques of Levinas’s account of ethics; second, in light of my responses to these 
critiques, I emphasize the significance of self-disruption in ethical development—
inspired by Levinas’s reimagining of ‘the good’, but also as latent in 1) Kant’s account of 
the moral self, 2) Aristotle’s account of the virtuous self, and 3) the teleological account 
of the self that we find in contemporary virtue ethics. Third, I end with a brief note on 
moral philosophy’s relation to moral cultivation with a view to the significance of self-
disruption and its relation to justice (qua conversation) as described in Chapter 4. I 
contend that ethics is conversation in the sense that ethics hinges on a sense of hospitality 
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to the disruption of reflective self-consciousness, which ultimately amounts to embracing 
our exposure to the other—first and foremost through conversation.  
In sum, the critical aim of this project is to address 20th-century debates on the 
task of moral philosophy and the moral philosopher. To get there, I first turn to the 
seminal works of the figures sitting at the heart of those analyses (Kant and Aristotle), 
developing a modest theory of their compatibility. My overarching goal is to offer a 
response to both the impasses and Aristotelian remedies that we find within the Anglo-
American tradition by critically interpreting and building upon the most robust 
reclamation of ethics that we find within the Continental tradition (Levinas), ultimately 
exploring to what extent these disparate accounts from distinct traditions might be 
attuned to each other, and can thus lead to new insights about who we are, where we 
come from, where we are headed, and why.   
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PART I  
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CHAPTER 1: THE MORAL SELF 
'Sons of Ariston,' he sang, 'divine offspring of an illustrious hero.’ The epithet 
is very appropriate, for there is something truly divine in being able to argue as 
you have done for the superiority of injustice, and remaining unconvinced by 
your own arguments. And I do believe that you are not convinced—this I infer 
from your general character, for had I judged only from your speeches I should 
have mistrusted you. But now, the greater my confidence in you, the greater is 
my difficulty in knowing what to say. For I am in a strait between two; on the 
one hand I feel that I am unequal to the task; and my inability is brought home 
to me by the fact that you were not satisfied with the answer which I made to 
Thrasymachus, proving, as I thought, the superiority which justice has over 
injustice. And yet I cannot refuse to help, while breath and speech remain to 
me; I am afraid that there would be an impiety in being present when justice is 
evil spoken of and not lifting up a hand in her defense. And therefore I had best 
give such help as I can.   
                                                                                                                     —Socrates, Plato’s Republic, 368a-c  
 
Although Kant’s often-considered ‘failed project’1 marks a problematic moment in the 
history of ethics (in its hyper-rationalistic account of how one ought to live), serving as 
an obvious point of critique in various neoaristotelian accounts, Kant’s project focuses on 
a very basic, incontestable dimension of human experience: the experience of being 
compelled to consider the other before oneself.  Regardless of whether one agrees with 
Kant’s moral claims, he persists (more than 200 years later) as a force to be reckoned 
with, signifying, as we will see below, the original critique of what later becomes 
utilitarianism-consequentialism—scandalously provoking us to consider the possibility of 
a sense of morality that is universal, necessary, and non-experiential. 
																																																								
1 I have in mind Alasdair Macintyre’s notorious critique of Kant (and the failure of the Enlightenment in 
general) in After Virtue (which will be highlighted in Chapter 3), as well as various contemporary Kantian 
accounts of ethics that, while honoring the spirit of Kant’s project, challenge and amend his method and 
claims in distinct ways (e.g., John Rawls, Christine Korsgaard, and Stephen Darwall). 
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This chapter will probe the roots of contemporary deontology by critically 
engaging the work of Immanuel Kant. I will begin by analyzing Kant’s motivations for 
crafting the moral project that he does, and, after providing an exegetical account of his 
seminal ethical texts (grounded in those motivations), I will flesh out the conception of 
the self that sits at the heart of Kantian ethics, so as to reveal who serves as the source of 
the particular set of values for the self that we find in Kant’s moral theory and subsequent 
breeds of deontology. I will then demonstrate that for Kant, the most authentic self (the 
moral self) is one that has given itself over to its desire2 for justice—synonymous with 
acting from duty—and that the chief values that correspond with this conception of the 
self are freedom and honesty. For Kant, these two values mark creative capacity in each 
and every one of us, serving as the condition for the possibility of bringing new 
phenomena into the world—most importantly, justice: here defined as each member of 
humanity having the ability to self-determine among others. Crucial to Kant’s account is 
that our desire for justice is experienced as a disruption of self-conceit by the other—a 
point that I elucidate in Chapter 5, after connecting it to Emmanuel Levinas’s account of 
the disrupted self in Chapter 4.  
My chief claim is that Kant’s primary moral aim is to demonstrate that we are 
more than self-interested, effect-oriented automatons, and that we should not reduce 
ourselves to predictable, production-oriented patterns of behavior. It is this dimension of 
self-retrieval that safeguards Kant’s moral theory as something more than a failed project, 
driving contemporary ethicists to continue to engage him, despite the project’s ostensible 
																																																								
2 While this is clearly a term that Kant is not interested in employing in moral contexts, I use it because I 
think (as I will attempt to illustrate here) that, phenomenologically speaking, he describes what it is to be 
pulled toward the moral law—pulled toward that which is not experientially determined.  
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failure. And as we will see in the chapters that follow, this dimension of Kant not only 
squares with contemporary Aristotelian accounts, but also illustrates an intimate relation 
between Aristotle and Kant’s respective ethos.  
1.1 KANT’S MOTIVATIONS 
A supreme principle of morality. In the Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant 
emphasizes that the project he undertakes is unprecedented in moral philosophy, and will 
thus reveal something that all moral philosophers prior to him have failed to see, even if 
it was latent in their claims. Notoriously, Kant’s task is an exercise in pure philosophy: 
that is, an exercise in a priori philosophy, probing the condition for the possibility of 
moral phenomena. 
It is in this mode of probing—understood as Kant’s transcendental method—that 
we find what could be considered the proto-type for what Heidegger later coins an 
‘existential analytic’: a thematized method of analysis that, while examining the human 
condition, does not rely on biology, anthropology, psychology, or any of the natural 
sciences. Existential analysis so construed works to uncover what is distinct from qua 
condition of, albeit immanent in, things as we encounter them in our day-to-day life.3  
																																																								
3 As Kant writes in the Preface to the Groundwork, all knowledge in philosophy is either material (the laws 
of the nature/physics and the laws of freedom/ethics) or formal (logic). Material philosophy involves 
objects in the world and the laws that constitute them, while formal philosophy has nothing to do with the 
empirical. The laws of freedom—best understood as the business of morality (for Kant, distinct from 
ethics)—involve the laws of the will and the ways in which objects in world are subject to those laws. 
Unlike physics, however, which considers the laws according to which everything does happen, “the 
doctrine of morals” considers the laws “according to which everything ought to happen, although these 
moral laws also consider the conditions under which what ought to happen frequently does not” (4:388). 
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 For Kant, metaphysics—which he tempers by redefining it in the Critique of Pure 
Reason as the science dealing with the conditions for the possibility of experience, rather 
than the unwarranted, despotic overstepping of principles beyond all possible use in 
experience (Aviii)—has two prongs. The first is the metaphysics of nature (what is 
arguably established in the first Critique), and the second is the metaphysics of morals. 
Rather than providing an account of practical anthropology dealing with the empirical 
dimension of ethics (how moral laws unfold in everyday life, i.e., habituated virtues and 
vices), Kant stresses the need to first substantiate the purely rational dimension of ethics 
to inspect and then showcase, what, if anything, reason can accomplish on its own 
(4:389). Although the laws of morality “require a power of judgment sharpened by 
experienced, partly in order to distinguish in what cases they are applicable, and partly to 
gain for them access to the human will as well as influence for putting them into 
practice,” it is imperative to locate the rules that necessarily apply in all cases, so as to 
eliminate the possibility of moral corruption (4:389).  
What Kant has in mind with moral corruption is a sort of moral relativism in 
which self-interested ends justify the means—something like Thrasymachus’s definition 
of justice in the Plato’s Republic: justice is whatever is advantageous to the stronger. 
Kant writes in his pre-critical meditations on ethics, “One always talks so much of virtue. 
One must, however, abolish injustice before one can be virtuous. One must set aside 
comforts, luxuries and everything that oppresses others while elevating myself, so that I 
am not one of those who oppress their species. Without this conclusion, all virtue is 
impossible” (20:151). Justice, for Kant, is the condition for the possibility of virtue; 
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Kant’s moral project is perhaps best understood as a search for the condition for the 
possibility of a virtuous society.  
With Thrasymachus’s definition of justice in mind, it is not only helpful, but 
crucial to think of Kant’s moral project as a continuation of the conversation set in 
motion by the Republic, as Kant answers both of the questions guiding the dialogue by 
offering a decisive definition on what, specifically, justice is and why we ought to be just. 
Central to Kant’s account is that these answers do not rely on judgment in a life beyond 
this one (which in turn relies on a dogmatic account of something we cannot know with 
certainty),4 but instead on reason alone. As we will see below, this marks Kant’s shift 
from heteronomy to autonomy, daring us to rely on ourselves (“What is 
Enlightenment?”), rather than on the arbitrary rules we have been fed through various 
bodies of power—insisting that we can locate the supreme principle of morality (the 
moral law), universally and necessarily governing everything we do, in reason alone.  
A metaphysics of morals must, therefore, precede all of moral philosophy’s 
practical endeavors, including the analysis of moral dispositions (the virtues, and how, 
specifically, the moral law is fulfilled), and moral education in general. For Kant, these 
practical endeavors, are not, properly speaking, moral philosophy. Moral philosophy is 
the consideration of the “ideas and principles of a pure will and not the actions and 
conditions of human volition as such, which is for the most part drawn from psychology” 
																																																								
4 I have in mind here an interpretation of Socrates’s Myth of Err in Book X of the Republic as his final 
attempt to “answer” the question of why one should be just (or put differently, whether justice is in fact 
better than injustice). In the myth, Socrates appeals to a final judgment in a “world” beyond this one, in 
which one’s soul is “laid bare” before the gods of the past, present, and future—in front of the spindle of 
necessity—judged according to its deeds in life. The soul being judged is given a variety of future lives to 
choose from (the variety depending on the past life of the soul), and then the soul would make its decision 
based on its knowledge of what is good and what is bad (this understanding of course fostered by its habits 
in life).  
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(4:391). Moral philosophy is the consideration of a priori moral intention, moral 
motivation. Kant makes it clear that before he can begin constructing a metaphysics of 
morals, he must first critically examine pure practical reason itself. But before he can do 
that, he needs to first establish what (if anything) the supreme principle of morality is 
(4:392)—and this will be the function of the Groundwork. Methodologically, the way in 
which Kant will locate the moral law is by examining ordinary knowledge, i.e., what 
most people think the moral law is (because people do, in fact, make moral distinctions), 
then abstracting the universal principle that is operative within, always and already in-
forming, common sense’s understanding of morality. It is worth stressing, as Kant 
incessantly does, that this (transcendental) method involves conceptually separating 
things (essences) that are never separated in existence.  
Contra empiricism. In addition to seeking to combat the corruption that can and 
does result from lacking a supreme norm by which people can correctly appraise their 
actions, it is important to emphasize that Kant’s moral project stands in the wake of 
empiricism—a tradition relying on sense experience and denying the possibility of non-
experiential knowledge. This tradition includes, but is not limited to, the works of John 
Locke, George Berkeley, and, most provocative to Kant, David Hume.  
In Hume’s Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, Hume asks: what is the 
foundation of morality? The rhetorical dilemma he offers in response to this question is 
that the foundation of moral principles is either 1) reason, marked by universality, truth, 
and disputability, or 2) sentiment, marked by particularity, based on perception, and, 
rather than being disputable, being a matter of taste (134-5). Hume’s slippery answer is 
that it is a false dilemma; both options are right and wrong. Reason plays the role of 
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adjudicating sentiment, by making decisions and drawing distinction—fine-tuning moral 
sense, habituating virtue. But in the end, desire (grounding sentiment) is what provides 
humanity with its final end (3.2). Moral sentiments (virtues and vices), i.e., the 
observable patterns we find in human behavior, flow from feelings of praise or blame. 
Virtue involves what is agreeable or pleasing, because it is praiseworthy, approved of by 
others; vice involves what is disagreeable or painful, because others disapprove of it.  
Hume stresses that judgment from others, based on how one appears, is a vital 
indication of moral value. Just as we find in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (as we will 
see in Chapter 2), pleasure and pain are the indicators of moral action—though for Hume, 
specifically pleasure and pain are felt in response to the approval or disapproval of others. 
Crucial for Hume is that there is no purely rational measure of what is right and wrong. 
Reason alone cannot motivate action or indicate what is virtuous. What motivates us are, 
at least for the most part, the feelings evoked by the way we are received or rejected by 
others. Kant of course disagrees with Hume’s answer, and will go on to claim that it is 
reason, and reason alone, that can truly measure what is right and wrong. And that this 
measuring process has nothing to do with pleasurable consequences, the tastes of others, 
or observable patterns in human behavior—intriguing patterns that might tempt one to 
reduce human beings to mere expressions of those predictable patterns and nothing else.   
Means and ends. Within this vein, another key motivating factor in Kant’s moral 
project is providing a moral principle that is defined by the absolute exclusion of the 
calculation of ends. Or in other words, Kant seeks to undermine moral schemas governed 
by the Machiavellian precept that, as far as action goes, the ends justify the means. As he 
puts it in the second Critique, the empiricism of practical reason is the most serious threat 
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to morality because it destroys the root of moral dispositions by placing good and evil in 
experiential consequences (for example, projections of happiness as the sum total of all 
our inclinations).   
In Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Project (published ten years after 
the Groundwork), Kant questions whether the very notion of perpetual peace is merely a 
dream among philosophers, given the fact that heads of state can never get enough of 
war. He then provides an account of the conditions for the possibility of perpetual peace, 
i.e., a just world, which unsurprisingly hinges on adherence to the moral law, albeit re-
construed as right. It is worth considering some key aspects of Perpetual Peace before 
analyzing Kant’s seminal ethical texts, as Kant’s vision of a cosmopolitan constitution5 
grounded in his understanding of what is perhaps best understood as universal human 
rights, in fact, frames and makes sense of his pre-political texts. Kant’s aim is to facilitate 
humanity’s movement toward an international state of perpetual peace—one in which 
morality is actualized, practically married with politics, ultimately making a case for the 
relevance of theory in politics.  
Most noteworthy in Kant’s approach in Perpetual Peace is that the condition of 
peace is not natural (for Kant, the state of nature is a state of war), but must be 
constructed, cultivated, and practiced. The mere suspension of hostilities among 
nations—agreeing to disagree, e.g., establishing a peace pact rather than a pacific 
league—simply preserves the constant threat of future hostility, even if the outbreak of 
																																																								
5 Kant takes pains to distinguish this (the World Republic’s constitution) from the constitution belonging to 
a state of nations, noting that a state requires superiors (the legislators) and inferiors (the legislated), setting 
up power dynamics that will inevitably inhibit the efforts of the constitution. It is important to note that 
nations enter into a league of nations, suggesting that it will be a union of nations, rather than a universal 
monarchy (which Kant thinks is impossible anyway, given the vast variety of languages and religions).  
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that hostility never occurs (8:349); the threat of future hostility itself undermines any 
hope for lasting peace. With this in mind, Kant stresses that each society, like a tree 
trunk, has its own roots (8:344). A society of people is not, therefore, a thing that can be 
annexed and grafted on to something else, but instead constitutes a dignity unto itself. He 
highlights the dangerous presumption in then-Europe that states can marry each other, 
denoting, by his account, a new form of industry for making oneself dominant through 
family alliances and the expansion of land (8:344). Kant is disturbed by the fact that no 
legislative authority exists that can prohibit the imperializing forces of one nation on 
another—interfering with their constitution, and exercising acts of hostility (vicious 
forms of torture, the employment of assassins, and various forms of dishonesty, e.g., 
going back on promises, espionage, etc.) that can potentially render mutual trust obsolete 
during future peace (8:347).  
Kant notably uses the language of hospitality in his definitive articles for 
perpetual peace, emphasizing, “cosmopolitan right shall be limited to conditions of 
universal hospitality” (8:357).  
Here as in the preceding articles, it is not a question of philanthropy but of right, so that 
hospitality (hospitableness) means the right of a foreigner not to be treated with hostility 
because he has arrived on the land of another. The other can turn him away, if this can be 
done without destroying him, but as long as he behaves peaceable where he is, he cannot 
be treated with hostility. What he can claim is not the right to be a guest (for this a special 
beneficent pact would be required, making him a member of the household for a certain 
time), but the right to visit; this right, to present oneself for society, belongs to all human 
beings by virtue of the right of possession in common of the earth’s surface on which we 
cannot disperse infinitely but must finally put up with being near one another; but 
originally no one had more right than another to be on a place on earth. (8:358)  
 
Thus, each person, and each nation qua collective of persons has a right to appear before 
others without being met by hostility, by virtue of their dignity, their freedom, their being 
counted as one. Kant goes on to describe the horror of the inhospitable behavior of 
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‘civilized’ Europeans to those in the Americas, black countries, etc.—behavior justified 
by an understanding that those inhabitants were no one. Pre-empting Martin Luther King, 
Jr.’s famous quote that “injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere,” Kant 
writes: “the violation of right on one place of earth is felt in all,” as humanity itself is 
undermined (8:360). Violence to any instantiation of humanity amounts to violence 
toward humanity as a whole. We will see what precisely Kant means by this in the next 
section.  
 In the Appendix to Perpetual Peace, Kant examines the relationship between 
morality and politics, claiming that it would be absurd to have established the moral law 
(as he already had), and then claim that acting from duty is impossible. As Kant writes, 
“Politics says, ‘Be ye wise as serpents’; morality adds (as a limiting condition) ‘and 
guileless as doves” (8:370). Kant not only thinks it is possible to actualize the moral law, 
but that true politics cannot proceed without paying homage to it (and the honesty it 
necessitates). The trouble, of course, is that the political moralist (distinct from the moral 
politician) pays homage to the (subjective) maxim: augment your power in whatever way 
you see fit. For Kant, the moral law—here cashed out as safeguarding the concept of 
right—always comes first, no matter the consequences. 
The universal right of human beings must be held sacred, however great a 
sacrifice this may cost the ruling power. The notion that peace can spring from war is 
what Kant calls the immoral doctrine of prudence, as it subordinates moral principles to 
the end, ineffectively putting the cart before the horse (8:376). Mirroring his remarks on 
the relationship between duty and happiness in the Groundwork and the Critique of 
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Practical Reason, Kant stresses that “all politics must bend its knee before right, but in 
return can hope to slowly reach the level where it will shine unfailingly” (8:380).6  
In addition to this, it is also important to underscore that, for Kant, justice requires 
that every claim to a right be publicly known, meaning that “all actions in relation to the 
rights of others are wrong if their maxim is incompatible with publicity” (8:386). This is 
to say that if one feels as though publicizing one’s actions in relation to the rights of 
others is incompatible with publicity (8:381)—that is, if one takes issue with honestly 
disclosing oneself before others—then this is an indication that the orientation is 
immoral, transgressing one’s duty to the others. Transparency is, therefore, essential to 
justice; and there is at least an implicit duty to voice that transparency in one’s dealings 
with others. It is precisely this form of concealment from the public that we find, for 
example, in cases of totalitarian regimes or among organizations being paid off by 
various interest groups, that reveals an explicit violation of universal human rights. If it 
were not a violation of right, what reason would these bodies have to conceal their 
principles of action?  
Kant’s meditations on what would be required for perpetual peace illuminates his 
dedication to constructing a moral meta-language (universal to any and every human 
being), grounded in pure practical reason (a feature that, for Kant, all human beings 
share), and cleansed of the empirical (all of the things that make each of us perceivably 
different from each other).  
																																																								
6 As he writes, “It can therefore be said, ‘Seek ye first the kingdom of pure practical reason and its justice, 
and your end (the blessing of perpetual peace) will come to you of itself’” (8:378).  
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With these motivations in mind, we can turn to a careful analysis of Kant’s pure 
moral philosophy, and the supreme moral principle that will ground-qua-define justice.7   
1.2 KANT’S MORAL PROJECT 
The will. Kant’s Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals infamously begins with the 
claim that it is impossible to conceive of anything—“in the world, or indeed even beyond 
it”—as good without qualification except a good will (4:393). As he writes:  
Intelligence, wit, judgment, and whatever talents of the mind one might want to name are 
doubtless in many respects good and desirable, as are such qualities of temperament as 
courage, resolution, perseverance. But they can also become extremely bad and harmful 
if the will, which is to make use of these gifts of nature and which in its special 
constitution is called character, is not good. The same holds with gifts of fortune; power, 
riches, honor, even health, and that complete well-being and contentment with one’s 
condition which is called happiness make for pride and often hereby even arrogance, 
unless there is a good will to correct their influence on the mind…Thus a good will seems 
to constitute the indispensable condition of being even worthy of happiness (4:393). 
 
This passage crucially frames everything that follows within and beyond the 
Groundwork, establishing the thrust of his entire moral project. For Kant, the will lies at 
the heart of any and every disposition or action—it is what births things into the world, 
effectively shaping the things we encounter. The will conditions who we are and what we 
do; it is what is expressed in the use of intelligence, judgment, wit, talents, power, riches, 
honor, health, and even happiness. Wit and riches in the hands of a sociopath is a nothing 
short of terrifying, just as the arrogance of someone who is accidentally famous, rich, and 
																																																								
7 It is important to note that given the scope of this project, I am not explicitly engaging Kant’s account of 
justice in The Metaphysic of Morals, which addresses how, specifically, we protect individual rights to 
freedom, i.e., constructing legislation that enforces the moral law, regardless of whether persons have moral 
‘intentions’. As mentioned in the introduction, my understanding of justice here is having a just disposition 
toward others by adhering to the moral law—that is, rational beings choosing to co-exist in a way that 
safeguards the ability of each member of humanity to self-determine among others, i.e., to be autonomous.  
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powerful is incredibly frustrating. If one’s will is not good, what proceeds from it can 
only be good accidently. As Kant stresses, the goodness of moral dispositions, e.g., calm 
deliberation, hinge on their essence: the will. The calm deliberation of a monk is a very 
different phenomenon than the calm deliberation of a student calculating how to steal the 
ideas of one of his peers and pass them off as his own.  
 A good will is, therefore, not good because of what it brings about, or because of 
the cleverness by which it is able to determine how to secure its desired end, but is good 
“only through its will, i.e., it is good in itself” (4:394). That is, it is good in its orientation. 
Kant points out that even if by its greatest efforts, the good will “should yet achieve 
nothing, and only the good will should remain,” it would shine like a jewel “by its own 
light as something which has its full value in itself” (4:394). To understand what Kant has 
in mind, one might think of the will of a well-known protagonist like Atticus Finch in To 
Kill a Mockingbird. After the jury wrongly finds Atticus’s client guilty of rape and 
assault (biased against him because of the color of his skin), all of Tom’s supporters in 
the back balcony of the courthouse stand up, in deep respect and admiration, as Atticus 
excites the courthouse. Though Atticus’s daughter is initially confused about why 
everyone is standing, given Atticus’s ostensible failure, she quickly realizes they are 
honoring Atticus’s will because it was good. This is a clear illustration of the good will—
intent on standing up against bigotry and hate—shining like a jewel, despite “failing” in 
its efforts.   
  After establishing the will as essential to uncovering the supreme principle of 
morality, Kant highlights the undeniable tension that exists in each and every human 
being—that is, the tension between reason, on the one hand, and happiness qua the 
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indeterminate sum total of our inclinations, on the other. Kant claims that it is because of 
this tension that people find themselves inclined to hate reason, as it often stops them 
from or, as a nagging burden, gets in the way of the fulfillment of their desires (4:395). 
“Desire” here denotes the securing of pleasure and the flight from pain (echoing Hume’s 
conception of human motivation). As Kant puts it, nature herself appears to have 
frustrated reason from the start, as reason alone is “not competent to guide the will 
toward the satisfaction of all our needs (which it in part even multiplies)” (4:396). 
Reason’s true practical function, by Kant’s account, is not to attempt to fulfill the sum 
total of our desires (as this is nothing short of impossible), nor to produce a mechanical 
will—masterful in its ability to successfully calculate the means required to certainly 
secure a whole host of ends (as this, too, is impossible)—but rather to yield a will that is 
good in itself.  
 But what is a will without reference to ends? Is not the very act of willing an act 
of end-setting? What is left when the will is stripped of its orientation toward things 
outside of itself, i.e., desired consequences? To further elucidate what the will is, and 
what makes it shine forth, Kant examines the “well-known” notion of duty (4:397); and it 
is here that we get the much-discussed four examples that illustrate the difference 
between acting in conformity with duty and acting from duty, e.g., giving to charity 
because it makes one feel good, because it is pleasurable, versus giving to charity because 
it is one’s duty. The moral motive is ultimately the latter (acting from duty), whereas the 
former is only accidentally moral (fulfilling a desire happens to align with duty). Integral 
for Kant is that in order for duty to be duty, one must be aware of the good one is 
doing—and why. Kant’s point here is not to suggest that the presence of a non-moral 
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motivation (pursuit of future pleasure, flight from future pain) undercuts the moral worth 
of an action. I think this is a problematic reading of Kant.8 His point is instead to suggest 
that it is much easier to understand the motive as moral when non-moral inclinations are 
not present, e.g., the moral worth of the cold-hearted philanthropist.  
A key take-away from this discussion is that only the acting agent can know 
whether or not an action is truly done from duty. And even then, as Kant points out, we 
are not completely transparent to ourselves:   
We flatter ourselves with the false claim to a more noble motive; but in fact we can 
never, even by the strictest examination, completely plumb the depths of the secret 
incentives of our actions. For when moral value is being considered, the concern is not 
with the actions, which are seen, but rather with their inner principles, which are not seen 
(4:407).  
 
That being said, the worth of the will is nonetheless contingent on the principle of 
volition (what determines it). And since duty is the necessity of acting from respect for 
the law, a good will is a will whose principle of volition is acting from respect for the 
law, rather than a hoped-for effect. It is a will standing before the law and concomitantly 
surrendering all desires qua sought-ends; it is a will surrendering all vestiges of self-
interest, self-conceit.  
The condition for the possibility of morality9 is, therefore, a good will. And a 
good will is a will that acts irrespective of potential consequences. It is a will that acts out 
of necessity from respect for the law. But what law? And in what sense is it necessary?  
																																																								
8 For a rich and illuminating account of the significance of these four examples in Section I of the 
Groundwork, and how consistency  (independent of circumstances) is the mark of moral worth, see Barbara 
Herman’s “On the Value of Acting From Duty,” in The Practice of Moral Judgment (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1996).  
9 And ultimately happiness, as Kant indicates in Section One of the Groundwork and more fully argues in 
the second Critique.  
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The categorical imperative. Kant demarcates three types of principles or 
imperatives that we issue to ourselves, depending on the context—only one of which 
providing the force of necessity that he is looking for. Unlike the rules of skill and the 
counsels of prudence, which are both hypothetical imperatives issued in the direction of 
actions seeking the conditions for desired ends/purposes beyond the action itself, a 
command of morality, the categorical imperative, is binding in its force, and the purpose 
of the action just is the action itself (4:416-17). It is crucial for Kant that the first two 
principles (problematic and assertoric hypothetical imperatives, respectively): 1) rely on 
sense data, and 2) help one bring about projected ends, ultimately rendering their 
outcomes unpredictable: things may or may turn out the way one hopes. In contrast, the 
commands of morality have nothing to do with the empirical, and involve necessity in the 
sense that the action necessarily “achieves” its purpose because the purpose is nothing 
other than the action itself. The “outcome” cannot be otherwise, as there is no other 
incentive beyond the purpose of the action itself: it is unconditioned, justified in itself. 
This is to say that acting from duty involves one’s will necessarily being fulfilled, as the 
“consequence” of the action is completely in one’s power qua the purpose of the action 
itself. The action is done for its own sake, not for the sake of something else—some 
projected future determination.  
‘Acting from duty’ denoting the exercise of an action that is completely within 
one’s power is, I think, the most helpful way of understanding what Kant means when he 
says that a failure to comply with the categorical imperative involving a contradiction of 
our own will, or a contradiction of reason (4:424). As he puts it, a contradiction in our 
own will holds that a “certain principle [is] objectively necessary as a universal law, and 
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yet subjectively [does] not hold universally but allow[s] exceptions” (4:424). This is to 
say that one’s objective principle of action (one should always do X) clashes with one’s 
subjective principle of action (but I do not really want to do X, so one should always do 
X, except for me in this case-here-now because I would prefer to secure Y). In other 
words, one willingly holds something to be true for everyone (presumably) including 
oneself, but simultaneously holds it to be false for oneself, thus rendering the principle 
self-defeating. Another way of understanding this is that when one acts without 
contradicting one’s own will, the will relies on itself—and nothing but itself—which 
means it can successfully determine itself without fail by completely fulfilling its 
intention because the intention is the purpose.10 The objective principle of action (the 
purpose) is harmoniously identified with one’s subjective principle of action (the 
intention), meaning that what one does is in fact what one should always do.  
To return to Kant’s motivations and his insistence on working within pure 
philosophy, distinct to the categorical imperative is that it is formal, rather than material, 
meaning that it does not rely on subjective ends, which, for Kant, are all empirical 
(material) byproducts of self-interest, i.e., self-interested desires we have to please 
ourselves in the future based on what we have experienced in the past or gained from 
sense data. “Formality” is what ultimately secures the universality Kant seeks, as 
formality abstracts from subjective interests based on taste. When we abstract the 
objective formula from which all cases of moral action spring—abstracting that which 
makes them moral by conceptually detaching it from the disparate interests that we find 
																																																								
10 I have Christine Korsgaard’s analysis of the various hypotheses on what Kant means by contradiction 
here in mind: “Kant’s Formula of Universal Law,” in Creating the Kingdom of Ends (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996).  
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among human beings—what remains is objective, ‘unchanging,’ i.e., the definition or 
form of morality under which all instances of morality fall. The formal dimension of the 
moral law marks the essence of morality—that which makes a moral action what it is—
which, practically speaking, if employed, will necessarily yield moral results, ultimately 
freeing the will from the turmoil that comes with contradiction.  
For Kant, the three forms of the categorical imperative—1) the formula of the 
universal law, 2) the formula of humanity, and 3) the formula of autonomy/the kingdom 
of ends—are three different ways of expressing the same thing; however, the formula of 
humanity is unique in the sense that it is the ‘material’ expression of the categorical 
imperative, which means that it includes content (an end), albeit an end that is non-
empirical, free from contingent, conditioned, subjective purposes.  
Humanity and autonomy. After Kant establishes the first articulation of the 
categorical imperative (4:421), and the four duties that follow (4:422-24), he asks 
whether there is “something whose existence has in itself an absolute worth, something 
which as an end in itself could be a ground of determinate laws. In it, and in it alone, 
would there be the ground of a possible categorical imperative” (4:428).  
In response, Kant states that each rational being “exists as an end in himself and 
not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will” (4:428). Rational beings 
(or persons), unlike things, are objective, unconditioned ends in themselves—and as 
expressions of rationality are, therefore, objects of respect. Kant defines the infinite 
reiterations of the moral law (in persons) as rational nature or “humanity,” each 
“member” is an end-setting end in itself. Or in other words, each member is a free 
creator, capable of bringing new (words and deeds) into the world; for Kant, to set an end 
	 26	
is to bring something about, and this ability is what constitutes our dignity. Crucial for 
Kant, however, is that humanity is (puzzlingly) not something we encounter qua 
empirical object in the world, but is rather the ‘species’ or type that any and every human 
being participates in, insofar as they are rational. It is something that we share and 
understand qua participants in it; each (rational) human being is an instantiation of 
humanity, a dignity, albeit not humanity itself. Humanity itself is, empirically speaking, 
‘invisible’. 
For Kant, humanity is synonymous with the moral community (all the others who 
are like oneself). And humanity is perhaps best understood as the creative capacity each 
of us has qua rational being; “the moral community” serving as a way of expressing the 
infinite number of individual creators who participate in the capacity to create in word 
and deed: autonomy.  
The content of the moral law (humanity), then, is nothing other than re-iterations 
of the law itself, which is to say that the end that the moral law seeks to secure is simply 
itself. Or put differently, the end that the moral law seeks to secure is its continued 
existence—the continued existence of free creation. Upon defining humanity as the 
unconditioned end that the moral laws seeks to preserve, Kant develops the most 
captivating articulation of the categorical imperative: act in such a way that you treat 
humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same 
time as an end and never simply as a means (4:429). Kant understands the principle of 
humanity as the “supreme limiting condition of every man’s freedom of action” 
(4:431)—because it commands that we allow ourselves and other end-setters to continue 
determining, legislating, and authoring themselves. It commands, pulls us toward, justice.  
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Moral worth, therefore, derives from the capacity to be autonomous—that is, the 
capacity to simultaneously give and be subject to the moral law (as well as the alignment 
of motive-intention with action), which can be understood as allowing both oneself and 
others to autonomously bring new things into the world. This is distinct from passively 
subjecting oneself to laws outside of oneself, i.e., doctrines that bind the will from 
without (e.g., obeying rules from a religious creed, the hope of desirable 
consequences/eventual happiness), as this inevitably stifles one’s ability to act freely, 
thus limiting one to simply re-acting to what is understood and accepted as law outside of 
oneself. Vital for Kant is that as far as morality goes, a human will cannot be 
subordinated to—or as Kant understands it, enslaved by—the will of another. Immorality 
(resulting from the heteronomy of the will) is precisely the subjugation of another’s will, 
or allowing one’s own will to be subjugated by another. Morality is being bound by 
nothing other than oneself (autonomy of the will), albeit oneself qua member of the 
moral community, or what he later calls the kingdom of ends. To choose autonomy is to 
thus choose to concomitantly understand oneself as determined by others, albeit not in the 
sense of obeying their wills, but in the sense of understanding oneself as necessarily in 
relation to them, co-existing and acting in a world with them, co-existing with others like 
oneself. By Kant’s account, what ought to be protected and preserved, then, is the ability 
of each member of humanity to self-determine among others. This is the condition for the 
possibility of a just society.  
Although Kantian morality is often criticized for its homogeneity—grounded in 
an understanding of the moral community that lacks multiplicity, as it sweeps individual 
differences into sameness, reducing everyone to interchangeable rational beings—this 
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charge moves too hastily. For instance, by Paul Ricoeur’s account (in the Eight Study of 
Oneself as Another), a shortcoming in Kant’s strict moral framework is the favoring of 
universality (humanity) over singularity (infinite plurality). Although plurality is implicit 
in the second formulation of Kant’s categorical imperative, it is not explicitly thematized. 
As Ricoeur I think rightly stresses, this is precisely where the inadequacy of an 
ahistorical, decontextualized moral norm of the Kantian or Rawlsian breed—inevitably 
(and tragically) conflicting with other moral norms—requires what Ricoeur calls critical 
phronesis: a practical wisdom that consists in “giving priority to the respect for persons, 
in the name of the solicitude that is addressed to persons in their irreplaceable 
singularity,” effectively shifting from the realm of right and wrong, to the perhaps more 
human realm of better and worse (or worse and even worse) (OA, 262).11  
What I want to stress is that the ‘sameness’ that Kant is sweeping all of us into, 
insofar as we are rational beings, is the power to bring things about: potency qua self-
motion. This is to say that my worth is precisely the same as the worth of every other in 
the sense that we are all equal in our power to determine ourselves, equal in the 
possibility of autonomy (if we so choose it), equal in the power to bring things about, to 
act—‘limited’ only in the sense that we share the world with others. This limitation need 
not be seen as an infringement on one’s existence, but instead a fact—a fact that does 
mean we will likely encounter infringements on our individual pursuits of happiness qua 
																																																								
11 For Ricoeur (as I will more fully fleshed out in Chapter 5), critical phronesis involves the recognition of 
both oneself and the other as simultaneously capable (agent) and vulnerable (patient), never forsaking the 
ethical and moral bottom line of care and respect for the other in their radical singularity. Beyond this, 
critical phronesis involves the hermeneutic shift away from ahistoricity to something more like 
contextualism, which acknowledges, considers, and appropriates the “historical and communitarian 
contexts” of the realization of moral norms (OA, 274). As Ricoeur writes, “It is through public debate, 
friendly discussion, and shared convictions that moral judgment in situation is formed” (OA, 290-1, 
emphasis added). 
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the sum total of our inclinations. Anyone who has siblings or an enormous family learns 
precisely what Kant means early on in life. You do not have license to do anything any 
everything you please; you have to work with others. From day one, you share a home, 
space, and time with other people. They might ‘get in your way’, but only insofar as one 
understands it that way. Making room for others early on in life makes this fact crystal 
clear—family relations do not impose limits on the freedom of action, but rather a re-
prioritization of action with others in mind.12  
The fact of reason, respect, and the trouble with consequence-oriented action. 
This notion of sharing the world with others is, I think, a fruitful way of understanding 
what Kant later calls the “fact of reason” in the Critique of Practical Reason (5:31). 
Because Kant decides that a deduction (providing a justification of objectivity and 
universal validity) of the moral law will not work in the way he hoped it would in the 
Groundwork, he changes his strategy and instead illustrates what it is to (non-
empirically) cognize the moral law.13  
As Kant portrays it, practical reason inevitably hits a crossroads in which it can 
either do something in pursuit of satisfying a particular inclination, or it can act from 
duty, and thus do something for its own sake. The “fact of reason” is Kant’s way of 
denoting what it is to experience the tension between acting from duty and acting from 
																																																								
12 I am grateful to my friend and colleague, Samantha Fazekas, for suggesting this as a way of describing 
the phenomenon.  
13 Because practical reason does not involve describing reality (as is the case with speculative reason in the 
First Critique), but determining it, Kant finds it more effective to start with a priori principles. Pure 
practical reason “proves its reality and that of its concepts by what it does,” thus giving us insight into the 
(a priori) idea of freedom (5:3). Further paraphrasing Kant in the Preface to the second Critique: with 
speculative reason, we had to begin with the senses and end with principles, but will proceed in the reverse 
order with practical reason, because we are considering reason in relation to the will (and its causality). 
Here (in the process of the critique of practical reason), the law of causality from freedom—that is, from 
our practical rational principle—constitutes the unavoidable beginning and determines the objects to which 
alone it can be referred (5:5-14).  
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inclination—recognizing that one can (and should) obey the moral law for its own sake. 
Another way of thinking about what Kant means by the fact of reason is that the call of 
duty is an incontestable fact. It is recognizing that doing the right thing will sometimes, 
or at least initially, be at the price of an end that we are inclined toward. To relate this to 
recognizing that we share the world with others, the fact of reason reveals that acting 
from duty is understanding oneself as a part of a community. That is, recognizing that 
existence is not just mine, but ours. My self-interested pursuits are disrupted, so to 
speak, by the possibility of acting from duty qua understanding myself as a part of the 
moral community—a moral community that is to be respected and preserved for its own 
sake; a moral community that is given not to the senses, but as a fact of reason to itself.  
In the second Critique, Kant provides a phenomenological account of 
‘encountering’ humanity—that is, experiencing the fact of reason qua the possibility of 
acting from duty—by describing what he calls the “incentive” of pure practical reason. 
This account should be understood as a phenomenological account of the desire to act 
from duty, albeit a form of desire that is distinct from an inclination to move toward a 
given end (i.e., a desire pertaining to our rational nature, rather than our human nature). 
Kant begins his account by asking in what sense (if any) the moral law becomes an 
incentive, i.e., a subjective determining ground for the will, especially if it cannot be 
empirical, since we do not encounter humanity in experience. Kant stresses that the only 
way to understand a non-empirical incentive like this is by investigating its effects, rather 
than that which it supplies itself, as this would be impossible because it (the moral law) 
is, empirically speaking, nowhere to be found (5:72).  
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While one might understand Kant’s depiction of respect as fear-induced 
humiliation,14  it is important to keep in mind that this is only one aspect of the 
phenomenon. The humiliating dimension is specific to self-conceit. What is humbled is 
the ego qua me-on-my-pursuit-of-happiness. And in that humility, the ego is provoked to, 
as Kant puts it, pay tribute, to offer gratitude, which denotes relinquishing the pride that 
comes with projecting consequences and believing that those projections are determinate. 
There is, without question, fear involved in encountering that which has no determined 
empirical correlate, i.e., the unknown, and when at the crossroads of decision, one truly 
does not know what will happen once one acts, as there is no end in sight other than 
acting from duty. Important for Kant is that when we react to our fear of the unknown 
with resistance, we run the risk of constructing seemingly determined consequences that, 
in reality, may or may not happen. Reacting to the fear of the unknown by resisting it, 
relying on projected consequences misses the exalting aspect of respect: the joy that 
comes with letting go of projections and recognizing that we cannot know with certainty 
the consequences of our actions. The contingency involved in hypothetical imperatives 
necessarily rests on probability. And while probability can be a pragmatic guide, Kant’s 
reminder is that, in the end, we really do not know how things will unfold—and being 
honest about this fact is empowering, as it provides a window of insight into what we can 
and cannot know, what is and is not in our power.  
The effect of encountering the moral law simultaneously involves pain and 
exaltation. The painful aspect is “striking down” self-conceit, which can be understood as 
																																																								
14 For an innovative phenomenological account of moral sensibility in Kant, especially the exalting 
dimension of experiencing the moral law, see Owen Wares, “Kant on Moral Sensibility and Moral 
Motivation,” Journal of the History of Philosophy Vol. 52, no. 4  (Oct. 2014): 727-746. Wares’ account is 
comprehensive and has without question influenced by own interpretation.  
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experiencing an infringement on “self-love” qua pursuing one’s projected self-interests. 
Affectively, one is humbled, humiliated in recognizing the prospect of ignoring one’s 
duty to the other, i.e., turning one’s back on the other. The positive aspect, respect, 
involves self-esteem—recognizing that the instantiation of the power of the moral law in 
another is a mirror of the power of the moral law in oneself. One witnesses humanity in 
the sense of understanding oneself as the others, and thus wanting to protect autonomy in 
both the other and oneself—and ultimately in all of the moral community’s constituents. 
While Kant describes this affect in a way that leads one to understand it as looking up at 
the law-on-high, it is perhaps better to understand this affective phenomenon as 
experiencing an immediate shift from one mode of understanding oneself to another—
that is, a shift from understanding oneself as an individual on the relentless pursuit of 
happiness to an individual understanding oneself as one among others in the moral 
collective, ready and willing to let go of one’s agenda of happiness so as to protect and 
preserve the free activity of the whole. Crucial for Kant is that the movement to act from 
duty, ultimately provoked by respect, is not the diminishment of activity, but a transfer of 
activity, as certain hindrances to self-esteem (barriers to understanding oneself as, first 
and foremost, a member of humanity) are removed, and one can act in and through a new 
understanding of oneself as one-with-the-others.  
The incentive of practical reason is, as Kant puts it, a “springing” that has no 
material object. Rather than a desire to pursue an end—that is, some thing, spatially or 
temporally outside of oneself—it is a desire to “let be,” “be-with,” and, most importantly, 
“be free.” As Kant writes in the Groundwork:  
For the pure thought of duty and the moral law generally, unmixed with any extraneous 
addition of empirical inducements, has by way of reason alone (which first becomes 
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aware hereby that it can of itself be practical) an influence on the human heart so much 
more powerful than all other incentives which may be derived from the empirical field 
that reason in the consciousness of its dignity despises such incentives and is able 
gradually to become their master (4:411).  
 
Thus, for Kant, there is a moral-rational desire that mirrors inclination, but is distinct in 
the sense that it has no object (for inclinations always have desired-objects), which means 
that it does not spring from attempting to satisfy a lack. It does not seek any thing in 
particular, but is instead an elevation, fulfillment, inspiration, and movement provoked by 
something it cannot grasp or perceive. This desire evokes humility, commanding reason 
to respect both the freedom-dignity of the other and the freedom-dignity of oneself.  
Beyond this, it seems clear that the desire for the moral law (humanity, dignity, 
the moral community, our creative capacity, justice) is Kant’s way of describing our 
desire to be free, to actualize our creative capacity. Although, by Kant’s account, we 
cannot prove how freedom is possible, we also cannot help but understand ourselves as 
(practically) free. And in the end, freedom is what we desire: it has an influence on the 
human heart so much more powerful than all other incentives, which may be derived 
from the empirical field. Reason in the consciousness of its dignity despises such 
incentives and is able gradually to become their master. In the end, we do not want to be 
slaves to inclination/the will of others; and, returning to his remarks in Perpetual Peace, 
to enslave another is to enslave humanity—including oneself, despite oneself. We want to 
be able to act, to be free, which necessarily involves wanting the condition for the 
possibility to act: that is, freedom, the moral law, justice.  
Crucial to Kant’s account is that respect does not ground the moral law, but is the 
affect that arises upon encountering the moral law, i.e., standing at the crossroads of the 
fact of reason. For Kant, respect ought be likened to admiration—the awe and amazement 
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one feels at the foot of a mountain, at the swiftness of an animal, or at the magnitude, 
distance, and number of the heavenly bodies (5:77). When we feel respect, our spirit 
bows in gratitude for the human being before us. Respect is not an effect of some quality 
we empirically perceive in another, but is our recognition of them as a unique end-setter: 
a distinct freedom that, like you, desires to be free. As Kant writes, respecting the law in 
another is self-approbation. Despite the moral law striking down self-conceit, respect 
reveals the harmony between self-esteem and care for the other, eliminating the conflict 
between self-interest and the interest of the moral community, as these two are in 
harmony when one lets ego’s pride go—recognizing that the other as end-setter and the 
consequences of one’s actions are out of one’s control; and that what is in one’s control is 
acting from duty, obeying the moral law. Specifically, obeying the moral law means to 
give in to our desire to be free without inhibition, which entails our desire for the others 
to be free, too: our desire for justice.  
 As Kant stresses, morality is made possible through freedom—that is, by 
choosing, when face-to-face with the fact of reason, to act from duty, which is to act for 
justice. In Kant’s account, the defining feature of morality (acting from duty) is always in 
our power. As Kant stresses, despite the fact that falling in love with another is not in our 
power, practically loving another qua respecting humanity is. The choice to fulfill our 
obligation to humanity is always in our hands, and when encountering the moral law 
within another, the fact of reason never fails to deliver an occasion to act from duty, 
insofar as we are willing to honestly face it, and not shirk away in fear. This is to say that 
we can always choose to obey the moral law instead of binding our wills to something 
external, heteronomous—be it a material object, or projected consequences, etc. And 
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insofar as we choose to act from duty, we will necessarily fulfill our desire for justice, 
because to act from duty is to be just, thus actualizing justice. The precepts or counsels of 
prudence merely advise what might (hypothetically) result from proceeding a certain 
way, whereas the command of reason necessarily and absolutely delivers, as the defining 
feature of a law; mirroring the notion of natural law that we find in physics, namely, that 
the cause is bound to its effect as its effect. Though the two aspects (cause and effect) are 
distinct, they express the same content. On this, Kant writes:  
It is always in everyone’s power to satisfy the commands of reason, the categorical 
command of morality; this is seldom possible with respect to the empirically conditioned 
precept of happiness, and it is far from being possible, even in respect to a single purpose, 
for everyone. The reason is that in the former it is only a question of the maxim, which 
must be genuine and pure, but in the latter it is also a question of capacity and physical 
ability to realize a desired object. A command that everyone should seek to make himself 
happy would be foolish, for no one commands another to do what he already invariably 
wishes to do. One must only prescribe to him the rules for achieving his goal, or, better, 
provide him with the means, for he is not able to do all that he wants to do … regarding 
the means of obeying [the moral] law, there is no need to teach them, for in this respect 
whatever he will to do he also can do (4:37). 
 
Thus, to fulfill the moral law is to find plentitude in reality as it is, rather than in a 
projected object that may or may not come about. What is in our power, by Kant’s 
account, is protecting the moral community—acting in such a way that we treat all of the 
others as ends in themselves, rather than as mere means. Navigating moral experience in 
this way secures justice qua rational beings harmoniously existing in relation to each 
other by unifying ourselves with different rational beings through our common desire: the 
desire to be free to exercise and actualize our creative capacity; or put differently, the 
desire for humanity to be what it is.  
With this comes another understanding of what Kant might have in mind in his 
insistence on the universal necessity of the moral law. Insofar as human beings fail to 
respect humanity (e.g., insisting on war, fulfilling the desire to dominate others via 
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marginalization and discrimination), the perpetual existence of humanity is not promised; 
which is to say that the categorical imperative seeks to protect humanity—the moral 
community—and that the moral community is the condition for the possibility of human 
existence. In other words, the categorical imperative is necessary for the continuation of 
mankind.15  
1.3 WHO IS THE KANTIAN SELF? 
Kant provides an explicit answer to who the self is, stressing that the human being is a 
will between worlds: a will caught between two ways of understanding itself in the 
world. In Section III of the Groundwork, Kant explains (in a particularly Platonic 
moment) that as a rational being, man belongs to the a-temporal intelligible world 
(humanity, a member of the moral community/kingdom of ends), but as a human being, 
man belongs to the spatio-temporal sensible world—"enslaved” to the ebb and flow of 
efficient causality (as a machine among other machines, subjected to the laws of nature) 
(4:453). To identify with, or understand oneself as a part of, the intelligible world—
denoting our rational nature—is to choose freedom. “Choose” is the key word here, as 
rational choice (versus merely being pulled by nature-inclination, the way an animal 
would be), for Kant, constitutes the most essential feature of being the type of beings we 
are. To be “between worlds,” then, is to dwell in a mode of existence that requires 
																																																								
15 To understand what Kant might have in mind with this, it is helpful here to consider the all-too-real 
dystopia depicted in Stanley Kubrick’s “Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the 
Bomb.” It is also helpful to consider the ecological crisis in which we find ourselves. 
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deliberation and choice in the sense that one can always choose to be otherwise than the 
ebb and flow of efficient causality, i.e., where human nature drags us.  
Given our ever-present sense of time qua a priori intuition, inner sense (time 
constituting a condition for the possibility of experiencing appearances, succession and 
simultaneity, alteration and motion), is a mode of existing that involves reflecting on 
projected consequences in relation to past occurrences, conferring reasons for proceeding 
in one way or another, and issuing imperatives. Discursive reasoning is itself an activity 
that occurs over time. To be “between worlds” denotes a mode of being that is not fixed, 
determined, or complete, but rather a mode of being that is always on the way, becoming, 
actualizing oneself in one way or another. It is important to point out that the fact that we 
exist in a mode of being that is never fixed is why the categorical imperative is a 
synthetic a priori judgment, rather than an analytic a priori judgment. The will and the 
moral law are not synonymous. For Kant, insofar as the will chooses to determine itself 
without reference to anything outside of itself, it remains a priori. Insofar as the will 
subjects itself to anything other than itself (that is, what is empirical), it forfeits its purity, 
activating synthetic a posteriori judgments, which are necessarily hypothetical, as their 
content involves what is outside of one’s power: what may or may not take place in the 
future, given certain conditions. The moral law assumes freedom because, practically 
speaking, the reflective experience of projected possibilities necessitates deliberation and 
choice—or, at the very least, the choice to not deliberate about one’s choice. 
 Kant fleshes out this understanding of freedom qua choice (the byproduct of our 
standing between worlds) most explicitly in the “Critical Elucidation of the Analytic of 
Practical Reason” in the second Critique. Kant mentions in the Preface that “freedom is 
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the stumbling block of all empiricists, but also key to the most sublime practical 
principles for all critical moralists, who see, through it, that they must proceed rationally” 
(5:8). The beginning of his proof for freedom’s compatibility with determinism runs as 
follows:  
1. Causality as a natural necessity (as distinguished from the concept of causality as 
freedom) concerns only the existence of things insofar as they are determinable in 
time.  
2. If one takes the determinations of the existence of things in time for determinations 
of things in themselves (which is the most usual way of representing them), then the 
necessity in the causal relation can in no way be united with freedom; instead they 
are opposed to each other as contradictory.  
3. For an action to be freely performed it must be in my control; that is, it must not be 
necessarily determined by a state that has just come before it that is outside my 
control.  
4. For things determinable in time, every event and every action that takes place is 
necessary under the conditions of what preceded it.  
5. Time past is no longer in my control.  
6. Therefore, every action that takes place in time in necessary under the condition of 
something that is not in my control. That is, every action I perform must be 
necessary by a determining ground that is not within my control.  
7. Therefore, I do not freely perform any actions in time—I am never free at the point 
of time in which I act … For at every point of time I still stand under the necessity of 
being determined to action by that which is not within my control, and the series of 
events infinite a parte priori which I can only continue in accordance with a 
predetermined order would never begin of itself: it would be a continuous natural 
chain, and therefore my causality would never be freedom (5:94-5).  
 
To save freedom, Kant unsurprisingly appeals to his doctrine of transcendental idealism 
(5:95).16 Rather than attempting to squeeze freedom into things determined in space and 
time by natural necessity (two concepts that are “mutually repellent”), freedom can be 
warranted (quid juris) as ascribed to “things in themselves.”17 If we consider phenomena 
																																																								
16 As Kant defines it in the Critique of Pure Reason: “I understand by the doctrine of transcendental 
idealism of all appearances the doctrine that [appearances] are all together to be regarded as mere 
representations and not as things in themselves” (A369). 
17 It is important to make a quick note here on Kant’s terminology. The thing itself is distinct from, though 
closely related to, noumena. Noumena are intelligible objects, or “beings of understanding” (B306). Their 
contrary, phenomena, are “beings of sense,” or appearances (B306). Defined as such, the concept of a 
noumenon does not correlate to any object of experience, rendering it logically possible, but void of 
sensory content, i.e., spatial and temporal content.  Kant further distinguishes between noumena in the 
positive sense and noumena in negative sense: this distinction is crucial because he stresses that 
theoretically we are limited to consideration, and use of, the latter. In the positive sense, a noumenon is 
reminiscent of Plato’s intelligible essences, depicting an “intellectual” intuition – the indeterminate content 
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as appearances, there is no freedom; everything is bound by causal necessity. But if we 
consider things in themselves (and our lack of access to them, i.e., our lack of access to a 
God’s eye view), it is possible to ascribe freedom. Thus, when considered as a member of 
the intellectual world, the self decides with nothing before it, there is no antecedent 
choice. That is, when considered noumenally, we can say that a given choice was not 
determined by what came before it because nothing came before it; a “noumenon” is 
precisely non-spatial and non-temporal: there is no before and after, no succession. When 
considering oneself as a thing in itself, one “views his existence insofar as it does not 
stand under conditions of time and himself as determinable only through laws that he 
gives himself by reason; and in this existence of his nothing is, for him, antecedent to the 
determination of his will, but every action” (5:98). And in the end, Kant thinks that, 
practically speaking, this is precisely how we can and do understand ourselves: as 
immanently free (5:105). Though we cannot explain freedom theoretically, we experience 
freedom’s possibility at every moment of decision—decision being an ineluctable feature 
of our existence.  
Therefore, by Kant’s account, in order for freedom to be freedom—that is, for 
freedom to be free from natural, causal necessity and preserved as absolute spontaneity—
it cannot be bound by or subject to time. This means that in every moment of decision, 
the self leaps into something undetermined, unpredictable, new. And that leap involves, at 
																																																																																																																																																																					
of which requires a non-human use of the understanding (B307-8). A noumemon in the negative sense is “a 
thing insofar as it is not an object of our sensible intuition, because we abstract it from the manner of our 
intuition of it” (B307). It represents a philosophical problem, as it limits “the pretension of sensibility” 
(B311). It marks thinkable terrain that, by definition, lacks real intuitive content, chiefly serving as a 
boundary concept (A287/B344). The concept of a thing in itself would be considered noumenal in the 
negative sense: uncognizable and problematic, though not entirely meaningless. Kant metaphorically 
expresses noumena as members of the “world of understanding,” housed in the conceptual (versus sensory) 
stem of our cognition (B311).  
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least in some sense, a suspension of time. Or put differently, it involves a lack of 
consciousness of the future’s successive relation to the past—undetermined by what 
occurred before.  
It is helpful to think of Kierkegaard’s conception of the self here. For 
Kierkegaard, we are a synthesis of what is infinite/indeterminate and what is 
finite/determined, and are defined by the way in which we relate to the relation between 
those two “poles.”18 Being juxtaposed between finitude (causal necessity, the sensible 
world) and infinitude (possibility, the intelligible world) is what fuels the experience of 
being able. At the moment of decision, one is not necessarily bound to anything that 
happened before, and, if one is honest with oneself, one has no idea of what will come 
after. At the moment of decision, one can choose to be otherwise than self-interested, or 
one can of course choose to bind oneself to the past and the future by projecting what will 
likely come after (based on the past). At the moment of decision, therefore, one can either 
keep one’s feet firmly planted on the ground, standing with conviction beside their 
projection of what will likely happen if one were to do X instead of Y, or one can 
surrender to the fact that one does not know what will happen: earnestly holding fast to 
the moral law, humbly accepting that the only thing we truly have control over is our 
will, our intention.  
Crucial for Kant, as is the case for Kierkegaard (despite his critique of the 
Kantian-Hegelian ethical mode of being), is that freedom does not know the 
consequences. And who we are when we are honest with ourselves are freedoms who 
know not what we do in the sense that we do not and cannot know the chain of effects 
																																																								
18 Here I have in mind Anti-Climacus’s notoriously difficult description of the self at the beginning of 
Kierkegaard’s The Sickness Unto Death (SUD, 14).  
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that will flow from what we put into the world, no matter how likely certain outcomes 
are.19 Life constantly humbles us with shocking, surprisingly, unpredictable outcomes, 
comprised of things that we could not have imagined because they have not happened 
before. They are new. And here we arrive at Kant’s notion of morality as that which 
involves the cessation of calculation; the ground for morality involves hospitality (rather 
than hostility) toward what is new—hospitality to the disruption of projected or 
calculated consequences for oneself, the interruption of hypothetical imperatives. As we 
will see in Chapter 4, this is an essential insight that will be clarified and expounded on in 
Levinas’s ethical-metaphysics, which is, above all, sensitive to and insistent on 
hospitality.  
Vital to Kant’s account is that the past and the future do not define us—at least 
not completely. Although memory lends itself to certain expectations, we can always, at 
any moment, choose to act otherwise: that is, choose to undermine projections and 
expectations, and, most importantly for Kant, choose not to fall prey to our self-interested 
inclinations. To be autonomous is to identify with the sublimity of our supersensible 
existence—to embrace our participation in humanity’s divinity (5:87-8). For Kant, 
acquiring personality, personhood, is choosing freedom in the sense of freeing ourselves 
from the “machinery of nature” by elevating ourselves from the sensible world. To be 
unmoved movers is to be able to bring new things into the world, and to not be governed 
by future projections based on what has happened in the past—that is, to not be governed 
by hostility toward what is new, chained to expectation, anticipation.  
																																																								
19 This point is underscored beautifully by Hannah Arendt in The Human Condition in Part IV on Action, in 
which she explicitly pays homage to Kant’s notion of freedom, recast as natality.  
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Considering Kant’s socio-historic context, it is not surprising that he wants to 
preserve a space for innovation, creativity, and progress—all of which, for him, are 
necessarily secured by freedom’s possibility. In “What is Enlightenment?” Kant 
famously cries for mankind to awaken from its self-incurred immaturity: to dare to know, 
and to have the courage to use our understanding. Kant wants humanity to release itself 
from the shackles of religious dogma (religious devotees as paradigmatic instances of 
what he means by heteronomy of the will), to not be afraid of shadows, and to think 
freely, so as to bring about new phenomena, new discoveries, new modes of being—like 
that of a just society, or international perpetual peace.  
It is ultimately in this rendering of freedom in the second Critique that we find 
another response to the “superficiality” of empiricism (5:94), which for Kant inevitably 
gets no further than a notion of freedom in which one’s freedom is that of a “turnspit, 
which, when once it is wound up, also accomplishes its movements of itself” (5:97). Kant 
is determined not to reduce human beings to the predictability we find in physics, but 
wants to safeguard our capacity to act otherwise than predictions based on behavioral 
analysis (which, by his account, all point to a sort of pseudo-hedonistic self-interest). 
Through this understanding of ourselves as between worlds, Kant stresses that we could 
“calculate a human being’s conduct for the future with as much certainty as a lunar or 
solar eclipse and could nevertheless maintain that the human being’s conduct is free” 
(5:99).  
To support this position, Kant describes the phenomenon of holding those who 
were not fortunate in their childhood education and grow up to be “villains” accountable 
for their “wickedness” (5:100). This, he claims, is something that we do, and is a 
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testimony of the fact that they are responsible for their decisions, regardless of their 
context. While this view might seem callous, the flip side of the phenomenon is that these 
children can change. They can be otherwise. Although, for Kant, they cannot eliminate 
the guilt they have for wicked past deeds, they can re-construct their character. By virtue 
of freedom’s possibility, nobody is bound to any behavioral fate or psychology, 
regardless of how solidified their habits may seem. We can and should expect to be 
surprised both by others and ourselves, and we should not categorize anyone into a box 
from which they cannot escape, as this would ignore the will’s capacity to shift its 
orientation, to determine itself anew, i.e., the capacity to act as opposed to merely 
reacting to empirical stimuli/a given socio-economic context. Mirroring the way in which 
Kant describes societies, each human being has its own roots qua individual dignity, and 
insofar as that creative capacity is protected, the possibility to grow into a noble oak is 
preserved. Like societies, human dignities are not to be imperialized, and others should 
not meddle with their constitution, especially because, in the end, the essence of each of 
our respective constitutions is the same: the desire for the moral law, which amounts to 
the desire for justice, as described above.  
It is worth returning to the notion of hospitality that we find in Perpetual Peace; 
each person by virtue of their freedom has a right to appear before others without being 
met by hostility. To hospitably allow one to appear in their dignity, in their individuality, 
is to recognize them as a bearer of the moral law—that is, to recognize them as similar to 
oneself, despite their difference. To allow one to appear in their dignity is to let them be 
in their autonomy, rather than shaping them into what one wants them to be. The same 
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goes for oneself. To be autonomously is to appear as you are, rather than the way the 
others want you to be.  
The authentic Kantian self is, therefore, a self that lets others appear as they are, 
and honestly appears before others. To warrant appearance in this way is to safeguard 
each freedom’s voice. And vital for Kant is each dignity as having a voice, contributing 
to the conversation, as conversation is the road to growth and peace—again, this is a 
point that will be underscored and clarified in Levinas. As he puts it in his Lectures on 
Ethics:  
Social intercourse is in itself a cultivator of virtue and a preparation for its surer practice 
... The exchange of our sentiments is the principle factor of social intercourse, and truth 
must be the guiding principle herein. Without truth social intercourse and conversation 
become valueless. We can only know what a man thinks if he tells us his thought, and 
when he understands to express them he must really do so, or else there can be no society 
of men. Fellowship is only the second condition of society, and a liar destroys fellowship. 
Lying makes it impossible to derive any benefit in conversation (198-224). 
 
Thus, in a Rousseauian moment, Kant stresses that the proclivity to be reserved spawns 
from a desire to conceal one’s faults and shortcomings (224)—pretending to be otherwise 
so that others will understand her to have virtues that she does not in fact have, ultimately 
to gain more, for her own sake. As Rousseau puts out in his Discourse on Inequality, the 
trouble with dishonesty is its fracturing of the subject: it emerges from the reflective 
distinction made between what one is and how one appears—the former causing the 
latter, like a puppeteer causing movement in a marionette. This objectification of oneself 
inevitably leads to the fostering of instrumental habits: working hard to secure certain 
perceptions of oneself to others, so as to obtain certain objectives. In honesty, the self is 
not spliced, but appears, as it is, without a causal relation between being and perceived 
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being. Justice requires honesty, which in turn requires a suspension of calculation, a 
disruption of predictable patterns.  
To further understand the Kantian self as a self between worlds, it is important to 
revisit Kant’s point regarding violations of the categorical imperative as inducing a 
“contradiction of reason.” Again, I think the best way to interpret this is as a self-
contradiction, or better, an existential contradiction: experiencing the incentive of 
practical reason to act from duty, the desire for justice, in tension with the desire to 
satisfy self-conceit, the inclination to actualize hypothetical states of affairs.  In 
Kierkegaard, this experience, the tension of human existence, manifests itself as anxiety. 
This marks the experience of the possibility of letting go of what is not in one’s control 
(outcomes in the future) juxtaposed with a desire to act in way that will lead to ideal or 
pleasant anticipated consequences. In his Lectures on Ethics, Kant describes this 
perceived tension as that between the two motives to action in man: “the one—self-
love—is derived from himself, and the other—the love of humanity—is derived from 
others and is the moral motive” (200). He continues, “if the purposes of self-love did not 
demand our attention, we would love the other and promote their happiness” (201). Kant 
stresses that the unity and harmony of our mental powers can, at times, feel like a pursuit 
to gain victory over oneself, but it is far better not to need to gain victory over 
ourselves—far better to not be at war (144-4). For Kant, it is ultimately morality that is 
the condition for the possibility of overcoming war. Again, the moral law is the condition 
for the possibility of justice qua actualization of justice.  
To more concretely flesh out the existential contradiction that Kant has in mind, it 
is helpful to consider, for instance, a situation in which you are no longer in love with 
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your significant other, and they ask you if you are, in fact, still in love with them. In this 
situation you can choose to be honest with them about your feelings, assuming that this 
will likely lead to pain and suffering for both yourself and the other, or you can choose to 
lie to them, manipulating them by telling them you still love them, sugarcoating your 
feelings. The fact of reason thus provides you with the opportunity to act from duty: to 
either be honest with the other and free them (and yourself) from existing in a distorted 
version of reality, or to avoid pain and suffering as much as possible by keeping them in 
the dark, and proceeding as though nothing is wrong. With the incentive of practical 
reason in mind, it is of course terrifying to honor their autonomy and yours because of 
the uncertainty of what will happen next. (They might get angry, they might threaten to 
hurt themselves, they might hate you, etc.). At the same time, the impulse to be honest is 
a testimony of our desire for both ourselves and the other to be free: to give them the 
freedom to respond based on an accurate description of reality, and to give oneself the 
freedom that comes with transparency, relinquishing the false understanding of how 
things ‘will’ proceed (painfully) after the truth comes out because, in the end, we do not 
know. This is the moral law’s promise of exaltation; humbly accepting that the future and 
the other are out of one’s control. Anticipation rests on probability—projections that are 
precisely mere predictions. 
This contradiction between the self’s projections (things it would like in the 
future) and the self as participant in humanity marks the ostensible clash between self-
interest and the interest of others. If we consider the same situation from the perspective 
of the one who is being told that they are not loved anymore, we gain further insight into 
what Kant means by respect for the other as awakening respect for ourselves, self-
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approbation. When the other is honest, freeing one from delusion (of their love), the pain 
you feel (fear of not knowing what comes next) can of course push you into a debilitating 
state of distress; but at the same time, the other’s honesty in walking away provides a 
vital occasion to realize that you can walk away too. That is, you, too, can be free; you 
can constitute yourself differently—recognizing that the other’s honesty with you is a 
way of honoring the creative capacity in you, your dignity. There is without question an 
elevating aspect of being on the receiving end of such honesty because the other’s 
transparency offers freedom to everyone involved.  
Crucial for Kant is that when we act from duty, we become less bound to 
hypothetical contingencies and externalities, and, more importantly, we become less at 
war with others and ourselves. To move toward freedom is to move toward a greater 
understanding of what is and is not in our power: finding plentitude in reality qua 
realizing we need nothing other than a good will, which ultimately amounts to 
courageously embracing our desire for justice without inhibition. The authentic Kantian 
self is thus a self who is not only capable of thinking about the other before herself, but is 
a self who is free from the anxiety that comes with constructing a projected reality that 
may or may not come to be.  
Encountering the moral law in the other ultimately brings the Kantian subject 
face-to-face with their true self—respect marking an occasion for a gestalt shift or 
conversion. That is, an opportunity to understand oneself anew: to understand the others 
as oneself, to constitute one’s will as good. As Kant notes at the end of the second 
Critique, images of good character reveal the dignity each of us has within ourselves, and 
that revelation is essential. 
	 48	
And now the law of duty, through the positive worth that observance of it lets us feel, 
finds easier access through the respect of ourselves in the consciousness of our freedom. 
When this is well established, when a human being dreads nothing more than to find, on 
self-examination, that he is worthless and contemptible in his own eyes, then every good 
moral disposition can be grafted onto it, because this is the best, and indeed the sole, 
guard to prevent ignoble and corrupting impulses from breaking into the mind (5:161). 
 
Thus, by Kant’s account, when we honor any and every inclination, operating under the 
modus operandi that I ought to pursue whatever will bring me closer to what I want right 
now, what I think will be the most pleasurable life, we, in fact, isolate ourselves from the 
moral community, fracturing our sense of community, repressing our desire for justice. 
Self-conceit as the governing force in one’s life leads to extreme isolation, as one starts to 
conceive of oneself as an island, understanding the others as nothing other than obstacles 
in one’s pursuit of happiness, or tools to be used in service of one’s pursuit of happiness.  
 
1.4 CONCLUSION  
To return to the aim of this chapter, given the sketch above of Kant’s moral project and 
the conception of the self that operates within his moral schema, it seems clear that for 
Kant, the most authentic self is the self that lives by and through their intrinsic desire for 
justice, which amounts to a desire for the good of the whole (of humanity), oneself 
included. Freedom and honesty serve as the condition the possibility for justice, and are 
best understood as marking the creative capacity in each and everyone of us, as they 
facilitate the birth of new phenomena in their suspension of projected states of affairs and 
the calculation involved in attempting to secure those projected future states. Both values 
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involve the refusal to reduce human activity to measurable patterns and projected 
outcomes. This refusal holds open the space for actualizing otherwise than the projected 
consequences that we can predict or ‘foresee’ based on an imposition onto the future of 
what was already determined in the past.   
While self-conceit may appear to be in direct conflict with justice, I contend that 
Kant’s conviction is that this is a false dilemma. What we all desire most is freedom, 
albeit not freedom in the sense of license to do anything and everything we want to do (as 
any inclination wishes), but freedom in the sense of continuing to co-exist and act in a 
world with others. This sort of freedom is limiting in the sense that it safeguards space for 
the freedom of others and of oneself, which can involve not always getting what you 
want. But this sort of freedom is also liberating in its honesty in regard to the significance 
of the moral community—the membership of which we both want and need—freeing us 
from the delusion that the preservation of oneself in one’s individual pursuit of happiness 
takes precedence over anything and anyone else.  
For Kant, justice is without question the vehicle by which we can adequately 
protect the free community that (as the fact of reason reveals) we all intrinsically desire. 
Our desire or housing of the moral law is another way of understanding the desire we 
have for justice and peace. This desire is a reminder of the perpetual possibility, at every 
moment, of augmenting and enriching reality by bringing new and unexpected 
phenomena into the world with others. For Kant, without celebrating and protecting our 
creative capacity, we have no hope for the justice, the perpetual peace that could one day 
be. And this aspect of self-identity is what is retrieved, recollected in Kant’s moral 
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project. Kant unveils freedom as honest orientation toward unpredictability, and 
preserves morality as the suspension of calculation.  
With this, we can turn to the ethical works of Aristotle to better understand the 
ways in which Kant’s account both squares with and compliments Aristotle’s account—
an account that fuels the recent revival of virtue ethics as a way of getting ourselves out 
of the current ‘crisis’ in moral philosophy, arguably fueled by the production-oriented 
conception of the self that reigns in the Anglo-American West. 
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2.0  CHAPTER 2: THE VIRTUOUS SOUL 
Suppose that we were painting a statue, and some one came up to us and said, 
Why do you not put the most beautiful colors on the most beautiful parts of the 
body—the eyes ought to be purple, but you have made them black—to him we 
might fairly answer, Sir, you would not surely have us beautify the eyes to such 
a degree that they are no longer eyes; consider rather whether, by giving this 
and the other features their due proportion, we make the whole beautiful. 
                  —Socrates, Plato’s Republic, 420b-d 
 
Mirroring the structure of Chapter 1, this chapter will probe the roots of contemporary 
virtue ethics by critically engaging the work of Aristotle. I begin by analyzing Aristotle’s 
methodology, and after providing an exegetical account of his seminal ethical texts, I will 
then flesh out the conception of the self—or ‘soul’ as Aristotle would put it20—that sits at 
the heart of Aristotelian virtue ethics, so as to illuminate who serves as the source of the 
particular set of values for the self that we find in Aristotle’s ethical theory, and 
subsequent varieties of neoaristotelian ethics. Essential here is that virtue involves the 
disruption of a certain mode of means-ends projection (as this heeds unimpeded activity), 
as well as what can be understood as disruptive intervention by virtuous others. These 
points will be further clarified in the chapters that follow.    
																																																								
20 Although it is anachronistic to use the term ‘self’ here, as it is not part of Aristotle’s vernacular, I am 
doing so for three reasons: 1) in our post-modern context, the term ‘soul’ is outdated, carrying a religious 
connotation that muddies the water in these analyses, as it often implies soul qua distinct from the body, 
carrying on after the body ceases to exist (something Kant addresses and critiques in the first Critique); 2) I 
am interested in relating Aristotle to both Kant and our post-Kantian context in ethics, which now involves 
a reflectively self-conscious subject (understanding itself as a self); and 3) I am interested in Aristotle’s 
account as informing contemporary neoaristotelian accounts in the Anglo-American tradition, which, in the 
wake of modernity, relies on the term ‘self’.  
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The aim of this chapter is twofold: first, I will illustrate that for Aristotle, the 
virtuous self is the properly habituated self, and that the values that correspond with this 
conception of the self are eudaimonia (happiness) and justice. For Aristotle, eudaimonia 
is the end that we desire most, and justice is the means to procure this end, as justice aims 
to safeguard the well-being of all of the individuals that constitute the whole (implying 
that we desire justice, too). Vital to Aristotle’s account of moral development is the role 
of virtuous others, and my chief claim is that the most crucial insight that we find in 
Aristotle’s ethics is that the condition for the possibility of eudaimonia is excellent moral 
education, which, I will argue, ought to be understood as the most important form of 
justice. Although friendship is, as Aristotle famously puts it, “the greatest of external 
goods,” upon close examination, it seems that justice is in fact a necessary condition for 
virtuous friendships based on the good.  
Given the role Aristotelian virtue ethics has played in contemporary debates 
concerning the state of moral philosophy today—serving as an alternative of sorts to 
deontology and utilitarianism-consequentialism (which will be explored in Chapter 3)—
the second task of this chapter is to underscore the ways in which Aristotle’s conception 
of who we are and what it is to live well is by no means incompatible or at odds with 
Kant’s, though their emphases and approaches are, of course, distinct. My claim is that 
there is an important sense in which Kant’s moral project can be understood as grounding 
Aristotle’s ethical project by establishing the necessary condition (i.e., the moral law) for 
the possibility of virtue and virtuous relations.  
	 53	
2.1 ARISTOTLE’S METHODOLOGY  
A lack of precision. For Aristotle, there were no specializations within philosophy as 
they exist today, and, contra Kant, ethics and morality were not distinct categories.21 This 
is not to say that there were not distinct topics within philosophy, but rather that the 
boundaries of questions and concerns were not as neatly separated as we find them, for 
instance, in Kant—and certainly not to the point of specialists exclusively dwelling in 
their area of expertise, unable to communicate effectively with specialists in other areas. 
For the Greeks, ethics and politics were related to and informed by metaphysics, which 
was related to and informed by epistemology, which was related to and informed by 
aesthetics, and so on.  
Keeping Kant’s methodological demarcations in mind, for Aristotle, there is no 
such thing as utterly non-empirical philosophy. In regard to ethics in particular, the 
practical (rather than purely theoretical) ought to take precedence,22 and recognizing this 
is crucial insofar as this informs the way in which his ethical investigation will proceed 
(e.g., it does not involve mathematical proofs or deductions of any sort). At the outset of 
the Nicomachean Ethics (which I will henceforth refer to as the Ethics), Aristotle 
stresses:  
																																																								
21 Paul Ricoeur does an excellent job addressing this point in the “Seventh Study” in Oneself as Another, 
170-1. Within this project, I will use the terms somewhat interchangeably, though it is worth pointing out 
that, following Kant, morality is often understood as dealing with the more prohibitive duty to obligatory 
norms, while ethics deals with what it means to live a good life.  
22 As Nussbaum writes about Aristotle’s ethical investigations: “Aristotle’s approach to ethics, the one with 
which I have most sympathy, takes as its subject matter the human good. And its investigations into matters 
of value are at the same time investigations into the form of life of a being both needy and resourceful, with 
certain capabilities and certain sorts of incompleteness, and a certain sort of body in which all of this takes 
place. They are attempts to describe the limits and possibilities of that species-specific form of life, saying 
where, within those, good is to be found” Love’s Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 389.  
  
	 54	
Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the subject-matter admits 
of; for precision is not to be sought for alike in all discussions, any more than in all the 
products of the crafts. Now fine and just actions, which political science investigates, 
exhibit much variety and fluctuation, so that they may be thought to exist only by 
convention, and not by nature… We must be content, then, in speaking of such subjects 
and with such premises to indicate the truth roughly and in outline, and in speaking about 
things which are only for the most part true and with premises of the same kind to reach 
conclusions that are no better. (1094b27-1095a11) 
 
Since ethics concerns what it means to live well, to flourish, it belongs to political science 
(the master science)—which, by Aristotle’s account, concerns the good of the state, i.e., 
what its members are to do and abstain from (1094b12-1094b26). Moreover, because 
political science investigates fine and just actions, which admit of variety and fluctuation 
(thought by many to exist only by convention), political science itself will inevitably 
admit of ‘variety and fluctuation’. This is to say that the answers to key ethical questions, 
as well as the reasons supporting those answers, will be, at best, for the most part true. 
Thus for Aristotle, ethical truth will always be rough; and the results of the investigation 
will never be as precise or unchanging as we might find in mathematics—and, contrary to 
what we find in Kant, they are certainly not universally necessary in his sense of the 
terms. 
Aristotle reiterates this point in Book VII of the Ethics, stressing that practical 
wisdom (phronesis) involves excellence in deliberation about particulars in the world of 
change or coming-to-be (1143b12.20), rather than excellence in the knowledge of 
universals and their theoretical application (episteme) or in the skillful production of 
certain ends (techne) (or in Kant’s words, a savvy with the rules of skill). With Kant’s 
critique of ‘happiness’ as a dictate of morality in mind (as something problematically 
indeterminate), it seems that Aristotle’s position on what happiness is validates Kant’s 
worry. Aristotle repeats that eudaimonia is not the sort of thing one can conceptually 
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grasp in its completion à la scientific knowledge. It is an activity, a way of being, which 
is not only contingent on the particular individual in question, but is something we can 
only affectively know if and when we ‘get there’. Though we can provide a general 
definition of happiness (as Aristotle does) under which particular variations, depending 
on the individual, will fall, to know what, specifically, happiness is, we must rely on 
perception, intuition, and practice-in-action.  
 Teleology. Also fundamental to Aristotle’s methodology is its teleological 
framework, which he describes most succinctly in the opening line of the Ethics: “Every 
art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and choice, is thought to aim at some 
good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things 
aim” (1094a18-20). In other words, as human beings, everything we do we do for a 
reason. There is always some end (a good) toward which we strive, seek, desire. From 
this, Aristotle argues: 1) all actions tend toward some good-end, 2) not all actions-ends 
can be instrumental (a means to some further end), 3) therefore, there must be some 
fundamental-grounding reason for the sake of which we do everything we do. The 
absolute end toward which we do everything must be something that all human beings (at 
least for the most part) seek, which he ultimately concludes is eudaimonia: human 
happiness, well-being, thriving, flourishing, activity of the soul in accord with virtue.  
Given the fact that the good of the whole—that is, the happiness of the 
community, rather than the happiness of the individual alone—is the overarching goal of 
his ethical investigations, the Ethics is, above all, meant to serve as preparation for the 
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Politics.23 As Aristotle puts it in Book VII of the Politics, the final end or the highest 
good of humanity is to form an organized state that is not an aggregate, but a union. He 
later goes on to define this union as a “community of equals aiming at the best life” 
(1328b7-1328b14). Thus, the more fundamental reason for the sake of which we do 
everything is the happiness of the community. That is, even beyond individual happiness, 
we ultimately seek to be members of a just community that actively strives to safeguard 
each of its members’ individual pursuits of happiness qua instantiations of the good of 
the whole. Essential, for Aristotle, is that final good of the individual and the final good 
of the whole go together, hand-in-hand.  
 Dialectic: ‘digging deeper’. Another key aspect of Aristotle’s methodology is 
what at least looks like a proto-type for Kant’s transcendental method. When analyzing 
phenomena, Aristotle is ultimately hunting for what appears to be constant in a diverse 
variety of instances—and conceptually distinct from those instances, albeit immanently 
operative within them as the ground for what they are. This ‘constant’ is not an eternal, 
unchanging truth (qua problematic caricature of the Platonic ‘Forms’). For Aristotle, 
these constants, or universals, are found in—that is, actually existing in—things in the 
world. In regard to his pursuit in the Ethics, Aristotle emphasizes that although different 
people living different sorts of lives seem to have disparate understandings of what 
happiness actually is, it is still happiness that everyone desires. 
																																																								
23 Thus, echoing a crucial point he makes in Book I: “Since [politics] uses the rest of the sciences, and 
since, moreover, it legislates what people are to do and what they are not to do, its end seems to embrace 
the ends of the other sciences. Thus it follows that the end of politics is the good for man. For even if the 
good is the same for the individual and the state, the good of the state clearly is the greater and more perfect 
thing to attain and safeguard. The attainment of the good for one man alone is, to be sure, a source of 
satisfaction; yet to secure it for a nation and for states is nobler and more divine. In short, these are the aims 
of investigation, which is in a sense an investigation of social and political matters” (1094b7-13). 
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Thus, in order to understand what happiness is, it is crucial to probe what 
happiness is to most people (to us, the many), locating both the shortcomings and insights 
that we find in our everyday discourse—that is, the false opinions and the kernels of 
truth—so as to work toward a more comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon at 
hand (in this case, happiness).24  
 Within this vein, also central to Aristotle’s method is his insistence on engaging 
with the positions of his predecessors—ostensible experts on the topic at hand—in a way 
that, again, seeks to locate kernels of truth in their discourse while simultaneously 
locating and dismantling problems there within by juxtaposing their positions with 
puzzles and counterarguments. This mode of conversation with what has come before 
safeguards philosophy’s pursuit to unconceal truth, as it respects thinkers who have 
wrestled with similar concerns, while dialectically moving beyond those positions in light 
of new puzzles and insights.  
Paraphrasing Martha Nussbaum (indirectly agreeing with major figures within the 
Continental-hermeneutic tradition like Heidegger, Gadamer, and Ricoeur), dialogue is the 
																																																								
24 This process of probing pros hen equivocation is one of Aristotle’s great methodological insights. ‘Pros 
hen’ means in relation to or tending toward one. As Aristotle writes in Book Gamma of the Metaphysics: 
“The term ‘being’ is used in many senses, yet not equivocally, but all of these are related to something 
which is one and a single nature … Thus, ‘being’ is used in many senses, but all of these are related to one 
principle, for some are called ‘being’ in view of the fact that they are substances, others by being attributes 
of substances, or else by being destructions or privations or qualities of substances, or productive or 
generative either of substances or of whatever is related to substances, or negations of any of these or of 
substances” (Γ.2.1003a33-12). For example, the attribute red is an aspect of “substance” (substance 
considered as the central case of being), and really is being, but only in a partial sense, as it is always 
defined in relation to, or predicated of, substance. Substance, on the other hand, is not an attribute of 
anything, and stands alone as the primary definition of being to which all other senses of being are related. 
For Aristotle, pros hen equivocation arises when a given term, e.g., being or happiness, is said or used in 
many ways, but each way is related to a central meaning or a definition of that term. When attempting to 
understand something in itself, surveying the host of ways in which the phenomenon is used and figuring 
out what each of those understandings are tending toward is therefore critical for Aristotle. Typically, what 
inhibits insight into the thing in itself is a lack of understanding, fostered either willfully or because of a 
poor education.   
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vehicle through which we can work toward the harmonious adjustment of our beliefs—
both individually and in community with one another.25 Aristotle is without question 
committed to a dialogic pursuit of ethical truth that seeks to overcome obstacles to 
communal agreement, as these, for Aristotle, mark “deficiencies in judgment and 
reflection.”26 This process is vital because it pushes the evaluator to remove themselves 
from their own prejudices: suspending disbelief, and committing themselves to the data 
of human experiences—especially to the opinions of the wise. Beyond this, for the 
Greeks, as Nussbaum stresses, the mark of being educated is understanding the ways of 
one’s community—the various discourses of the people—and recognizing that these 
positions, even if problematic or shortsighted, are relevant in themselves.27 People have 
reasons for what they believe, and, as Aristotle puts it in the Eudemian Ethics, “every 
man has some contribution to make to the truth” (1217a18-1217a29). Whether or not 
those reasons are strong is what is to be evaluated; and this process of sifting and sorting 
through various opinions and their reasons is the vehicle to further clarity.  
 The priority of particulars. With this dialectical method in mind, chief among 
Aristotle’s interlocutors is of course Plato. Aristotle never fails to evaluate the positions 
held by the ‘Platonists’; and in regard to ethics, there are key points of disagreement with 
‘Platonism’ that motivate Aristotle’s position. Perhaps most significant is what 
Nussbaum refers to as Aristotle’s ‘anthropocentricity’, which can be understood as a 
response to Socrates’s challenge to Protagoras’s dictum that man is the measure of all 
things—the challenge being that if man is the measure of all things, then there can be no 
																																																								
25  Martha Craven Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and 
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 10-11.  
26 Ibid., footnote on 11.  
27 Ibid., 252. 
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absolute truth, given the (often contradictory) variety of truths we find among men.28 For 
Socrates, this sort of relativism leaves much at stake, especially if things like 
‘knowledge’ and ‘justice’ admit of that sort of variety, often leading him toward a more 
‘divine’ perspective in which god, not man, is the measure of all things. For Aristotle, the 
lens through which we are able to understand phenomena is, and will always be, 
distinctly human, meaning the only appropriate place to start an investigation on what it 
means to live well is to understand what this means to human beings. While this might 
initially lead to what appears to be a sort of brute relativism (as human beings tend to 
disagree, as Aristotle remarks, on any point—especially in regard to norms or customs), 
Aristotle’s commitment to the aforementioned dialogic methodology safeguards a 
steadfast pursuit toward a sort of agreement that acknowledges difference, but is 
nonetheless committed to what remains constant.  
This is to say that, for Aristotle, there is no view from nowhere, no ultimate 
standpoint, no non-experiential (like Kant’s supreme moral principle) or divine (like a 
‘Platonic Form’) measure. Thus, our perspectives and judgments on morality are 
necessarily conditioned by our being human. And for Aristotle, the pursuit of the good is 
the pursuit of what is (empirically speaking, as evidenced in experience) good to us. 
There is no standard or criterion other than that of a diverse variety of human beings, 
each making judgments and claims about phenomena. As Aristotle puts it in his notorious 
critique of the universal ‘Platonic Good’ in Book I of the Ethics:  
But then in what way are things called good? They do not seem to be like the things that 
only chance to have the same name. Are goods one, then, by being derived from one 
good or by all contributing to one good, or are they rather one by analogy? Certainly as 
sight is in the body, so is reason in the soul, and so on in other cases. But perhaps these 
subjects had better be dismissed for the present; for perfect precision about them would 
																																																								
28 Ibid., 243.  
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be more appropriate to another branch of philosophy. And similarly with regard to the 
Idea; even if there is some one good which is universally predicable of goods or is 
capable of separate and independent existence, clearly it could not be achieved or attained 
by man; but we are now seeking something attainable. Perhaps, however, some one might 
think it worthwhile to have knowledge of it with a view to the goods that are attainable 
and achievable; for having this as a sort of pattern we shall know better the goods that are 
good for us, and if we know them shall attain them. (1097a15-1097a23) 
 
Central for Aristotle, therefore, is establishing a notion of the (human) good that is 
relevant and attainable in this life. That is, a life that we can actually live. The backdrop 
for these remarks in the Ethics is the ‘Good beyond being’ that we find in Platonism—a 
Good (denoting the essence of all that is predicated to be good) that at least appears to be 
transcendent and only problematically connected to life, as we know it.29 By Aristotle’s 
account, if the Good did exist in the way that his characterization of the Platonists 
propose, i.e., as a self-subsisting, ontologically distinct substance, then it is unclear how 
the sensible variety of particular goods that we experience in the world ‘participate in’ 
these eternal, unchanging, self-subsisting things. For Aristotle, a good of this sort (‘the 
One’), ontologically distinct from the variety of goods  (‘the many’) that we encounter in 
the world, does not make sense, and is, practically speaking, not helpful (1218b25-
1218b31).  
Again, decisive for Aristotle is that universal predications (e.g., goodness) only 
exist immanently in their particular instantiations. This point is crucial because 
particularity denotes being-reality in the most fundamental sense. Universals, essences, 
are only real as immanent in the plurality of their sensible instantiations, though they are 
not the ‘most real’ feature of a given thing. By Aristotle’s account, to be is to be a 
particular this (tode ti)—an incommunicable differentiating factor (thisness) makes a 
																																																								
29 It is important to note that this puzzle (the relation between ‘the One’ and ‘the many’) occupies the vast 
majority of his investigations in the Metaphysics. It is perhaps the most fundamental ontological problem.  
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thing what it is most fundamentally. Universals are what enable us to conceptualize and 
discuss particulars, as knowledge is always of universals (1003a7-18). This metaphysical 
point is important, as particulars (that which is distinct, different, singular) are what 
illuminate reality more so than anything else, whereas concepts (which are still real, 
though in a lesser degree) are what make particular things intelligible, understandable, 
and ordered objects of knowledge. For Aristotle, to be (in the most fundamental sense) is 
to be actual (Metaphysics, Books Eta and Theta), and to be actual is to be a particular 
this.  
Beyond this, the many particulars that we encounter in experience are what 
ultimately provoke movement in the soul (DA, 433b5-	433b26)—they are what awaken 
our appetite, desire, affecting us and calling us to respond. For Aristotle, we do not desire 
concepts. Concepts are formed after our immediate encounter with a particular thing. And 
as we will see in 2.2, these metaphysical and epistemological points have clear 
implications within his ethics.   
The things themselves: phenomena. It perhaps goes without saying that in line 
with his prioritization of particularity, and his insistence on relying on a distinctly human 
perspective, Aristotle is also deeply committed to the prioritization of phenomena: the 
things we perceive in the world through experience, as they appear to us. For Aristotle, 
appearances are precisely the sorts of things that we can make claims about; appearances 
are what are actual, and ever-present for us to access and probe. Appearances are what 
affect us and what are affected by us.  
This of course marks a clear distinction from Kant’s moral project, as Kant wants 
to establish and safeguard an a priori conception of morality that cannot be served by the 
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empirical-examples-appearances, as these inevitably fall short of the sort of universally 
necessary objectivity that he is interested in. That being said, it is important to point out 
that Aristotle is not concerned with the distinctly modern political concerns that Kant has 
(i.e., international perpetual peace, or anything like universal human rights). Moreover, as 
we will see below, Aristotle’s conception of the self is, while in many ways similar, of 
course distinct from Kant’s. Kant’s ‘two-standpoint’ perspective mirrors what could be 
considered a more Platonic picture—that is, a conception of human beings 
simultaneously participating in the divine and in the world of appearances. Aristotle 
instead attempts to make sense of our ethical pursuits by honoring our species. For 
Aristotle, we are animals that belong exclusively to this world (of appearances), and this 
is not a defective feature of our condition. For Aristotle, we are not fallen, and we do not 
participate in two different realms or worlds, but are simply the type of animal that 
employs reason. Thus, we truly share certain features with animals—features that should 
also be taken into consideration—and we also appear to have capacities (namely, reason) 
that are distinct from animals, which should be taken into consideration. While I think 
Kant would agree (as this dimension of who we are is the dimension that clouds moral 
thinking, bound to the world of appearances), Aristotle does not find the ‘animal’ aspects 
of ourselves to be immoral, but instead valuable sources of information.  
While Aristotle, as we will see below, is committed to self-sufficiency as a key 
dimension of his rendering of eudaimonia, his notion of self-sufficiency is radically 
distinct from the sort of self-sufficiency we find in Kant (i.e., autonomy). As both 
Bernard Williams and Nussbaum argue, vulnerability (to luck, fortune) plays a major role 
in Aristotle’s project. And this is something that falls out of the picture in modern and 
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contemporary ethics with the rise of a conception of the self that can will to constitute 
itself in a particular way if it so chooses. Despite the fact that we all start off morally 
neutral, we are not born into equal opportunity or an equal playing field. Some people are 
more fortunate than others—this is a fact of life that has a major impact on whether one 
can flourish. As Williams puts it, the modern project is committed to providing us with 
“good-news” about our condition: we can always choose to be good—it is in our power. 
In agreement with Williams, Nussbaum reiterates that Aristotle, in reverence to the Greek 
tragedians, recognizes the caprices of amoral power.30 And that in the end, for some of 
us, no matter how hard we try, we simply will not be happy, given our lot in life.  
 With this framework in mind, we can turn to a careful analysis of Aristotle’s 
account of ethics: an account in which the phronimos, the practically wise human being, 
flourishes as one 1) who can deliberate gracefully in any and every situation, 2) who feels 
no tension between reason and passion, habituating their co-operation (under the rule of 
reason), and 3) who is constitutive of and, more importantly, is constituted by one’s 
community.   
2.2 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS 
What is happiness? For Aristotle, Happiness is directly related to our proper function-
activity (ergon) as human beings, and therefore hinges on what we are qua what we do. 
In Aristotle’s notion of proper function, we find a clear illustration of his teleological 
impulses. Just as all things tend toward some desired end, all human action is for the sake 
																																																								
30 Nussbaum, Fragility, xxxv.  
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of some desired end or good. Since human beings are rational animals, our proper 
function is “activity of the soul in conformity with a rational principle or, at least, not 
without it” (1098a5-10). Reason (or at least the capacity for reason) is our distinguishing 
characteristic, as this is what makes humans properly human. The human good, then, is 
activity of the soul in accordance with virtue (arete) or excellence; to act virtuously is to 
habituate activities that make us good at performing our proper function, ultimately 
enabling us to flourish, as habituating those activities enables us to do what we truly 
desire to do.  
Thus, to be human is to act in accord with reason, as reason, ultimately governed 
by intellect (nous), is our distinguishing feature; nous “by its very nature rules and guides 
us” and “gives us our notions of what is noble and divine” (1177a14-16). To be most 
fully human is to let reason be our primary guide. As he writes in De Anima, because we 
are beings in time (able to reflect on the future), our appetites can originate movement 
counter to rationality, stretching out toward multiple things (433b5-433b11):  
Since appetites run counter to one another, which happens when a principle of reason and 
a desire are contrary and is possible only in beings with a sense of time (for while thought 
bids us hold back because of what is future, desire is influenced by what is just at hand: a 
pleasant object which is just at hand presents itself as both pleasant and good, without 
condition in either case, because of want of foresight into what is farther away in time), it 
follows that while that which originates movement must be specifically one, viz. the 
faculty of appetite as such (or rather farthest back of all the object of that faculty; for it is 
it that itself remaining unmoved originates the movement by being apprehended in 
thought or imagination), the things that originate movement are numerically many. 
(433b12-433b26)  
 
Thus, our condition is constitutive of experiencing multiple and often conflicting desires, 
and being able to reflect on them—as he puts it, thought bids us hold back because of 
what is future. This means that the fine-tuning of the rational principle—and ultimately 
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fostering obedience to the rational principle—requires an active tempering of certain 
desires. The habituation of this tempering is how we eventually let reason be our guide.  
It is worth noting that Aristotle often describes the relation between the soul and 
body as that between a master and slave (e.g., Book I of the Politics), or ruler and subject. 
As he puts it in the Eudemian Ethics, “we, by nature, are composed of a ruling and 
subject part, and should live according to the governing part” (1249b24-1249b25). The 
mind should, therefore, govern the appetites, because the mind, thought itself, is always 
right, while the appetites can be wrong, often striving toward apparent goods rather than 
the good itself (DA, 433b5-433b11). Thus, in order to live well—to most fully be what 
we are—we must live according to the activity of the ruling principle of reason. And 
while the appetites are the source of self-movement—driven to reach out toward objects 
of desire—thought can resist what the appetitive part of the soul desires, rendering 
thought a source of movement as well (DA, 433a9-433a12). It perhaps goes without 
saying that this schema is very similar to that which we find in Kant: an explicit call for 
obedience to reason in the face of conflicting desires. That is, a need to temper certain 
appetites (or as Kant puts it, a need to legislate oneself), and a conception of thought 
itself being a source of movement (as we saw in Chapter 1, for Kant, we are unmoved 
movers).  
While Aristotle’s emphasis on rationality might lead one to think that he is quick 
to dismiss the role of the body in decision-making, Aristotle is mindful of our being 
composed of an animal element and a rational element, and the animal element’s 
influence on deliberation and action. The passions and their associated pleasures and 
pains provide important truths about human life, and serve as sources of insight, e.g., fear 
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in the case of courage, or anger in the case of gentleness. Rather than being ‘good’ or 
‘evil’ (NE, 1154a1-5), pleasure and pain are vital sources of information, indicators of 
moral action, meaning the virtuous person has the right attitude toward pleasure and 
pain—that is, not dismissing pleasure, pain, or any of the emotions, but rather using them 
as evidence (revealing something about our relation to the objects evoking pleasure or 
pain, e.g., feeling pained by anger toward somebody lying to us).31  
Aristotle’s acknowledgement of emotions, pleasures, and pains as valuable 
sources of information in human action distinguishes his ethical theory from Kant’s. As 
we saw in Chapter 1, Kant contends that to be virtuous is to go against one’s inclinations 
(qua expressions of self-love—fleeing from pain, running toward pleasure), and act from 
duty (for justice), whereas for Aristotle, the virtuous human being finds pleasure in doing 
virtuous things, maintaining the right attitude toward pleasure and pain. As Aristotle 
writes in Book IX of the Ethics:  
A happy man ought to be pleasant. … For a morally good man, inasmuch as he is a 
morally good man, finds joy in actions that conform to virtue and is displeased by actions 
which display vice, just as an expert in music feels pleasure when we hears beautiful 
tunes, and pain when he hears bad tunes … life is about the good and pleasant. We can 
see that from the very fact that everyone desires it, especially good and supremely happy 
men: for them life is the most desirable of all things, and their existence is the most 
blessed … they are pleased when they are conscious of the presence in them of what is in 
itself good. (1170a4-1170b10) 
 
																																																								
31 For a more on the informative nature of the emotions, see Nussbaum’s “Form and Content, Philosophy 
and Literature” and “An Aristotelian Conception of Rationality” in Love’s Knowledge.  As she writes, 
“practical reasoning unaccompanied by emotion is not sufficient for practical wisdom; that emotions are 
not only not more unreliable than intellectual calculations, but frequently are more reliable, and less 
deceptively seductive” (40). She of course further qualifies what she means by this, explaining that for 
Aristotle, emotions, e.g., fear, anticipation, grief, hope, anger, etc., are not blind animal reactions, nor are 
they merely false judgments or instances of pernicious reasoning, contra the Stoics, Plato, Kant, Spinoza, 
etc. Though they are not “self-certifying sources of ethical truth,” there is a “richness of connections 
between emotions and judgments” that is beyond condemnation (42).  She continues, explaining that 
emotions, to her, “are closely related to value judgments, and that the relevant judgments are judgments 
about things that we don’t fully control” (388).  
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Aristotle continues this train of thought in Book X, stating that it is no wonder that men 
aim at pleasure, as each man finds that it “completes his life, and his life is desirable” 
(1175a17-20). For Aristotle, activity and pleasure (which also is an activity pertaining to 
the organic dimension of ourselves) are interdependent. Each type of pleasure, e.g., 
pleasures of thought, pleasures of sense, etc., accompanies and completes its respective 
activity. Thus, life itself and living ethically are pleasant in themselves. If ethical life 
were not pleasurable, we would be denying an important aspect of what it is to most fully 
be what we are. 
Aristotle’s ethical theory (in contrast to someone like Kant’s) is, therefore, one 
that is uniquely hospitable to life in the sense that he is attuned to distinctly human moral 
indicators that lie beyond universality, e.g., universal duty, as well as his understanding 
of the often messy reality that is lived experience.32 As Aristotle writes, “there are no 
fixed data in matters concerning action and questions of what is [morally] beneficial … 
the agent must consider on each different occasion what the situation demands” (1104a3-
5). Moral action is about carefully attending to the particularities of both oneself and the 
given set of concrete circumstances. For Aristotle, when we are honest about decision-
making, we realize that there is no one-size-fits all rule. Decisions always have to be 
made in relation to the particular situation at hand. As is the case with excellent doctors, 
we can and should use the ‘rule’ as a rule of thumb (e.g., you ought to treat this case of Y 
with X), but more importantly, we need to be ready, willing, and able to adapt that rule to 
the individual being treated. Adaptability is essential to virtue.  
																																																								
32 Ibid., 179.  
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 With adaptability and attunement to particularity in mind, the defining features of 
happiness, as Aristotle delineates them, are: 1) its self-sufficiency (not in the sense of 
isolation, but in the sense that the happy human does not lack anything, e.g., one is not 
striving for something beyond one’s current state—one is utterly fulfilled as one is); 2) 
that it is an activity and an internal good (i.e., an orientation or way of being of the soul); 
3) that it requires a sufficient amount of external goods (e.g., a higher social status, a 
degree of material wealth, friends); 4) that it occurs within a complete life (1089b26-29; 
1099a30); and 4) that it does not happen by chance (1100b20). For Aristotle, it is not be 
possible to live well without certain goods outside of oneself (e.g., sufficient resources 
that are basic to life, a decent amount of fortune, beauty, good social standing, and 
healthy relations with others), and can only occur in a complete life since it requires the 
development of nous (experience gained by actively living life), as well as the proper 
habituation of virtue (including taking pleasure in virtuous activities), which takes 
practice and time. To enjoy virtuous activity—activity that is not initially pleasant—it 
must be repeated (like exercise), eventually giving way to pleasure in the activity as one 
reaps the benefits of excellence.  
  What Aristotle means by virtue being the ‘mean’ is that virtuous activity involves 
habituating moderate, rather than extreme, dispositions or characteristics (i.e., how we 
are). Aristotle’s notorious notion of virtuous activity being the mean (e.g., friendliness) 
between extremes (e.g., obsequiousness and cantankerousness) is far from surprising. For 
Aristotle, the virtuous path is the middle path. And while it is often difficult to live 
moderately, the aim itself is quite intuitive. These moderate habits are acquired through 
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proper education: observing, experiencing, and ultimately living/doing/being the 
activities to the point of habituating them. As he writes: 
Actions, then, are called just and temperate when they are such as the just or the 
temperate man would do; but it not the man who does these that is just and temperate, but 
the man who also does them as just and temperate men do them. It is well said, then, that 
it is by doing just acts the just man is produced… But most people do not do these, but 
take refuge in theory and think they are being philosophers and will become good in this 
way, behaving somewhat like patients who listen attentively to their doctors, but do none 
of the things they are ordered to do. As the latter will not be made well in body by such a 
course of treatment, the former will not be made well in the soul by such a course in 
philosophy. (1105b5-15) 
 
This point is crucial and is often taken for granted. Aristotle stresses that virtuous activity 
not only involves observing and emulating what virtuous people do, but also intuiting the 
right way to perceive in various contexts and confidently acting in precisely that way. 
One can only be good if one’s activities follow suit. The virtuous mean is always going to 
be determined in relation to the subject, i.e., the mean for you will be different than the 
mean for me, given our particularity (personal strengths, weaknesses, natural capacities, 
etc.). This means that the individual alone has access to what the mean is for them: 
nobody can tell them how, precisely, to proceed in a given context. While this might 
make it seem like virtue is subjective, relative—an expression of the mean as one sees 
fit—the way in which virtue is taught, in the observation and emulation of (virtuous) 
others, there is a general, flexible, measure (a rule of thumb/standard deviation) that is 
resized, reshaped to fit the soul in question.  
The role of the ‘rule of thumb’ is important. These rules are not universally 
necessary laws, but rather general guidelines to be appreciated, reassessed, and tweaked 
though experience and discourse. We rely on the actions and conclusions of past-experts 
and then modify them to suit the present. As Aristotle puts it, virtue is “a state of 
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character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e., the mean relative to us, this being 
determined by the rational principle, and by that principle by which the man of practical 
wisdom would determine it” (1106b45-1107a5). While it might be easy, for instance, to 
get angry, to do this “to the right person, to the right extent, at the right time, with the 
right motive, and in the right way, that is not for every one, nor is it easy; wherefore 
goodness is both rare and laudable and noble” (1109a20-30). To be happy and thus to 
attain the highest good, therefore, is rare, difficult, and contingent on an exceptional 
education—that is, a window into how the practically wise man would determine things. 
The practically wise man provides the rule of thumb. 
Perhaps the most important characteristic of happiness (in the fullest sense, as he 
defines it) is that it is a choice.33 For Aristotle, happiness is voluntary (free from external 
forces), and requires awareness of what one is doing: it cannot be accidental. The 
defining feature of choice is that it is a byproduct of reasoned deliberation. We deliberate 
about things that are in our power and that can be realized in action. That is, we 
deliberate about means to desired ends, and about things that are not fixed, indeterminate. 
As he writes, “Deliberation, then, operates in matters that hold good as a general rule, but 
whole outcome is unpredictable, and in cases in which an indeterminate element in 
involved” (1112b10). Deliberation enables us to actively choose a preferred course of 
action to achieve the desired end in view—ultimately happiness. When Aristotle stresses 
that we deliberate about means to ends, rather than the ends themselves, his point is that 
the end is already decided, so to speak; the day-in, day-out choices that we make are 
																																																								
33 It is important to stress here that the fact that we desire happiness is not up to us. We do not choose 
whether or not we want to be happy; happiness is the end that we all seek, whether we like it or not. What 
is up to us, however, is how we actualize that desire. My claim here is that happiness qua activity of the 
soul is accord with virtue is the byproduct of deliberation. This is to say that virtue is a choice (as we do not 
get there by default), but our desire to flourish is not (as this is the case by default).   
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always for the sake of flourishing, living well. Aristotle is not talking about comparing 
and selecting among options (a variety of ends), but instead a response to desires (that we 
are pulled by), influenced by pleasure and pain. This is distinct from achieving a pre-
determined goal, producing something, or bringing about some state of affairs—which in 
the end, is out of our power (1114b30-1115a).34  
So, how do we ‘get happy’? As stated at the outset of this chapter, vital to 
Aristotle’s account is the role of others in the development of virtue. Learning through 
observation and training require an exemplar—a virtuous paradigm—in whom, upon 
observation, one can see-feel-experience virtue’s nobility, and thus feel motivated to 
aspire to what one observes in the other person. This is where Aristotle’s account of 
friendship and justice crucially factor into his conception of happiness. And, as I will 
stress in the final section of this chapter, the condition for the possibility of eudaimonia is 
excellent education; that is, loving guidance from others, which is ultimately a form of 
justice.  
Friendship. In Book VIII of the Ethics, Aristotle states that friendship requires 
that two people: 1) have a mutual good will toward each other (which means wishing 
each other’s good qua wanting the other to improve in capacity for their own sake) 
(1155b30),35 2) are aware of each other’s good will, and 3) are moved toward each other 
by desiring one of the three loveable qualities in each other, i.e., pleasure, utility, or 
																																																								
34 The further the effects get from the original source of movement, the less power we have or them to be 
moral. To be moral, then, is to properly orient oneself so as to intend virtue. Grasping what that proper 
orientation is (intuiting virtue) is the result of much experience with many choices involving or assuming 
virtuous deliberation. 
35 As Aristotle puts it, “For many people have good will towards persons they have never seen, but whom 
they assume to be decent and useful, and one of these persons may well reciprocate this feeling. 
Accordingly, the two parties appear to have good will toward one another; but how can they be called 
‘friends’ when they are unaware how they are disposed to one another?” (1156a). 
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goodness. This means that above all, friendship requires a good will, as well as a personal 
investment in the pleasure experienced with the other, the utility exchanged with the 
other as a means to pleasure, or the virtue shared with the other. Moreover, as Aristotle 
stresses, in order for a friendship to truly be a friendship, the relation stipulates that the 
better friend ought to receive more, as each ought to receive what they deserve, equalized 
through proportionate equality. 
Friendship based on goodness is the most complete sense of friendship, though 
the other two types of friendship are also friendship, albeit in a partial sense.36 Unique to 
friendship based on the good is that these friendships are rare and among few, as they 
require a lot of time and energy, living in close proximity to the friend, and immersing 
oneself as fully as possible in the friend’s joys and sorrows, i.e., empathizing with the 
friend. Like virtue, friendship based on the good is the only type of friendship that is 
properly a choice: that is, being pulled to the other by reason (the result of deliberation), 
rather than the appetites alone (being pulled to the other because they are pleasant or 
useful). This is to say that in friendship based on the good, what you love and seek in 
your friend is ultimately what you love and seek in yourself: eudaimonia, living in accord 
with the rational principle within oneself (1157b25-25).  
 It is worth quoting Aristotle’s initial remarks about friendship in the Ethics, as it 
is here that he underscores the necessity of others in the good life:  
After what we have said (about virtue), a discussion of friendship would follow, since it 
is a virtue or implies virtue, and is besides most necessary with a view to living. For 
without friends no one would choose to live, though he had all other goods; even rich 
men and those in possession of office and of dominating power are thought to need 
																																																								
36 For a thorough presentation of Aristotle’s meditations on friendship, see Gary M. Gurtler, S.J., “Aristotle 
on Friendship: Insight from the Four Causes” in Ancient and Medieval Concepts of Friendship, ed. by Gary 
M. Gurtler, S.J. and Suzanne Stern-Gillet (Albany, SUNY: 2014), 35–50. 
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friends most of all; for what is the use of such prosperity without the opportunity of 
beneficence, which is exercised chiefly and in its most laudable form towards friends? … 
And in poverty and other misfortunes men think friends are the only refuge. It helps the 
young, too, to keep from error; it aids older people by ministering to their needs and 
supplementing the activities that are failing from weakness; those in the prime of life it 
stimulates to noble actions—‘two going together’—for with friends men are more able to 
both think and act… Friendship seems too to hold states together, and lawgivers to care 
more for it than justice; for unanimity seems to be something like friendship, and this 
they aim at most of all, and expel faction and their worst enemy; and when men are 
friends there is no need of justice, while when they are just they need friendship as well, 
and the truest form of justice is thought to be a friendly quality. (1155a5-25) 
 
For Aristotle, the value and necessity of friendship is self-evident, though he provides 
reasons for those who might be skeptical about whether friends are truly necessary to the 
good life.37 Aristotle emphasizes that despite the fact that happiness involves self-
sufficiency, it would be strange to assign all good things to the happy man, but to not 
assign him friends, who are thought to be the greatest of external goods (1169b5). Since 
human beings are political by nature—again, community itself as the end above all ends 
that human beings seek—living with others is simply part of the human condition. 
Aristotle points out that those who suggest the happy man does not need friends are 
partially correct if what they mean by ‘friends’ is friendships based on utility: that is, 
friends sought for a particular use, an economic agreement, a “commercially” oriented 
relation (1158a20). Someone who is self-sufficient (in Aristotle’s sense of the term) has 
little need for commercial relations, though they will always need friendships based on 
pleasure, as this involves sharing activities one finds pleasant with others (1158a20), 
which is vital to life. 
 With the skeptic in mind, Aristotle stresses that a major reason why friends are 
essential to the good life is that we learn from other people: “A certain training in virtue 
																																																								
37 For a wonderful account of friends being the necessary condition for self-knowledge, and how loving and 
valuing the other for his own sake is the condition for the possibility of being able to love and value 
oneself, see John M. Cooper, “Friendship and the Good in Aristotle” in The Philosophical Review, Vol. 86, 
No. 3 (Jul., 1977): 290-315 
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arises also from the company of the good…” (1170a10). Friends are mirrors by which we 
are able to observe and understand the nature of our actions, as it is far easier to observe 
other people’s actions than our own (1169b30-1170a5). Experience is a testimony of this. 
In addition to this, Aristotle stresses that others are far better at stimulating activity—they 
motivate us more than we motivate ourselves. Experience is a testimony this as well, as 
other people often ignite the desire for activity, e.g., hearing a friend describe how 
meditation has helped her ease her anxiety and being motivated to try a meditative 
activity as well, or hearing a friend discuss things she learned in philosophy and being 
motivated to read philosophy, too, or even simply seeing a friend and being motivated to 
do things (rather than stay at home). Within this vein, actively sharing in discussion and 
thought are vital activities (1170a25-1170b15); this is of course something that we do 
with our friends. It is through sharing our experiences, thoughts, and reflections that we 
are able to think and grow both individually and with others.  
 In regard to others serving as sources of self-knowledge—mirrors through which 
we can better understand virtue in others and ourselves—in Book IX of the Ethics, 
Aristotle takes pains to sort out the relation between self-love and love-of-the-other.  For 
Aristotle, virtuous friendship proceeds from one’s relationship with oneself (1166a); 
habituating self-love is the basis for habituating a healthy love for others. By self-love, 
Aristotle is of course not referring to anything like narcissism, egocentricity, or what 
Kant would call self-conceit, but rather a properly ordered soul that embraces its capacity 
for reason, and is actively working toward eudaimonia through the habituation of 
excellent deliberation. For Aristotle, to truly love oneself is to honor one’s capacities, and 
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thus live a life that is devoted to making those capacities excellent.38 To honor one’s 
capacities in this way—what Kant would call self-respect—one must have a sense of 
what virtue is instilled in them, so as to habituate movement in that direction. Naturally, 
if one loves (or rather, values) these capacities within oneself, one inevitable loves-values 
these capacities in the other(s)—that is, one loves other(s) who also honor themselves in 
precisely the same way, valuing the same things that the other values.  
The takeaway here is that self-love is, in many respects, the same as love for the 
other insofar as what one loves is virtuous activity (acting in accord with virtue, acting in 
accord with one’s rational principle). Though virtuous activity will be slightly different 
for each individual (as virtue is always determined in relation to oneself, i.e., one’s 
particularity), the desire for the excellent exercise of reason is the same. Friendship based 
on the good is a mutual striving for excellent rational activity (happiness), loving and 
activating the rational element within oneself and the other by exercising reason by way 
of dialogue, discussion, conversation.  
It seems clear that while we are, of course, capable of exercising reason alone—
reflecting on the context-specific situations that we face, working to understand what the 
context at hand demands—we do not start out as virtuous (good reasoners), wherefore we 
need to observe, practice, and engage in this process with others who excel in reasoning 
well. This point is crucial; it hinges on the fact that we are shaped by those we are 
surrounded by. We are infected by their habits, so to speak. We become like our friends 
																																																								
38 For an excellent article on Aristotle’s notion of self-love qua self-respect/self-esteem, see Marcia L. 
Homiak’s “Feminism and Aristotle's Rational Ideal,” in Feminism and History of Philosophy, ed. 
Genevieve Lloyd (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).  
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and they become like us, meaning who shapes us is of the utmost importance. This 
process begins when we are young, and continues through the end of our lives.  
Justice. Although it is clear that the moral education (of the youth) is a vital, if 
not the most vital, element in a virtuous society,39 it is not clear how, specifically, 
education relates to friendship and justice. With his definition of friendship in mind, 
Aristotle defines justice—the “greatest of virtues,” concerned with what is fair—as the 
exercise of complete virtue in relation to one’s neighbors (1129b25-30). This is to say 
that justice involves one having practical wisdom and orienting that activity toward the 
community. This definition of justice can be understood in the sense of legislation, 
instilling virtue-conducive laws in the community, and also in an unwritten/moral sense, 
in one’s disposition or orientation toward others—friends and otherwise (1162b20). 
Justice (in the legal sense and in the moral sense) is the means by which we regulate our 
interaction with others, acknowledging that they, too, are animals acting in accord with 
their rational principles, pursuing eudaimonia. 
 In addition to this, Aristotle stresses that: 1) justice and friendship are concerned 
with the same objects and the same people (1159b25); 2) all communities have both 
friendship and justice (as they exist in the same relationship and coextensive in range 
(1159b25-1160a30); and 3) friendship itself depends on the justice established within a 
																																																								
39 Aristotle’s words on education per se in the Politics are sparse, and while it is clear that it is a vital 
ingredient in the virtuous city, the sketch he provides is very rough. He emphasizes that many disagree on 
what the character of education should be (e.g., is it of what is useful, or of what is virtuous, or of higher 
knowledge?), and that the practice as it existed then was “perplexing,” to say the least (1337a30-35). Not 
much has changed since the time Aristotle was writing. What we do know is that for Aristotle, education 
begins with cultivating the body, and then cultivating the mind (134b25), and that different age groups are 
educated according to what is appropriate for their souls at that age (telling stories that are age-appropriate, 
e.g., sweeter stories of virtue, rather than vice, to the young, as “we always like best whatever comes first” 
(1336b30)). We also know that for Aristotle, education should be public, universal/unified, and controlled 
by the state (1337a2-30), and that music plays a fundamental role in moral cultivation. In addition to this, 
for Aristotle, “education should be based upon three principles—the mean, the possible, the becoming, 
these three” (1342b30). 
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given community (based on the type of constitution that community has) (1159b25-
1160a30). Friendship is, therefore, contingent on the form of justice it is situated within; 
for instance, as Aristotle puts it, “the role of friendship decreases to the same extent as the 
part played by the just. It is least significant in the worst form: in a tyranny friendship has 
little or no place” (1161a30). And presumably, the just state is able to house not only a 
host of friendships, but also a host of friendships based on the good.  
In light of Aristotle’s remarks on justice and its relation to friendship in Book VIII 
of the Ethics, it seems reasonable to conclude that a just disposition—that is, being 
virtuous and being able to orient that virtue toward one’s neighbor—is a necessary, albeit 
not sufficient, condition for friendship. As Aristotle states, “the just in the fullest sense is 
regarded as constituting an element of friendship” (1155a30). Accordingly, justice is 
distinct from friendship in that it can be less intimate (though the “gravity of an unjust act 
increase[s] in proportion as the person to whom it is done is a closer friend” (1160a5)), 
and one can be just toward anyone and everyone (in contrast to one only being able to 
have a handful of virtuous friendships). It is also distinct from friendship in that it 
involves a duty to give what is owed (in proportion to merit), mirroring friendships based 
on utility, rather than friendships based on the good. There is ultimately a rehabilitative 
aspect to justice that is not required in friendships based on goodness, as the two are 
equal in goodness and their distribution of that goodness; though that rehabilitative 
movement could become necessary between friends who are on their way to a virtuous 
friendship, as the two must learn how to love each other well. 
There is, therefore, a duty-based dimension built into justice that is latent in 
virtuous friendships—latent in the sense that the two in a virtuous relationship never fail 
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to fulfill their duty to the other. This fulfillment is built into the expression of their philia. 
There is no question as to whether the virtuous friend will give what is ‘owed’ or 
‘deserved’, as both friends love, value, and appreciate the same thing—namely, 
flourishing—and desire it in the other. Their values are completely aligned: they value 
and desire eudaimonia, and value and desire each other as instances of it. As Aristotle 
notes, between friends, there is no need for justice in the sense of enforced legislation 
(though the just, like anyone, of course need friends) (1155a27-30). It is crucial, for 
Aristotle, that virtuous friends do well by each other for the sake of each other’s well-
being, which rests in an unwavering trust in each other’s desire to foster precisely this.  
To return to the question of how we might categorize education (as a form of 
friendship or justice), it seems clear that education is a form of justice, though in some 
cases, it is a form of friendship, too, but not necessarily. Education is the exercise of 
virtue in relation to unequal others (in the sense that one is a teacher and the others are 
learners)—others that are not necessarily intimate in relation, but others whose well-
being the community has a vested interest in (for their own sake and for the sake of the 
whole). For Aristotle, education in virtue is vital. In order to become virtuous in relation 
to others 1) as a just human being, and 2) as a friend (entering a friendship based on the 
good), the individual needs to first be virtuous, as this clearly is the condition for the 
possibility of being virtuous toward the others. The condition for the possibility of virtue 
is a proper education in which the student is habituated into a virtuous existence by 
observing, emulating, and ultimately living the lives of virtuous role models—that is, not 
just by understanding the good, but being good by doing good.  
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2.3 THE ARISTOTELIAN SOUL 
First and foremost, as mentioned at the onset of this chapter, the Aristotelian self is not a 
self that is caught between two worlds—fallen, depraved, in need of rehabilitation—but 
instead an animal that is unique from other animals in its capacity to reason. To be human 
is to act in accord with the rational principle within oneself; to most fully be human is to 
do this well.  
It is important to point out that for Aristotle, reason conceptually breaks down 
into two faculties: one dealing with what cannot be otherwise (the scientific, theoretical 
faculty), the other dealing with decision-making in the world of coming-to-be, or dealing 
with what can be otherwise (the calculative, practical faculty) (1139a17-1139a18). 
Deliberation is the activity proper to the calculative dimension of reason (e.g., 
deliberating about whether to quit a current job trajectory for the sake of one’s well-
being). As detailed above, everything we do, as human beings, is for the sake of 
flourishing. Desire necessarily leads us toward eudaimonia: an activity of the soul in 
accord with virtue. To act is accord with virtue—to be practically wise—is to deliberate 
well.  
To deliberate well involves the ability to identify relevant, salient features in new 
contexts, so as to tactfully make decisions that are informed by past experiences, albeit 
fine-tuned to fit the phenomena at hand. This process involves referencing ‘rules of 
thumb’ or ‘right-reason’ (universal notions of how one ought to proceed in various 
situations, derived from the community’s social norms and personal experience), and 
then tweaking them, so as to most adequately address the present situation—striving for 
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the mean (in relation to oneself) between excesses. To be virtuous is to have habituated 
this sort of adaptability, driven by a confidence in one’s ability to excellently respond to 
what is changing, unexpected, otherwise than before. This confidence derives from a 
habituated openness to external phenomena, and an acceptance of one’s exposure in the 
face of the unpredictable. This should be understood as a form of self-sufficiency, 
marked by a trust in oneself to respond appropriately, no matter the circumstances.  
This self-sufficiency qua self-confidence is what Aristotle has in mind when he 
describes self-love: it is taking pride in, and thus loving-desiring, one’s ability to reason 
well, even in the face of adversity, and especially in the face of something new and 
unexpected. Aristotelian self-love is the activity of trusting our capacity for virtue—a 
capacity that we can actualize and polish through intentional care toward how we respond 
to (changing) things outside of us. This trust in oneself is a necessary condition for being 
hospitable to, and thus vulnerable before, new data. 
With the Kantian self in mind, it is important to stress that the Aristotelian schema 
is by no means incompatible with Kant’s. The emphasis on self-legislation, i.e., 
governance by reason, is crucial for both thinkers, and while Kant has a different 
understanding of happiness than Aristotle (as Kant is ultimately critiquing a more 
hedonistic/relativistic/heteronomous sense of happiness than we find in Aristotle), both 
thinkers agree that happiness is not completely in one’s power, and that happiness is not 
the sort of thing that permits a universal definition that is not at least in some sense 
contingent on the agent. Kant’s response,40 however, is to provide a determinate moral 
																																																								
40 Here, I am following suit with his insistence on equality among rational beings, and, as Bernard Williams 
puts it, the need for “good news” about our human condition. For more on this, see Bernard Williams’s 
argument in Shame and Necessity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).  
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principle that is not only accessible to all, but completely within our control—and, in 
fact, something that we desire/will to do. That fact (of reason) never changes. For Kant, 
despite happiness being something we do not have control over—something we can 
simply hope for—we do have control over forming a just disposition; it is always in our 
power, it is always a matter of choice. It is in this sense that we are capable of being 
completely self-sufficient agents—freely choosing the autonomy of the will qua obeying 
the moral law/acting from duty. The bottom line for Kant is that satisfying individual 
happiness is never promised (contingent, conditioned), though a just community is ours, 
if we will it to be: if we will freedom. For Aristotle, if we are fortunate enough to find 
ourselves in a just community, and are properly trained by way of excellent moral 
education and good friends, virtue is for the most part in our power. This is to say that 
virtue is something that we are responsible for, but only insofar as we are provided with 
the right conditions. For Aristotle, we might simply be unlucky: born in an unjust 
community, born a slave, born a woman, or born in an environment that is simply 
inhospitable to virtuous behavior.   
In addition to this, and in contradistinction to the depiction of virtue that we get in 
Kant, the phronimos knows the good, does the good, and finds pleasure in that activity. 
This is to say that for Aristotle, there is no tension felt in the exercise of virtue—
especially not in the sense of a painful striking down of self-conceit (which, above all, 
honors inclination). For Aristotle, if self-conceit is pained, one is not fully virtuous, but 
rather morally strong or continent. Accordingly, moral strength involves knowing the 
good, doing the good, being pained by the process, but not shunning that pain in the way 
a morally weak/incontinent soul would. A central feature of virtue is that the virtuous self 
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is able to deliberate and choose in a way that is, as Aristotle puts it, “unimpeded” 
(1153a15), meaning that the subject is fully present to the content at hand, and is not at 
war with herself in any regard (‘war’ indicating a tension induced by fear’s hesitation, or 
the drive to flee from pain). Thus, the properly habituated soul does not feel painfully 
pulled by duty to do the right thing, or drawn toward the pleasure associated with various 
excesses. The properly habituated soul finds joy in the process of measuring, seeking the 
mean, and (through the habituation of temperance) working toward balance in any given 
context: by understanding all of the variables, locating what is and is not in one’s control, 
and then confidently choosing the best course of action, i.e., what is most conducive to 
happiness.  
Pleasure, as Aristotle understands it, is not a perceptible process, but an 
unimpeded activity that augments the full exercise of one of our faculties (1153a15-35). 
The pleasure specific to virtue is perhaps best described as a tranquil freedom, which is 
markedly distinct from the pleasures that are marked by self-indulgence (1153a30). Kant 
does not use this language in his account (as he dismisses all notions of pleasure as 
antithetical to virtue), but it seems clear that Aristotelian temperance is not incompatible 
with Kantian morality. The phronimos’s tranquil freedom is something akin to Kant’s 
autonomous will—a will not menaced by things that are ultimately not within one’s 
power. Moreover, Aristotle’s understanding of the pleasures of self-indulgence as 
something to be avoided is akin to Kant’s understanding of non-moral inclinations.  
The important point that Kant makes, which again, is in fact not at odds with 
Aristotle’s account, is that we cannot even begin talking about the practical dimensions of 
ethics (e.g., the virtues, friendship, etc.) until we know with certainty what is right: the 
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moral law, justice. For Aristotle, too, a just community is the condition for the possibility 
of virtuous dispositions and virtuous relations. Kant’s decisive move is to bring our desire 
for justice (the crowning virtue for Aristotle) ‘into the subject’ as the condition for the 
possibility of living well with others, ultimately redefining it as the moral law. For Kant, 
this is the baseline for peacefully co-existing in a community, ultimately built upon a 
notion of self-respect as an affect that springs from feeling respect for others by rationally 
encountering the humanity that each of has within ourselves (by virtue of reason). I 
would contend that, for both thinkers, justice is the necessary condition for effective 
moral education; and justice is the necessary condition for the ability to be an authentic 
friend. For Kant, following the moral law is nothing more than respecting the dignity 
(capacity for reason) in oneself and the other. Without a respect for dignity (or in 
Aristotle’s terms, a recognition and love of activity in accord with virtue), how could a 
friendship based on the good ensue? The moral law, as Kant establishes it, safeguards the 
integrity of non-economic relationships—that is, relations in which the other is always 
considered as an end in itself, never a mere means to something else (as is the case in 
Aristotelian friendship based on pleasure and utility). For Kant, friendships based solely 
on economy or pleasure would effectively be non-moral relations.   
To return to Aristotle’s account, it seems clear that justice—including 
education—is the condition for the possibility of the self-love that is required to properly 
order one’s soul, which ultimately involves granting reason the role of the master, i.e., 
respecting it as the highest and most noble part of the soul, and then habituating activities 
conditioned by reasoning well, so as to eventually find pleasure in activities that are, in 
fact, pleasant in themselves. In order to love oneself qua housing a rational principle, one 
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needs to be educated in a way that celebrates that dimension of oneself, and provides 
adequate space and time for one to learn how to do precisely this. As Aristotle writes at 
the end of the Ethics:  
But it is difficult to get from youth up a right training for virtue if one has not been 
brought up under right laws; for to live temperately and hardily is not pleasant to most 
people, especially when they are young. For this reason their nurture and occupations 
should be fixed by law; for they not be painful when they have become customary. But it 
is surely not enough that when they are young they should get the right nurture and 
attention; since they must, even when they are grown up, practice and be habituated to 
them, we shall need laws for this as well, and generally speaking to cover the whole of 
life; for most people obey necessity rather than argument, and punishments rather than 
the sense of what is noble. (1179b30-1180a5)  
 
Thus, those who do the work of actualizing justice (both unwritten and qua legislation) 
need to facilitate the habituation of virtue by constructing laws, systems, and structures 
that instill this in the community—above all, through the education of the youth. As 
Aristotle writes, “It makes no small difference, then, whether we form habits of one kind 
or of another from our very youth; it makes a very great difference, or rather all the 
difference” (1103b27-1104a9). We are the types of animals that form habits, and, qua 
social animals, those we are surrounded by inevitably in-form those habits. We are 
mirrors of those we are surrounded by, and as Aristotle stresses, this makes all the 
difference, as we are not born with habits innately built into us. Habits are either taught 
actively (e.g., observing and reflecting on a virtuous protagonist in a story with friends or 
classmates), or passively (e.g., becoming friends with someone who is a liar, and, over 
time, acquiring their habit of lying when facing painful situations). By instilling virtue 
into the youth, they can grow with their desires in line with virtue. 
 For Aristotle, education begins with the child integrated into the discourse of their 
community (by way of stories, traditions, music, morals, etc.,), and then gradually, with 
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age, reflecting on those accounts they are provided with, so as to learn how to construct 
judgments, and provide good reasons for those judgments. If properly habituated, the 
virtuous self is a self who is able to foster an orientation toward unpredictability and 
indeterminacy—the world of coming-to-be—that allows one to not only deliberate with 
confidence, but also to find tranquil freedom in this activity, embracing the 
unpredictability of life as we know it. Moral educators are, therefore, like doctors training 
aspiring physicians—both activities involve a lack of precision and predictability. They 
educate youth who are not only learning about what it might mean to live well, but who 
are actively engaged in the first steps of that process—hearing stories of virtue and vice, 
observing acts of virtue and vice, discussing them with their teachers and peers, and then 
eventually acting in light of those stories. With this in mind, it seems clear that 
conversation (and the habituation of conversation) is a vital, if not the most vital, 
dimension of moral education. That is, conversation understood as opening oneself to 
what is other than oneself qua listening (e.g., to a story, or to another person’s 
perspective), then working to understand the phenomena at hand with another. It goes 
without saying that the Socrates of the Platonic dialogues is paradigmatic of this activity.  
A brief note on the life of contemplation. I will refrain from entering the debate 
as to whether or not Aristotle’s account of happiness in Book X.6-8, i.e., happiness as the 
life of contemplation (activity of the soul in accordance with its highest or best part, 
nous), is at odds with the rest of the Ethics, i.e., the claim that happiness is the life of 
practical wisdom. However, it seems clear that, given Aristotle’s account of the faculties 
of reason, there is an excellence specific to our capacity and need to make decisions 
(phronesis), as well as an excellence specific to our capacity to study and behold 
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theoretical truths: namely, theoretical wisdom (sophia).41 Contemplation is the activity 
proper to the scientific/theoretical dimension of reason, accompanying theoretical 
wisdom.  
It is absurd to think that the philosopher, living the life of contemplation, 
completely ceases participation in the world of particularities and action altogether, or 
that the calculative element of the rational part of her soul somehow dissolves, and that 
making virtuous choices is no longer necessary. Deliberation is an intrinsic feature of 
human existence; deliberation is how we work toward the ultimate end that we all seek. 
As Aristotle writes:  
It is now clear that we should still need practical wisdom, even it had no bearing on 
action, because it is the virtue of a part of our soul. But it is also clear that <it does have 
an important bearing on action, since> no choice will be right without practical wisdom 
and virtue. For virtue determines the end, and practical wisdom makes us do what is 
conducive to the end. (1145a3-6, emphasis mine) 
 
Thus, it seems like the human good (given our embodied and social context, and our 
proper function) would ideally encompass both theoretical and practical wisdom—though 
this is an admittedly tall order. That said, I think Aristotle’s point is that although sophia 
and phronesis are distinct, the two intellectual virtues are by no means mutually 
exclusive, as “both theoretical and practical wisdom are necessarily desirable in 
themselves,” each simply involves a different part of the rational soul (1144a1-3). Sophia, 
pertaining to the “better part of our soul,” does not ever lose authority over practical 
reason; however, “man fulfills his proper function only by way of practical wisdom and 
moral excellence,” as “no choice will be right without practical wisdom and virtue” 
(1144a3-11). Insofar as a human is human, phronesis is a vital component of the good 
																																																								
41 For an impressive solution to this long-standing debate, see Gary M. Gurtler, S.J.’s “The Activity of 
Happiness in Aristotle’s Ethics.” The Review of Metaphysics 56 (June 2003): 801-834. 
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life because human life necessarily involves making decisions as one navigates through 
the particularities of experience—regardless of the type of life one is living.  
Beyond this, phronesis is what makes the provisions to secure or attain 
theoretical wisdom, even though phronesis is always subordinate to the contemplative 
end that it secures (1145a7-12). Given the fact that practical wisdom makes the 
provisions to secure theoretical wisdom, it seems somewhat unlikely that the philosopher 
would lack practical wisdom altogether (as she virtuously chooses to live the life of 
contemplation as a means to eudaimonia), though it is possible (as Aristotle notes in 
Book VI, referring to Anaxagoras and Thales). The philosopher inevitably needs to make 
decisions based on the concrete, particular circumstances she is confronted with, meaning 
she will inevitably be called to deliberate, exercise right reason, consider the emotions, 
and make good choices in a variety of situations. This means that it is by no means 
unthinkable for the sage, in addition to being wise in the most complete sense, to be 
practically wise, successfully habituating the moral virtues. 
Per Aristotle’s account in Book X, it seems like philosophers ought to strive to be 
both practically and theoretical wise—deliberating, acting, and contemplating at the right 
time, toward the right objects, toward the right people, for the right reason, and in the 
right manner (1106b21-23). As Aristotle puts it, contemplation itself can be injurious to 
health (1153a21)—not because it is pleasurable, but because it can, like anything else, be 
pursued in excess. An example of this might be an academic, completely immersed in her 
contemplative-scientific activities, disconnecting themselves from her communities, 
forgetting to tend to the practical dimensions of her well-being (e.g., her physical health), 
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and not having healthy social relations, which are crucial to being a part of the discourse 
of the community, and knowing the language of the people.42  
2.4 CONCLUSION 
To return to the chief aim of this chapter, given the sketch above of Aristotle’s ethical 
project and the conception of the self that operates therein, it seems clear that, for 
Aristotle, the virtuous soul is a soul habituated toward eudaimonia by and through a just 
community. Eudaimonia is the end that we desire most, and justice is the means to 
procure this end, as justice aims to safeguard the well-being of all individuals that 
constitute the whole community—thus implying that justice, including just education, is a 
concomitant end toward which all of our actions aim as a necessary condition for 
eudaimonia. Wherefore, we desire justice, too.  
Thus, the Aristotelian self is a self whose well-being depends on others. For 
Aristotle, we are social animals that require: 1) a just community through which we 
receive a proper education, and 2) friends who seek to love, preserve, and augment our 
well-being (and for which we do the same). Virtuous others are most necessary to 
living—necessary in the sense that it is (as Aristotle defines ‘necessary’ in the 
Metaphysics), “(a) that without which, as a condition, a thing cannot live … (b) the 
conditions without which good cannot be or come to be, or without which we cannot get 
																																																								
42 For an insightful and illuminating account of the relation between the philosophical and political lives in 
the Nicomachean Ethics, see Gabriel Richardson Lear’s “Two Happy Lives And Their Most Final Ends,” 
Chapter 8 in Happy Lives and the Highest Good: An Essay on Aristotle’s “Nicomachean Ethics," 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).  
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rid or be freed of evil; e.g., drinking the medicine” (Metaphysics, 1015b10-15). This is 
perhaps self-evident, but crucial, for it bears repeating that the road to eudaimonia hinges 
on the people around us (determining how we govern ourselves), which reiterates that 
eudaimonia, while a choice that we are responsible for, is something that is only partially 
in our control. We are vulnerable to those around us.  
Beyond this, it is ultimately through conversations with others who are older and 
wiser, and others who are our age, experiencing the things that we are experiencing as we 
experience them, that we are able to make sense of phenomena and work toward the aim 
of promoting eudaimonia both in ourselves and in the community at large. It perhaps 
goes without saying that habituating this sort of conversation is vital not only to one’s 
health, but also to the health of the community. It is this fundamental dimension of who 
we are—animals that are groomed, shaped, and habituated by others—that is safeguarded 
in Aristotle’s project. As is the case with Kant, it is ultimately the other who helps or 
hinders our capacity to know thyself. Furthermore, for Kant, it is our desire for the well-
being of the community—our desire for justice—that serves as a necessary condition for 
the possibility of our own well-being. And in the end, acting for the good of the whole 
takes precedence over everything, as this is the condition for the possibility of virtue. 
With this in mind, we can fast-forward to contemporary Aristotelian accounts, 
and the ways in which Aristotle’s ethics has been recollected, rejuvenated, and 









3.0  CHAPTER 3: RECOLLECTING THE TELEOLOGICAL SELF 
 
Nay, I said, ask if you will; but I am certain that you have heard the 
answer many times, and now you either do not understand me or, as I 
rather think, you are disposed to be troublesome; for you have been 
told that the idea of good is the highest knowledge, and that all other 
things become useful and advantageous only by their use of this. You 
can hardly be ignorant that of this I was about to speak, concerning 
which, as you have often heard me say, we know so little; and, without 
which, any other knowledge or possession of any kind will profit us 
nothing. Do you think that the possession of all other things is of any 
value if we do not possess the good?  
          —Socrates, Plato’s Republic, 505a-b 
 
This chapter fast-forwards to the ways in which Aristotelian approaches have been 
employed to address the arguably stifled state of contemporary moral philosophy. I will 
begin by describing the ‘crisis’ in 20th-century moral philosophy as rendered by seminal 
texts in the Anglo-American/analytic tradition, underscoring the problematic conception 
of the self that undergirds and fosters the perpetuation of that crisis—as production-
oriented and anti-contemplative—and the movement to reclaim Aristotelian virtue ethics 
as a direct response. I will then critically interpret two Aristotelian-inspired approaches to 
re-imagining the task of moral philosophy and the moral philosopher—one at the 
inception of the movement (Alasdair Macintyre), the other within the last decade (Talbot 
Brewer). Both Macintyre and Brewer are deeply committed to reclaiming the teleological 
self who is on the way to the good.  
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I conclude by identifying the major insights to build from in these exemplary 
cases, particularly the recovery of our intrinsic desire to immerse ourselves in activities 
for their own sake, that is, our desire to lose or disrupt ourselves (what I will call ‘self-
disruption’ in Chapters 4 and 5). I end by returning to Macintyre’s claim that Aristotle 
and Nietzsche are the only viable theoretical alternatives in our disordered contemporary 
context, ultimately proposing that Levinas’s unique and radical reclamation of moral 
sense and the ethical ‘self’, may in fact, be a viable ‘third way’—especially when 
understood through, and combined with, the motivations, critiques, and reclamations 
showcased in this chapter.43   
3.1 THE CRISIS 
 
In Robert Frodeman and Adam Briggle’s 2016 New York Times piece, “When Philosophy 
Lost its Way,” the authors argue that philosophy, in its attempt to emulate the method of 
the natural and social sciences in the modern university, deleteriously began “operating 
under the modus operandi of knowledge production,” prioritizing “knowledge of the 
good over doing the good.”44  
																																																								
43 I am grateful to Drew Alexander, Jorge Garcia, and Micah Lott for illuminating key debates within 20th-
century Anglo-American ethics, and for helping me appreciate the (re)turn to Aristotle there within.  
44 Robert Frodeman and Adam Briggle, “When Philosophy Lost Its Way,” in New York Times, “The Stone” 
(January 11, 2016).  It is important to stress that in order to do the good, there must be some sort of 
knowledge of the good, so this is not to say one comes without the other. Their point is that knowledge of 
the good qua concrete answers with supporting data/adequate justification has become the status quo in 
philosophy at the expense of the most pressing concern of being and doing good. Another way of putting it 
is that true belief in the good has taken precedence over the activity of understanding the good, which 
involves living that good.  
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At the onset of his 1981 text, After Virtue, Alasdair Macintyre notoriously laments 
that although we who do moral philosophy within academia’s walls use the language of 
morality, moral philosophy itself is in a grave state of disorder. Philosophy has lost its 
theoretical and practical comprehension of morality, which is to say that, despite 
Aristotle’s warning in Book II of the Ethics, philosophical knowledge of the good has 
effectively been divorced from doing the good. Rather than striving to help both others 
and themselves understand what it means to flourish or live well, moral philosophers now 
strive to keep up with the hard sciences: producing knowledge qua concrete answers, 
supported by adequate evidence, to a prefigured set of questions (e.g., what grounds the 
claims that morality makes on us?). This method often leads to reductionism for the sake 
of clarity, simplicity, universality, and normalization.45 And as we will see, it has also 
arguably led to the calcification of a predominantly production-oriented understanding of 
what it is to be, which has in turn de-emphasized the significance of activities and sources 
of value that are otherwise than industrious, efficient, or well-calculated.  
As Frodeman and Briggle stress, the language(s) of philosophy have somehow 
become more and more arcane and abstruse to those both inside and outside of 
academia’s walls—inhibiting both intra and inter-disciplinary communication. The most 
troubling aspect of this phenomenon is that once philosophers decided to stick to debates 
among those of ‘their kind’, esoterically quibbling over minor details within complex, 
abstract, and obscure arguments, people stopped listening to philosophers—and perhaps 
for good reasons. It is, after all, difficult to listen to someone who has fallen so deep into 
																																																								
45 Ibid. For a beautiful account of how the biggest danger to philosophy is not ignorance, but rather ‘bad 
philosophy’, see Chapter 8 of Martha Nussbaum’s The Fragility of Goodness. It is here that she 
characterizes bad philosophy as philosophy that values oversimplification and reduction, and captivates 
because of its clarity—ultimately simplifying life, as we know it.   
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their area of expertise that they have (almost) forgotten how to break things down to their 
most basic elements, or invite others into new discourse by way of accessible language. 
This is all to say that in its pressure to keep up with and protect a space for itself within 
the academy, it seems that philosophy has lost its way in the sense that it has strayed from 
an understanding of itself as a way of life—therapy for the soul—perhaps best 
exemplified by Socrates, the philosopher par excellence.46 Working within a results-
oriented paradigm (extending far beyond the academy, within K-12 spaces, too), graduate 
students and faculty feel the all-too-often insurmountable pressure to “publish or perish,” 
and are driven to become experts in a sense that often eliminates the possibility of having 
conversations with those outside of their area of specialization (sometimes including their 
own students).47  
It is important to stress that in itself, the pressure to keep up with the hard 
sciences is not necessarily a problem; it becomes a problem when philosophy—especially 
ethics/moral philosophy, questioning what it is to flourish in a world with with others—is 
rendered obsolete. That is, it becomes a problem when philosophy comes to be 
understood as a discipline that perhaps has no place in education, especially if there is 
sparse evidence of its efficacy.48   
																																																								
46 Authors like Pierre Hadot have made precisely this point, attempting to swing philosophy back, in the 
spirit of the ancients to philosophy as a way of life. See Hadot’s 1995 text, Philosophy as a Way of Life: 
Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault.  
47 There are, of course, exceptions to this, but the way the discipline is set up, in order to succeed in the 
academic world, one must become an expert on a thin slice within the tradition—perhaps opening up to a 
set of thinkers or questions adjacent to the thinker or question at hand, but never much more than that. And 
how could they? We only have so much time, and between teaching, publication, and service requirements, 
it is incredibly difficult to become well-read beyond a given piece of the philosophical pie, and the 
approved strictures beyond which one need not proceed.  
48 I have in mind here what is now referred to as the crisis in the humanities, which involves the growing 
lack of institutional-financial support for various programs in the liberal arts due to skepticism on how 
these programs contribute to student success. For a rich account of the problem and subsequent defense of 
the value of the humanities, see “What Good are the Humanities,” a lecture delivered by Talbot Brewer on 
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Rewind to 1912: in H.A. Prichard’s seminal defense of ethical intuitionism, 
“Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?,” 49  Prichard provides a much-cited, 
thorough account of the crisis in 20th-century moral philosophy. He begins by explaining 
that a time inevitably comes when the student of moral philosophy finds herself 
dissatisfied with the subject as a whole. The arguments becoming decreasingly 
convincing and the aim of the subject becomes increasingly obscure. The aspiring moral 
philosopher cannot help but ask herself what she is arguing for, for whom, and why.50 
Though Prichard does not get into this, it is important to underscore that this inevitable 
moment of existential crisis often leads to frustration, apathy, and at its worst, resentment 
toward one’s activities within the discipline—and the discipline as a whole. While 
Prichard’s description of the plight of the student of moral philosophy is apt (even 100 
years later), it seems strange that the aim of moral philosophy could be or become so 
obscure. Although living well is not always an easy task, what about it is so abstruse?  
What Prichard is referring to is an abstruseness that is the result of a particular 
way of proceeding in moral philosophy—that is, a methodological approach that (in the 
wake of Kant) requires 1) proofs or arguments for specific ways of understanding 
ourselves and how we ought to be within a world with others, and 2) the relentless 
critiquing, tweaking, and sharpening of those proofs (in deference to the 
literature/debates on the table) over and over again. Prichard’s claim is that the chief 
reason the student of moral philosophy becomes increasingly unconvinced by moral 
																																																																																																																																																																					
December 14, 2016. Also see Frodeman and Briggle’s recent publication, Socrates Tenured: The 
Institutions of 21st-Century Philosophy, which uses data to elaborate on their claims in this article.  
49 H.A. Prichard, “Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?” in Moral Writings (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 1-17.  
50 Echoing Prichard: what are we really going to learn by Moral Philosophy? What are the books on Moral 
Philosophy really trying to show, and when there is clarity, why are they so unconvincing and artificial? 
And why is it so difficult to substitute anything better? (Ibid., 1).  
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philosophy’s arguments and suspicious of its aim is that moral philosophy is repeatedly, 
mistakenly, and even foolishly attempting to answer an improper question: namely, why 
should I take care of the other(s)? Or in Kantian terms, why should I act from duty?  
The moral philosopher’s task, therefore, presupposing the precedence of some 
version of this question, is to 1) find the ground of morality—namely, the fundamental 
thing, à la Kant, that justifies why I ought to do my duty and take care of the other(s)—
and then to 2) convincingly prove why it is so. And by Prichard’s account, 
methodologically speaking, this is a mistake.  
Critical of both the deontological and utilitarian-consequentialist traditions, as 
well as the predominantly binary ethical milieu in modern moral philosophy (that is, the 
theoretical either/or of some breed of deontology or utilitarianism), Prichard stresses that 
the underlying fallacy in moral theory is that ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ have something to do 
with motives or aims. His claim is that these things have nothing to do with motives 
because duty has nothing to do with (a certain form of) justification. And why? Because 
it is immediate, intuitive, and self-evident. There is no motive for our motives in the 
sense of reasons that lie somewhere outside of immediate apprehension of the value in 
engaging in the activity itself—that is, desiring to engage in the activity itself.  
Kant himself suggests as much in the Groundwork, carefully delineating the 
difference between hypothetical and categorical imperatives: the former involving an 
action done for the sake of an intended purpose (denoting a lack of moral worth), the 
latter expressing the marriage of action and purpose (denoting moral worth). Where 
moral worth is concerned, the ‘purpose’ is the action. That is, the action is done for its 
own sake, not for the sake of anything else. For Kant, as we saw in Chapter 1, the mark 
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of morality is precisely the fact that the action is not chosen on the ground of something 
different from the action itself. Granted, Kant nonetheless asks and tries to answer the 
allegedly illegitimate question. 
So why, then, do we insist, like Kant, on finding a ground for just actions? 
Prichard’s claim is that we insist on finding a ground because reflection evokes the why 
question (why did you do X? And why should you do Y?), ultimately leading reason to 
demand a motive for the moral motive (though the motive for the motive does not 
actually exist in the form that reason demands). Prichard’s point is that when we reflect 
on our actions, and untangle our motives (as Kant does in the Groundwork), we cannot 
help but arrive at a sense of mediation that leads us to think there were reasons (beyond 
engaging in the right thing) for doing the right thing, somehow disconnecting the action 
itself from the purpose of that action (what the action will bring about). Prichard stresses 
that ‘motive’ is not the same thing as ‘purpose’, as the latter implies an understanding of 
obligation based on the recognition of goodness (in or by the action), whereas the former 
is simply a desire-inducing action, which need not involve a determinate object of desire 
or purpose. Reflection thus leads us into a moral perspective that problematically 
presupposes the need to prove the purpose of our action, as though every action has an 
objective aim or purpose outside of itself that we ought to desire to bring about.  
For Prichard, hearkening to Aristotle, we do not appreciate obligation by way of 
argumentation. Our sense of obligation results from, as he puts it, our immediate 
apprehension and appreciation of goodness, intuition. Thus by Prichard’s account, we 
(moral philosophers) have been duped in the sense that reflection has tricked us into 
reinforcing a problem that we cannot solve because it is ultimately self-evident; it is a 
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fool’s task to try and prove what is already the case. Our mistake in moral philosophy, 
therefore, is presupposing the possibility of proving what is right in front of our faces. As 
Nussbaum puts it in the Fragility of Goodness—echoing Aristotle’s insistence in Book 
Gamma of the Metaphysics that we cannot prove what is self-evident—the charge to 
prove what is right in front of our faces is ultimately made by one who does not know the 
ways of one’s community, as they lack a certain degree of education (apaideusia).51 In 
Prichard’s case, the non-community member who demands a demonstration for what 
need not be demonstrated is the moral philosopher.   
With the discontented students of moral philosophy in mind, Prichard 
appropriately asks: if there can be no answer to an illegitimate question, except that the 
question is illegitimate, what can moral philosophy hope to answer or offer? What work 
is there to be done? By Prichard’s account, we, moral philosophers, will inevitably and 
erroneously continue to repeat an improper question—demanding, like Kant, a ground for 
morality—until we realize that obligation is self-evident, immediate apprehended.52 That 
is, we will continue asking an illegitimate question until we realize that there is no ground 
for morality—at least not in the way philosophical reflection has assumed there to be.  
Does this mean that ethical intuitionism—unwavering confidence in instant 
ethical knowledge—has the final word?  And that when it comes to questions concerning 
duty, justice, and what we owe each other, there is no place for a certain type of 
argumentation? What, then, is the task of moral philosophy?  
																																																								
51 Nussbaum, Fragility, 252.  
52 Prichard, “Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?”, 8.  
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A plethora of 20th-century philosophers have agreed with Prichard, discarding 
morality and moral theories as illusions or futile attempts to prove something that we 
simply cannot prove. Because the sense that we ought to do something arises in our 
unreflective consciousness, occasioned by the various situations in which we find 
ourselves, it rests on immediate confidence in response to certain phenomena—
apprehended by an act of moral thinking. This resonates with the ‘Aristotelian’ approach, 
as Aristotle is not trying to prove why we ought to be just, or to convince us (via logos 
alone) that we ought to do things. The best that virtue ethics can offer, as Prichard 
stresses, is the details of our desire to flourish, to be more fulfilled, which is always and 
already being the case. But this will not tell us what we ought to do and why. As Prichard 
writes, the Nicomachean Ethics is so “disappointing” to moral philosophers because 
Aristotle does not do what moral philosophers want him to do, i.e., answer why we ought 
to do our duty.53 As we saw in Chapter 2, Aristotle does not promise to tell us what we 
ought to do and why, but instead describes virtue and its relation to eudaimonia. Virtue, 
as Prichard puts it, is no ground for morality. For Aristotle, there is an immediate 
apprehension of the goodness of good dispositions: they are pleasing, intuitive, 
intrinsically fulfilling.54  
																																																								
53 Ibid., 13.  
54 That said, plenty of ink has been and continues to be shed on attempts to ground our duty to others, 
presupposing that we can in fact argue our way into moral behavior, or satisfy the egoist’s demand for 
proof as to why one ought to proceed otherwise than in a way that is in one’s self-interest. This is not to say 
that this work (of attempting to demonstrate what is allegedly non-demonstrable) has been in vain, but that 
it is symptomatic of habits that we (in moral philosophy) have trained ourselves into (e.g., how to approach 
philosophical problems)—habits that have calcified, and are extremely difficult to break, given the power 
structures operative within the discipline itself. The Kantian approach, crucial for our purposes here, 
(illegitimately) demands that we locate the fundamental thing that justifies why I ought to do my duty and 
take care of my neighbor—and then to prove why it is so. It is important to keep in mind, as we saw in 
Chapter 1, that Kant himself ditched the need for a deduction proving the moral law, as the moral law is not 
the sort of thing can be proven that way, but is simply a fact of reason: something that is immediately 
apprehended when human dignity is at stake.   
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Prichard’s somewhat scandalous point at the end of the essay is that the remedy 
for moral philosophy does not lie in the process of reflection (e.g., providing a new and 
improved argument for a new ground for morality, thus attempting to answer what 
Christine Korsgaard calls, “the normative question”: what justifies the claims that 
morality makes on us?), but instead in a reconsideration of the nature of A (e.g., 
obligation to be honest) and B (e.g., when you do not love someone anymore) as it leads 
to the knowledge that A necessarily involves B. That is, it lies in the process of enriching 
our understanding of the relations among things.  
Prichard stresses that the realization of the self-evidence of moral thinking is in 
fact positive knowledge, and that as long as moral philosophy is confined to this type of 
knowledge, the work of moral philosophy is not in vain. Thus, the best (and perhaps 
only) way to understand morality is to get ourselves into situations that occasion 
obligation, talk to those who have been in those situations, or imagine ourselves in those 
situations, and then let our moral capacities do their work—reconsidering/working to 
understand, by way of experience, what is self-evident. As Prichard writes, “if we do 
doubt that there is an obligation to originate A in a situation B, the remedy lies not in the 
process of general thinking, but in getting face to face with a particular instance of the 
situation B, and then directly appreciating the obligation to originate A in that 
situation.”55 Or in other words, if we come to doubt that 2+2=4, then we should do the 
math again. And, as he concludes, when doubts arise in regard to obligations that affect 
the whole conduct of life, the business of ‘doing the math again’—legitimate moral 
philosophy—is vital.  
																																																								
55 Prichard, “Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?”, 17.  
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 Forty-six years later, Elizabeth Anscombe notoriously addresses the still-troubled 
state of moral philosophy in her 1958 piece, “Modern Moral Philosophy.” In the text—
famous for explicitly initiating the renaissance of Aristotelian virtue ethics—Anscombe 
presents three clear theses, all of which have served as a starting point for a number of 
contemporary moral projects:  
The first is that it is not profitable for us at present to do moral philosophy; that should be 
laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, in which we 
are conspicuously lacking. The second is that the concepts of obligation and duty—moral 
obligation and moral duty, that is to say—and of what is morally right and wrong, and of 
the moral sense of "ought," ought to be jettisoned if this is psychologically possible; 
because they are survivals, or derivatives from survivals, from an earlier conception of 
ethics which no longer generally survives, and are only harmful without it. My third 
thesis is that the differences between the well-known English writers on moral 
philosophy from Sidgwick to the present day are of little importance.56 
 
In regard to the first thesis, by “philosophy of psychology,” Anscombe is referring to a 
careful analysis of what links motives to actions, as well as a thorough description of 
action, intention, pleasure, wanting, and virtue in general—including what type of 
characteristic virtue is. This should be understood as a call to provide a more adequate 
account of who we are, as revealed in the things we desire and do.  
In regard to the second thesis, Anscombe is suggesting that moral philosophy 
ditch the moral ought and all of its associated action-focused (rather than character-
focused) baggage, i.e. the Kantian-inspired language of obligation, duty, right, wrong, 
should, need, must, etc., and should instead ‘return’ to a more Aristotelian way of 
proceeding. The moral ought, by Anscombe’s account, is nothing more than the residue 
of divine command theory in Christianity, which reigned throughout the middle ages and 
the renaissance (initiated by the Church’s need to adequately deal with sin), ultimately 
requiring a divine source to serve as the absolute criterion by which one can determine 
																																																								
56 G.E.M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” in Philosophy (1958) 33, No. 124. 
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whether an action is right or wrong. This was re-appropriated by Kant, who located the 
‘divine’ source in rationality itself, still serving as an absolute criterion by which one can 
decisively determine whether an action is right or wrong.  
Anscombe’s final thesis is in direct response to what she takes to be the ethical 
theory that had come to dominate modern moral philosophy: consequentialism. Her chief 
issue with consequentialism, as she strikingly reiterates at the end of the piece, is that it is 
the sort of ethical theory that could in fact warrant the judicial condemnation of the 
innocent, insofar as it produces the ‘best’ consequences by conventional standards. She 
charges the theory (the latest breed of utilitarianism) as being shallow, anything but 
profound, ultimately revealing the detachment of theorizers in their imagined 
hypotheticals (laced with false dilemmas) from life, as we know it. For Anscombe, 
English philosophy—setting the status quo in Anglo-American philosophy—was in fact 
dwelling so high up in the ivory tower than they failed to recognize the self-evident 
problems with this sort of theory, e.g., that human beings can be used as a means to 
secure the most desirable set of (subjective) ends.  
Anscombe somewhat pessimistically ends her piece by stressing that the then-
current situation in moral philosophy lacks the philosophical equipment it needs to 
adequately move forward, and that our task in modern moral philosophy is to start 
constructing that equipment, so as to get ourselves out of the dire situation in which we 
find ourselves. Like Prichard, Anscombe stresses that Aristotle will not provide us with 
an adequate account of moral theory as universal norms, a defense of why we should act 
from duty, etc., though his methodology and focus sheds light on how we might 
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proceed—namely, by focusing on character, the acting subject, rather than the actions 
themselves and their possible consequences.  
Korsgaard later emphasizes that the active ‘flight’ from utilitarianism is an apt 
way of describing the task of late 20th-century moral philosophy (to the present).57 As a 
Kantian, Korsgaard recognizes the trouble with locating moral worth in the often 
unpredictable consequences of our actions, as well as the fact that morality so construed 
looks something more like economics—locating value in what is brought about, rather 
that how an agent orients themselves toward the phenomena at hand. Korsgaard takes this 
a step further, and rightly emphasizes that morality is not about owing or doing 
something to one another, but rather doing something together.58 The force of morality 
comes from the inter-subjective dimension of it, our personal relations.  
*** 
With contemporary moral philosophy’s crisis in mind, the question moral 
philosophy and moral philosophers face is: how might we re-imagine our approach to the 
problems moral philosophy and moral philosophers inevitably face? Namely, A) the 
methodological problems that come with attempting to answer a problematic set of 
																																																								
57 In her 1993 article, Korsgaard provides a description of the situation in moral philosophy. As she writes: 
“To later generations, much of the moral philosophy of the twentieth century will look like a struggle to 
escape from utilitarianism. We seem to succeed in disproving one utilitarian doctrine, only to find ourselves 
caught in the grip of another. I believe that this is because a basic feature of the consequentialist outlook 
still pervades and distorts our thinking: the view that the business of morality is to bring something about. 
Too often, the rest of us have pitched our protests as if we were merely objecting to the utilitarian account 
of what the moral agent ought to bring about or how he ought to do it. Deontological considerations have 
been characterized as ‘side-constraints’, as if they were essentially restrictions on ways to realize ends. 
More importantly, moral philosophers have persistently assumed that the primal scene of morality is a 
scene in which someone does something to or for someone else. This is the same mistake that children 
make about another primal scene. The primal scene of morality, I will argue, is not one in which I do 
something to you or you do something to me, but one in which we do something together” (“The Reasons 
We Can Share: An Attack on the Distinction Between Agent-Relative and Agent-Neutral Values,” Social 
Philosophy and Policy 10, no. 1 (1993): 24-51), 24.  
58 Ibid.  
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prefigured moral questions (e.g., what do we owe each other? And why do we owe each 
other anything at all?) by way of a certain mode of argumentation, and B) the existential 
problems that result from moral philosophers being dissatisfied with the discipline as a 
whole.  
In direct and indirect response to Prichard’s problematization of the reigning 
method in moral philosophy, we find at least three different movements in contemporary 
ethics: 1) some, in the legacy of Kant, continuing to produce arguments for moral 
behavior, still asking what grounds or justifies the claims that morality makes on us;59 2) 
others heeding the call initiated by Elizabeth Anscombe to return to the virtue ethics of 
the ancients, in hopes of the wisdom of the past saving us from the sad state of the 
present;60 and 3) some probing what gives ethics meaning in the first place.61 This 
chapter will primarily focus on those who have heeded Anscombe’s call; Chapter 4 will 
focus on Levinas’s probing of what gives ethics meaning in the first place.  
As has been alluded to above, the 20th-century’s revival of virtue ethics is perhaps 
best characterized as a direct response to the false dilemma between Kantianism-
																																																								
59 This question comes from Korsgaard’s The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), spawning, as she explains, from the philosopher’s demand to justify morality (20). Here I 
have in mind thinkers like John Rawls, Thomas Nagel, T.M. Scanlon, Christine Korsgaard, and Stephen 
Darwall, among many others within the Anglo-American tradition (representing various breeds of moral 
theories, e.g., deontology, utilitarianism, and virtue ethics). 
60 I also have in mind here the work of thinkers like Martha Nussbaum, Paul Ricoeur, and Richard Kearney, 
who advocate a narrative approach to ethics, which is itself grounded in a ‘return’ to Aristotelian ethics. 
61 E.g., Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Nancy, Derrida, Sartre, and Levinas, among many others in the 
so-called ‘continental tradition’. For a helpful account of “the problem of responsibility” or the continental 
tradition’s response to the futility in arguing for, or proving, a moral code of conduct, see François 
Raffoul’s, The Origins of Responsibility (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010). As he puts it, 
referencing Jean-Luc Nancy, “In fact, one may ask whether it is the role of philosophy to prescribe norms 
of ethics, to establish a ‘morality’, to posit norms or values. Jean-Luc Nancy, for instance, considers that 
“no philosophy either provides or is by itself a ‘morality’ in this sense. Philosophy is not charged with 
prescribing norms or values.” Rather, the task of philosophy is to question the ethicality of ethics, to engage 
a philosophical reflection on the meaning of ethics, on what puts us “in the position of having to choose 
norms or values” (2). 
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deontology and utilitarianism-consequentialism as the reigning options in moral theory. It 
has become the ‘third option’, a new solution to the same problem (how ought we to act? 
And why?), though its status as a third option has been contested.62 That being said, the 
neoaristotelian approach differentiates itself by reclaiming: 1) the significance of 
metaphysics as informative to ethics; 2) a robust sense of goodness/the good; and 3) the 
importance of narrative and conversation. This reclamation is born out of a response to 
the predominantly binary ethical milieu in contemporary ethics: a theoretical either/or 
between deontology (the legacy of Kant) and utilitarianism-consequentialism (the legacy 
of Bentham and Mill). 
While I think that the approach to and account of the subject that we get within 
contemporary virtue ethics marks an important shift in moral thinking in the 20th-century, 
the position is perhaps less radical than one might expect. As we saw in the first two 
chapters, Kant and Aristotle are far from incompatible, but rather emphasize different 
dimensions of our ethical lives. Within this vein, Nussbaum stresses in Fragility that, first 
and foremost, this “taxonomy” (of ‘virtue ethics’ versus, for example, ‘deontology’) is 
confused, as Kant and major utilitarian thinkers have theories of virtue.63 Beyond this, 
there is little unity within the ‘virtue ethics’ movement itself, which makes sense, given 
the fact that Aristotle is an extremely wide-ranging thinker, often included contradictory 
perspectives within his own account.64 As Nussbaum points out, some use virtue ethics as 
the cornerstone of anti-utilitarian thinking (allowing for a heterogeneity of values), others 
use virtue ethics as the cornerstone of anti-Kantian thinking (because Kantian project 
																																																								
62 By both Alasdair Macintyre and Talbot Brewer, among others.   
63 Nussbaum, Fragility, xxiv.  
64 Ibid., xxv.  
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focus too much on rationality, at the expense of sentiments and passions), and still others 
understand Kant and Aristotle as complementary, ultimately seeking to synthesize their 
respective projects to construct a more robust/comprehensive moral theory.  
It is important to stress that Aristotle, Kant, Mill, etc., are part of the same 
Western tradition (and they are certainty taught within the same curricula)—even if, as 
Macintyre will argue, the Aristotelian tradition was lost with the rise of the modern 
autonomous moral subject, and the lack of historical context in 20th-century Anglo-
American ethics. That said, as Talbot Brewer rightly points out in The Retrieval of Ethics 
(as I will elucidate below), using virtue ethics as yet another theory among normative 
moral theories—the silver bullet that will save moral philosophy was its disordered 
state—is problematic, as it still fails to address the problem(s) moral philosophy and 
moral philosophers face. It simply throws another solution at the same problematic 
problem, rather that working to understand the problem in the first place. 
With this sketch of the ‘crisis’ in contemporary moral philosophy mind, we can 
now turn to two case studies within the neoaristotelian movement in contemporary 
Anglo-American ethics—one residing at its inception as an initial diagnosis of the 
troubled state of contemporary moral philosophy/proposal for something otherwise 
(Alasdair Macintyre), the other serving as a current-exemplary-comprehensive case 
elaborating on Macintyre’s proposal (Talbot Brewer)—to critically analyze the ways in 
which each author has rejected the ethos of modern moral philosophy, and attempted to 
propose something new. This will ultimately give us the tools we need to frame the 
chapters that follow, fine-tuning and elaborating on their insights.  
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3.2 A REVIVAL OF VIRTUE ETHICS: ALASTAIR MACINTYRE & THE 
NARRATIVE SELF 
Macintyre’s After Virtue is, without question, one of the most significant contemporary 
texts on the revival of virtue ethics—grounded in a genuine despair about the state of 
20th-century moral philosophy. As Macintyre writes in the prologue to the 2007 edition of 
After Virtue,	65 “ours too is a time of waiting for new and unpredictable possibilities of 
renewal. It is also a time for resisting as prudently and courageously and justly and 
temperately as possible the dominant social, economic, and political order of advanced 
modernity.” (He calls not only for a renewal within the academy, but within our culture 
as a whole.) For Macintyre (echoing Anscombe), a lot of work needs to be done before 
we can do moral philosophy again. And part of this work involves relinquishing certain 
methods, models, and understandings: above all, the Enlightenment-inspired 
understanding of ourselves as atomized autonomous agents. This process includes 
looking back, retrieving, and rehabilitating Aristotle’s ethical project—attempting to 
bring the past into the present, first and foremost, because in the ancients we find robust 
philosophies of psychology qua descriptive accounts of desire, deliberation choice, 
intention, and action.66  
Macintyre reiterates that the point in rehabilitating virtue ethics is not to use 
Aristotle to battle and defeat the Kantians, utilitarianism, etc., once and or all, but rather 
to use Aristotle as a precious resource for understanding “why the culture of moral 
modernity lacks the resources to proceed further with its own moral enquiries, so that 
																																																								
65 Because I am providing a close analysis of After Virtue (and am not referencing other texts by Macintyre) 
I will include parenthetical references in cases that would otherwise be relegated to footnotes.  
66 Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” 26.  
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sterility and frustration are bound to afflict those unable to extricate themselves from 
those predicaments” (x). As we saw in Chapter 2, crucial within Aristotle’s framework is 
his understanding that human beings function as they do because they are directed toward 
a very specific end. He finds Aristotle’s teleological conception of the self to be vital, as 
the death of teleology in modern/Enlightenment era philosophy marks both the death of 
the good, and (in the wake of Kant) the rise of secular, rationalistic accounts of the nature 
and status of morality—which have all failed.  
Morality as it stands (that is, Anglo-American/analytic moral philosophy) 
possesses only fragments of morality without socio-historic context, rendering morality, 
as we know it, to be nothing more than simulacra of being moral-ethical. What’s worse is 
that moral philosophy as it stands may not even know that philosophy has suffered and is 
suffering—and if it does, it may be struggling to recognize and admit defeat. Although, 
for Macintyre, there is no remedy for a disaster this big, he thinks that pessimism is a 
cultural luxury that is simply not acceptable (5). Macintyre thus calls for, as Brewer 
succinctly puts it, “radical reform in modes of ethical thinking in and beyond the 
academy.”67 
  So, what, specifically, makes 20th-century moral philosophy so disordered? And 
how does this relate to a problematic understanding of who we are?  
Macintyre argues that 20th-century moral philosophy is best characterized as 
something resembling political debates, in which opposing parties air out their feelings, 
attitudes, and preferences (approvals and disapprovals), masquerading them as 
impersonal criteria-objective standards. The trouble with this is that moral disagreements 
																																																								
67 Talbot Brewer, The Retrieval of Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 4.  
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on certain issues (e.g., is abortion wrong?) have no terminus because, despite opposing 
arguments simultaneously being valid, their assertions are incommensurable, meaning 
there is no way to determine who should win an argument when each side is appealing to 
incommensurable values-criteria (preferences)—like a religious war between peoples 
whose sacred texts have radically different orientations toward truth, or a debate between 
an atheist and a theist.68   
  What is most alarming for Macintyre is that despite the fact that emotivism—the 
theory suggesting that all evaluate judgments (including moral judgments) are nothing 
but subjective expressions of preference, attitude, or feeling (11-12)—fails as a theory of 
meaning (because it fails to “decipher the meaning of key expressions in both everyday 
and scientific language” (20)),69 it retained power, culturally speaking, in 20th-century 
England, thus setting the agenda in Anglo-American moral philosophy. (This is to say 
that methodologically speaking, Anglo-American moral philosophy predominantly 
consists of arguments defending somewhat arbitrary preferences.) Though emotivism 
turns to language to understand moral judgments, it fails to acknowledge that language is 
contingent on its socio-historic context, ultimately underestimating the complexity of 
history/the heterogeneity of moral sources that we have inherited.  
As Macintyre notes, the most powerful response to emotivism in early 20th-
century moral philosophy is the Kantian claim that we can only justify judgments by 
referring to a universal rule—a claim defended by deontological thinkers like John 
																																																								
68 As Kierkegaard I think rightly points out through Johannes Climacus in Philosophical Fragments, an 
argument is not going to convince you of the existence of god (that is truly believing it with every ounce of 
your being), or push you into a new mode of living. These shifts are the result of passion—a leap—and this 
is not the sort of thing that an argument in itself will induce. Although arguments can help someone 
understand something differently, being wholly convinced requires more. 
69 Because moral judgments are, in fact, more than arbitrary choices.  
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Rawls. But again, the trouble with this claim is that its defenders cannot agree on “the 
character of moral rationality or on the substance of the morality which is to be founded 
on that rationality” (21). For Macintyre, this is case and point of the fact the universal-
rule project fails, as each perspective again rests on the preferences, attitudes, or feelings 
of the subject advocating the universal-rule. As he writes:  
The diversity of contemporary moral debate and its interminability are indeed mirrored in 
the controversies of analytical moral philosophers. But if those who claim to be able to 
formulate principles on which rational moral agents ought to agree cannot secure 
agreement on the formulation of those principles from their colleagues who share their 
basic philosophical purpose and method, there is once again prima facie evidence that 
their project has failed, even before we have examined their particular contentions and 
conclusions. Each of them in his criticism offers testimony to the failure of his 
colleagues' constructions. (21)  
 
Emotivism’s stronghold on 20th-century moral philosophy is, therefore, a key dimension 
of its disorder. Macintyre’s twofold task in After Virtue is thus 1) to show that he is 
correct in his characterization of “the modern age”—that is, the culture of contemporary 
moral philosophy and Western culture in general—as predominantly emotivist in 
practice, and 2) to identify the lost morality of the past, and evaluate its claims to 
objectivity and authority, as its loss marks severe cultural degeneration (22). A crucial 
part of task 1 involves understanding historically what set the stage for emotivism’s 
fracturing and displacement of morality; and a crucial part of task 2 involves 
reconstructing Aristotelian virtue ethics, in particular its conception of who we are.  
 Task 1. By Macintyre’s account, the (Anglo-American) subject of the modern age 
is a subject that has been dissociated from its context: no social identity, no historical 
embeddedness, and, most tragically for Macintyre, no telos, i.e., no notion of a complete 
or whole human life. And because emotivism is limited to evaluations expressing 
personal preference (even if under the guise of a universal rule), there can be no 
	 111	
distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative relations because everything 
amounts to finding the means to one’s self-interests, thus rendering others as means, as 
the goal is always to align the interest of others with one’s self-interest (23-4). As 
Macintyre writes:  
For evaluative utterance can in the end have no point or use but the expression of my own 
feelings or attitudes and the transformation of the feelings and attitudes of others. I 
cannot genuinely appeal to impersonal criteria, for there are no impersonal criteria. I may 
think that I so appeal and others may think that I so appeal, but these thoughts will always 
be mistakes. The sole reality of distinctively moral discourse is the attempt of one will to 
align the attitudes, feelings, preference and choices of another with its own. Others are 
always means, never ends. (24) 
 
So the social scene of the modern age is that of decontextualized selves seeking to fulfill 
their own interests (capricious as they may be), doing whatever it takes to maintain their 
preferences, and becoming quite efficient at this process of establishing means to 
projected ends.  
Macintyre thus diagnoses our culture as a culture of managers (seeking profit 
through skill, avoiding public debate), therapists (seeking to shift maladjusted individuals 
into adjusted individuals, avoiding public debate), protestors (seeking to make their 
dogma the dogma of others), and rich aesthetes (resembling something like Kierkegaard’s 
‘A’, governed by pleasure and pleasure alone). These four characters represent the masks 
worn by moral philosophies, and serve as representations of our culture. These 
characters—rat-racing to fulfill their self-interests—are part of an age that is governed by 
the ghostly bureaucracy of Heidegger’s Das Mann or Kierkegaard’s Public. Given our 
current social and political context in the United States at least, it seems clear that 
Macintyre’s disturbingly accurate social theory is alive and well. Our current president is 
the manager par excellence, placed into office at least partially because he represents the 
values of the people: namely, the consumerism that drives people to make profit, spend 
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that profit, and do their best to become adjusted individuals by whatever means 
necessary, e.g., therapy, drugs, exercise, diet, etc.  
Anglo-American culture in practice is clearly not Aristotle’s just city or Kant’s 
kingdom of ends, but rather an amalgam of physically and mentally disconnected 
individuals pursuing happiness—inevitably in competition with each other, tirelessly 
working to establish their place in the sun, whatever the price.  
And how did we come to this? Macintyre’s claim is that the Enlightenment’s 
failure to solve its own problems was a key factor in determining our current academic 
and social problems (39). Both the Enlightenment and Renaissance before it—best 
exemplified in Kant’s ‘Copernican’ turn—marks an era in which man as rationality 
became the standard of truth, rather than some external authority (e.g., religious doctrine 
or a teleological worldview). Man again became the measure of all things: liberated from 
the shackles of religious dogma and superstition. Some key consequences of the failure of 
the Enlightenment include the theoretical gaps established between 1) reason and 
emotion, 2) nature as it is and nature as it ought to be, and 3) self-interest/happiness and 
the interest of others/the happiness of the whole. As we saw in Chapter 1, to determine 
whether reason or sentimentality grounds morality became a central task in modern moral 
philosophy, in addition to the need to determine how human nature (nature as it is) relates 
to moral expectations (nature as it ought to be, or as it could be), and how self-interest 
could be reconciled with the interests of others. All of these gaps are problematic in the 
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sense that they involve attempting to connect and construct a relation of causal 
dependency between two ostensibly heterogeneous things.70  
Beyond this, as Macintyre points out, Kantianism and utilitarianism-
consequentialism are the two key Enlightenment theories that have failed, albeit remain 
at the center of moral philosophy, as though they have to some degree succeeded. They 
are the starting points of the vast majority of discussions in ethics, characterizing the ‘two 
poles’ in which we can place moral worth: either in the intention/principle or in the 
consequences. As Macintyre writes: 
I take it then that both the utilitarianism of the middle and late nineteenth century and the 
analytical moral philosophy of the middle and late twentieth century are alike 
unsuccessful attempts to rescue the autonomous moral agent from the predicament in 
which the failure of the Enlightenment project of providing him with a secular, rational 
justification for his moral allegiances had left him. I have already characterized that 
predicament as one in which the price paid for liberation from what appeared to be the 
external authority of traditional morality was the loss of any authoritative content from 
the would-be moral utterances of the newly autonomous agent. Each moral agent now 
spoke unconstrained by the externalities of divine law, natural teleology or hierarchical 
authority; but why should anyone else now listen to him? It was and is to this question 
that both utilitarianism and analytical moral philosophy must be understood as attempting 
to give cogent answers; and if my argument is correct, it is precisely this question which 
both fail to answer cogently. Nonetheless almost everyone, philosopher and non-
philosopher alike, continues to speak and write as if one of these projects had succeeded. 
(68) 
 
The chief problem with these accounts is that they lack a robust account of the good, as 
the modern age is marked, for Macintyre, by the death of teleology—killed partially 
because of the its affinity with religion. The modern age separates the happiness of the 
individual from the happiness of the whole, as though they are (naturally) mutually 
																																																								
70 Reiterating the naturalistic fallacy or (isàought fallacy), Macintyre stresses that prescriptive moral 
content does not derive from descriptive factual premises. As we saw in Chapter 2, the problem of trying to 
decipher how difference issues forth from sameness guided Aristotle’s investigation in the Metaphysics 
(and beyond), and Aristotle ends up concluding that these differences simply constitute different aspects of 
the same thing. This is also an issue that Hegel identifies in his Phenomenology of Spirit, highlighting and 
predicting the Enlightenment’s (or natural consciousness’s) inevitable failure to bridge the gap between 
allegedly heterogeneous phenomena—that is, phenomena that are heterogeneous because they have been 
conceptually separated by the philosophers analyzing them. This marks the scandal of modern philosophy. 
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exclusive, things, congealing an antagonism between the individual and the community—
an antagonism that did not exist in the work of Aristotle, but is emphasized in the work of 
Kant by way of the tension involved when facing the fact of reason.  
The trouble is: if these heterogeneous phenomena (e.g., my good versus the good 
of the whole, how things are versus how they ought to be) lack a common ground, then 
how can we successfully put them back together? Or ‘unite’ them as one? (A recast 
version of the problem between ‘the one’ and ‘the many’ that Aristotle faces in the 
Metaphysics.) This orientation is fundamentally misguided in the sense that it seeks 
harmony between antitheses, for instance, assuming that peace can be derived from war 
(or what Kant calls the ‘immoral doctrine of prudence’, which aims at securing the 
dominance of one’s interest over the interest of others). As Macintyre puts it, by the 
modern account, we are free moral agents, who do not want to be manipulated by 
anything or anyone, but nonetheless seek to manipulate others to protect ourselves (68). 
We are agents marked by incoherence and war—agents who construct and attempt to 
justify fictions (e.g., impersonal objective criteria like ‘utility’ or ‘rights’), which are 
ultimately, echoing Nietzsche, arbitrary expressions of our subjective will.71  
Task 2. With this, we return to Macintyre’s point that the philosophical debate in 
the modern age consists in opposing parties airing out their feelings, attitudes, and 
preferences. These are wars in which each side seeks to be understood, rather than truly 
																																																								
71 Hearkening to Prichard, the modern age is marked by our seeking to find legitimate answers (e.g., the 
categorical imperative) to illegitimate questions (why should I take care of my neighbor?). Macintyre 
ultimately sees Prichard’s way out—namely, appealing to our intuitions for moral truth—as a sign we have 
in fact lost our way in moral philosophy. To quote Macintyre, “Twentieth-century moral philosophers have 
sometimes appealed to their and our intuitions; but one of the things that we ought to have learned from the 
history of moral philosophy is that the introduction of the word 'intuition' by a moral philosopher is always 
a signal that something has gone badly wrong with an argument” (After Virtue, 69).  
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hearing, actively understanding the perspective of the other; each side is speaking a 
language/following a line of reasoning that is incommensurable to that of the other.  
By Macintyre’s account, in the wake of the “death” of teleology, modern moral 
philosophy is thus left with 1) failed rational, secular accounts of the nature and status of 
morality, and 2) Nietzsche’s indictment of the “would-be objective moral judgments as 
the mask worn by the will-to-power of those too weak and slavish to assert themselves 
with archaic and aristocratic grandeur”–which is ultimately the 19th-century version of his 
diagnosis of the emotivist culture of the modern age (22). And for Macintyre, Nietzsche 
represents “one of the two genuine theoretical alternatives confronting anyone trying to 
analyze the moral condition of our culture,” the other being Aristotelian virtue ethics 
(110). Macintyre perhaps unsurprisingly chooses Aristotle as the most viable theoretical 
alternative for moral philosophy,72 as Aristotelian virtue ethics represents a radically 
different, ‘lost’ ethical tradition that does not fall prey to Nietzsche’s indictment or the 
woes of emotivism.  
																																																								
72 Contemporary moral philosophy (Macintyre included) has chosen Aristotle over Nietzsche for a variety 
of reasons, including the “negative” nature of Nietzsche’s project (something Nietzsche himself was 
acutely aware of) (Genealogy of Morals, 2.24). Macintyre—following the footsteps of Elizabeth 
Anscombe, and fronting a line of ethicists whose work seeks to reclaim Aristotelian virtue ethics—perhaps 
unsurprisingly chooses Aristotle over Nietzsche. In addition to Nietzsche being a representation of 
individualism’s last attempt to escape from its consequences (After Virtue, 259), problematic, by 
Macintyre’s account, is the negative character of his project (destroying, rather than building edifices), as 
well as the fact that Nietzsche’s Übermensch is severely lacking in both activities and relationships. This is 
of course problematic because ethics is precisely concerned with the things we do and our relations to 
others. For Macintyre, Nietzsche’s man of the future appears to be an individualistic moral solipsist in the 
sense that he must effectively cut himself off from his community, so as to most fully exercise his will to 
power: quarantining himself from any forces that might stifle his creativity and effectiveness (Ibid., 258). If 
the man of the future does not proceed this way, he risks degenerating into the very impotence that fuels a 
system of values based on resentment. Nietzsche’s Übermensch, then, in recognition of his greatness, ought 
to protect himself from the slaves in society by embracing isolation. To hearken to a familiar image from 
the history of philosophy, Nietzsche’s Übermensch, immersed in his will to power, is one who has been 
freed from the shackles of Plato’s cave, but knows better than to return to the weak-minded prisoners 
below, as they will surely annihilate his greatness. For a more thorough account of whether or not this is a 
fair depiction of Nietzsche, see Melissa Fitzpatrick, “A Nietzschean Ethics of Care?” in misReading 
Nietzsche, (Pickwick Publications, 2018). 
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And what is so radically different about Aristotle’s ethics? Chief among the 
differentiating features of Aristotle’s ethics are: A) Aristotle’s conception of the self is 
teleological, and B) that Aristotle bridges the theoretical gaps that were chiseled open by 
the modern age.  
A. For Macintyre, the Aristotelian self is a self that seeks unity-harmony, seeks to 
avoid conflict, and is able to do so because it has a final end/aim/good: eudaimonia.73 
The Aristotelian sense of unity that Macintyre has in mind is narrative unity, which 
ultimately corresponds to our narrative identity. Narrative identity is Macintyre’s 
extrapolation of the (unproblematic) sense of identity that we get in Aristotle’s work. As 
Paul Ricoeur (another advocate of Aristotelian narrative identity) puts it, the Aristotelian 
self is a self that is neither an incoherent series of events, nor an immutable, substantiality 
impervious to change.74 The ‘Aristotelian way’ is ultimately a ‘middle way’ between 
multiplicity and unity, accommodating both discordance and concordance, thus 
suggesting that what it means to be human is to be on-the-way-to-becoming-one. In the 
same way that a plot smooths a multiplicity of events into a single, unified story, I, too, 
am unity of sorts—an integrated enumeration of inter-relations with a common task, 
namely, the self who I am on the way to becoming. To quote Macintyre, “The unity of 
human life is the unity of a narrative quest” (219): a quest for the good.  
																																																								
73 Macintyre quickly problematizes this unity, questioning whether is it rationally justifiable to conceive of 
each life as a unity, so as to specify “one form of unity over another.” Moreover, in the modern age—
constituted by an amalgam of ghostly, context-less selves—compartmentalization, (a clear separation of 
aspects of oneself from each other, e.g., your roles are not your identity) rather than unity is prize (After 
Virtue, 204). Philosophers tend to analyze human action atomistically, rather than in relation to the 
character of the whole person, disregarding the virtue of integrity-constancy. 
74 Paul Ricouer, “Life in Quest of Narrative,” in In On Paul Ricoeur: Narrative and Interpretation, edited 
by David Wood (London: Rutledge, 1991), 32.  
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Narrative history is what provides the intelligibility or content of one’s life, as 
narrative showcases the things we do, our activities. And for Aristotle, we just are (most 
fundamentally) our activities. The way in which we receive narratives is by way of 
conversation—“the most familiar type of context in and by reference to which speech 
acts and purposes are rendered intelligible”—, which is so “pervasive of a feature of the 
human world that is tends to escape philosophical attention” (210). But as Macintyre 
rightly notes, if we were to remove conversation from human life, what would be left? 
Conversation is “the form of human transaction in general” (211). Beyond this, our basic 
sense of what we ought to do emerges from an understanding of the stories 
communicated to us, the stories that we belong to. We can only understand communities 
through “stock stories” or mythologies (260). Stories are the source of a given 
community’s values, privileges and duties, and our sense of what actions “are required to 
perform these and what actions fall short of what is required” (122). For example, 
courage is prized as virtue securing safety both in the household and for the community 
as a whole, safeguarding trust and reliance among community members.  
For Macintyre, the two key features of narrative identity are: 1) that I am “what I 
may justifiably be taken by others to be in the course of living a story that runs from my 
birth to my death; I am the subject of a history that is my own and no one else's, that has 
its own peculiar meaning” (217); and 2) that I am accountable and can ask others for an 
account. That is, to:  
Put others to the question…I am part of their story, as they are part of mine. The narrative 
of any one life is part of an interlocking set of narratives. Moreover this asking for and 
giving of accounts itself plays an important part in constituting narratives. Asking you 
what you did and why, saying what I did and why, pondering the differences between 
your account of what I did and my account of what I did, and vice versa, these are 
essential constituents of all but the very simplest and barest of narratives. Thus without 
the accountability of the self those trains of events that constitute all but the simplest and 
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barest of narratives could not occur; and without that same accountability narratives 
would lack that continuity required to make both them and the actions that constitute 
them intelligible. (218) 
 
All attempts to elucidate personal identity without appealing to accountability, 
intelligibility, or narrative are destined to fail, as all attempts to do so have failed—
especially as such attempts (e.g., that of Sartre) employ narrative to make their case 
(219). Macintyre stresses that narrative and accountability are vital in assisting us in the 
ordering of goods (decision-making). They condition our capacity to do. The quest for 
the good (narrative unity) is a quest understood as education: hearing the accounts and 
stories of others, so as to facilitate both an understanding of the sort of character that we 
seek to be, as well as a deeper understanding of ourselves. The good life is a life spent 
seeking the good, and recognizing that we are not simply what we choose to be (again, 
based on arbitrary preference), as the modern age would have it, but we are actually 
embedded in a variety of contexts, roles, narratives, through which we can work to 
understand better and worse ways of living in our situation, keeping the limits of what we 
can predict in mind.  
 B. Aristotelian ethics also bridges the gaps that the modern age has constructed 
between 1) reason and emotion, 2) nature as it is and as it ought to be, and 3) self-
interest/happiness and the interest of others/the happiness of the whole—and is able to do 
this precisely because these gaps did not exists for Aristotle. As we saw in Chapter 2, 
although reason ought to play a governing role (in the properly ordered self), the 
emotions and associated pleasure and pains also provide critical information. For 
Aristotle, one aspect does not take ontological precedence over the other in the sense of 
grounding/causing the other, and/or pushing the other to fall out of the moral schema all 
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together. Though Aristotle separates each faculty conceptually, he is committed to a 
sense of cooperation among our ‘faculties’ that precludes any sort of ontological divide 
between them. We might conceptually understand them as distinct, with different 
functions, but in actuality, they are also the same, of the same substance. 
 Moreover, Aristotle’s notion of each thing having a function (ergon) and 
corresponding virtue-excellence (arête) ‘bridges’ the nature as it is versus nature as it 
ought to be gap that menaced/menaces modern philosophy. For Aristotle, a thing is what 
it does (e.g., a human being is the sort of thing that employs reason in speech and action), 
and to most fully be what one is is to do what one does excellently. A thing functioning 
excellently is a thing fulfilling its purpose, and a thing fulfilling its purpose is a thing 
coalescing with its good. As Macintyre writes:  
Within the Aristotelian tradition to call x good (where x may be among other things a 
person or an animal or a policy or a state of affairs) is to say that it is the kind of x which 
someone would choose who wanted an x for the purpose for which x's are 
characteristically wanted. To call a watch good is to say that it is the kind of watch which 
someone would choose who wanted a watch to keep time accurately (rather than, say, to 
throw at the cat). The presupposition of this use of 'good' is that every type of item which 
it is appropriate to call good or bad-including persons and actions-has, as a matter of fact, 
some given specific purpose or function. To call something good therefore is also to 
make a factual statement. To call a particular action just or right is to say that it is what a 
good man would do in such a situation; hence this type of statement too is factual. Within 
this tradition moral and evaluative statements can be called true or false in precisely the 
way in which all other factual statements can be so called. But once the notion of 
essential human purposes or functions disappears from morality, it begins to appear 
implausible to treat moral judgments as factual statements. (59) 
 
Thus, within the Aristotelian framework, the notion of what a thing ‘is’ is already loaded 
with what a thing ‘ought to be’. The loss of the notion of proper function, and excellence 
has led to a more shallow understanding of moral concepts, as factuality becomes two-
dimensional—completely detached from anything prescriptive. As Macintyre points out, 
the prescription involved in Aristotelian ethics is marked by imperatives at once being 
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both hypothetical and categorical, e.g., hypothetical in that if you are a human being, then 
your telos is Y, therefore, you ought to do X, and categorical in that the ought is governed 
by Nature or God (60). Key in Macintyre’s account is that for the Enlightenment, the loss 
of such divine governing forces was understood as liberation. However, this liberation—
the birth of the autonomous individual—has left the subject without any guidance outside 
of oneself: man became the measure of all things in the sense that Socrates feared.  
 In regard to the gap between self-interest and the interest of others, the birth of the 
autonomous individual during the Enlightenment is intimately tied to what Macintyre 
refers to as the death of ‘the common good’.75 As we saw in Chapter 2, within an 
Aristotelian framework, the good of the individual and the good of the whole are not 
distinct as contrary to each other. But (reinforcing Macintyre’s point), as we saw in 
Chapter 1, the tension between self-interest and moral duty is severe (acutely painful 
even), marking the shift that happens in modern philosophy.  
For Macintyre, during the 17th and 18th-centuries (and beyond, into the present), 
human nature as it is became tied to an insatiable egoism, while human nature as it ought 
to be became tied to an often-painful altruism. Altruism became “at once socially 
necessary and yet apparently impossible and, if and when it occurs, inexplicable” (229). 
Macintyre continues:  
On the traditional Aristotelian view such problems do not arise. For what education in the 
virtues teaches me is that my good as a man is one and the same as the good of those 
others with whom I am bound up in human community. There is no way of my pursuing 
my good which is necessarily antagonistic to you pursuing yours because the good is 
neither mine peculiarly nor yours peculiarly—goods are not private property. Hence 
Aristotle's definition of friendship, the fundamental form of human relationship, is in 
terms of shared goods. The egoist is thus, in the ancient and medieval world, always 
																																																								
75 This is to say that this marks the death of a non-utilitarian/consequentialist sense of the common good, as 
the rise of utilitarianism in the modern age of course prizes the happiness of the whole, but as Macintyre 
stresses, that whole is an amalgam of atomized individuals, rather than a harmonious community or unit.  
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someone who has made a fundamental mistake about where his own good lies and 
someone who has thus and to that extent excluded himself from human relationships. 
(229) 
 
For Aristotle, the egoist is a non-community member: one who has veered from the 
language, customs, and values of their community. With the rise of the conception of 
human nature understood as egoism we find ourselves at the origin of the mistake that 
moral philosophy rests on.  
Macintyre illustrates this (modern) shift by highlighting Hume’s questioning of 
why we should obey rules (justice) if it were not in our best interest to do so? And his 
answer, of course, is that it is because it is in our long-term advantage to do so (229-30). 
As we saw in Chapter 1, this is the springboard for Kant’s desperate hope to revitalize a 
sense of morality that is otherwise than self-interested (though the attempt to provide a 
justification for the egoist/non-community member remains a cornerstone of his work).  
 It is important to return to the sense of self that is implicit in this false dilemma 
between what is in one’s self-interest (‘happiness) and the interest of others (‘justice’ or 
‘morality’). As Macintyre insists, it is ultimately a self who understands itself as 
detached from the others. That is, a self who understands itself as a morally autonomous 
agent: an individual, an island. It is an understanding of oneself as something distinct 
from qua over and against the others—others who almost inevitably infringe on its 
pursuit of happiness. This perception of oneself sets a standard of war, rather than 
cooperation, thus fostering an incommensurability between, on the one hand, my right to 
what I have, my possessions/acquiring more of them, and on the other hand, the desire (in 
the disturbing face of inequality) to redistribute justice, albeit never at the expense of the 
fruits of my labor. It seems clear that the capitalist-consumerist current in the Western 
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world cannot help but inculcate this antagonism, as it is pleonexia—the drive to 
acquire—rather than harmony that is valued in the modern age.76 
 Macintyre concludes that Aristotelian virtue ethics is our only hope for working 
ourselves out of our emotivist cultural reality—particularly our post-Enlightenment 
understanding of who we are. One of Aristotle’s key insights is that the answer to the 
inescapable human question, what sort of person am I to become?, requires some 
conception of the unity and completeness of one’s life (225). For Macintyre (and for 
Aristotle), we cannot answer questions about what is good for us if we do not have a 
complete sense of who we are and where we are headed, which requires a sense of the 
common good.   
In addition to this, if our sense of who we are (as a narrative unity) derives from 
the complex of narratives in which we find ourselves embedded, and if we understand 
ourselves as part of a mythology, then unfortunately for the modern age, our mythology 
is one that at least ostensibly lacks a desire for unity-harmony, a sense of purpose (telos), 
or an adequate sense of community. Virtue ethics is, therefore, a theoretical tool that 
might enable moral philosophy to reclaim a sense of virtue that, as Macintyre puts it, 
restores intelligibility and rationality to our moral and social attitudes—helping moral 
philosophy work toward a more robust, unified account of the virtues, and assisting the 
modern age in shaping new forms of community that will allow us to sustain civility and 
																																																								
76 As Macintyre writes, “In Benjamin Franklin's list [of virtues] we find almost all the types of difference 
from at least one of the catalogues we have considered and one more. Franklin includes virtues which are 
new to our consideration such as cleanliness, silence and industry; he clearly considers the drive to acquire 
itself a part of virtue, whereas for most ancient Greeks this is the vice of pleonexia; he treats some virtues 
which earlier ages had considered minor as major; but he also redefines some familiar virtues” (After 
Virtue, 183).  
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the intellectual and moral life “through the new dark ages which are already upon us” 
(263).77  
That being said, because virtue, and more specifically the practice of the virtues, 
is culturally embedded—hinging on the values of a given community—the implicit 
question that Macintyre leaves us with at the end of After Virtue is the question of how 
we are to change our values. Or in other words: how are we to facilitate the re-imagining 
of our understanding of ourselves in a way that liberates us from individualism?  
With Macintyre’s critique of, and subsequent call to, the modern age in mind, we 
can turn to an exemplary account of contemporary virtue ethics. It is important to stress 
that with both of these neoaristotelian case studies, the authors have at least in some sense 
heeded Prichard’s call to do moral philosophy in a way that strives to enrich our 
understanding of the relation among things that are self-evidently cherished. In 
Macintyre’s account, chief among self-evidently cherished things is the good life as the 
narratively unified life.  
3.3 RECLAIMING MACINTYRE’S TASKS: TALBOT BREWER & THE 
DIALECTICAL SELF 
Talbot Brewer’s 2009 text, The Retrieval of Ethics,78  is one of the most current, 
comprehensive, and original works within contemporary neoaristotelian virtue ethics. In 
																																																								
77 As Macintyre concludes After Virtue: “This time however the barbarians are not waiting beyond the 
frontiers; they have already been governing us for quite some time. And it is our lack of consciousness of 
this that constitutes part of our predicament. We are waiting not for a Godot, but for another-doubtless very 
different-St. Benedict” (263). 
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light of the section above, one of the most noteworthy aspects of Brewer’s text is that it is 
an explicit effort to reclaim Macintyre’s tasks in After Virtue—including its original 
distress and despair about the current state of ethical philosophy (6). This is to say that 
Brewer does not seek to offer virtue ethics as another solution qua normative theory in 
normative ethics (a tendency that is primarily the result of institutional pressures in the 
academy) (7),79 but instead seeks to employ virtue ethics as a means of critiquing our 
current cultural and academic context, underscoring its fruits as capable of providing a 
more enduring moral scheme.  
The text is an exercise in self-retrieval, and contests the reigning Anglo-American 
conception of the self (as a result of the Enlightenment and the contemporary liberalism 
that followed), drawing from the “conceptual scaffolding of compelling alternative 
pictures of the human self, its capacities, its aspirations, its concerns” (9-10). Brewer 
wants to sculpt a picture of the self that makes better sense of our lives as we actually live 
them, and does not reduce us to the production-oriented beings that the modern age has 
made us out to be.  
Thus, Brewer, like Macintyre, is committed to acknowledging and working our 
way out of the prejudices of “the post-Enlightenment West,” especially the notion—
following the legacy of Kant—that it is possible to articulate and defend (universal) 
standards of rightness without reference to the ‘all-too-subjective’ concept of the human 
good. These allegedly value-neutral, Kantian-inspired standards of rightness are not 
																																																																																																																																																																					
78 Because I am providing a close analysis of The Retrieval of Ethics (and am not referencing other texts by 
Brewer) I will include parenthetical references in cases that would otherwise be relegated to footnotes. 
79 On this, Brewer writes: “It is far easier to present normative ethics to undergraduates in the form of a 
survey course—one that begins with a characterization of a well-defined field of questions and proceeds to 
set out and assess a series of competing answers to these questions… This self-presentation staves off 
questions of legitimacy and relevance that would undoubtedly arise if professors were to call in question 
the conceptual framework of the background culture’s conversation about morality” (7). 
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adequate guides to flourishing, and their reign in contemporary ethics has resulted in 
results-oriented and anti-contemplative values (8). Brewer is clearly referencing 
Macintyre’s sketch of the ghostly, emotivist self, who asserts and vents arbitrary attitudes 
and feelings under the banner of hallow objective standards. Like Macintyre, Brewer 
stresses that unless we contest this conception of the self and construct new values, we 
will not be able to make sense of our efforts to unify our lives, based on a conception of 
how best to live them—that is, the “yearnings that draw us to our ideals and to each 
other” (8).   
 Brewer also heeds Anscombe’s call for a more adequate philosophical 
psychology, which he understands as a “far-reaching reconsideration of the notion of the 
nature and sources of human agency, particularly of the way in which practical thinking 
gives shape to activities, relationships, and lives” (8). This involves raising doubts about 
the status quo in philosophical ethics, and putting, like Macintyre, a more “tenable 
conceptual framework” in its place (8). Key is that Brewer does not just mean ‘tenable’ in 
that it holds up in current debates, but that it is something otherwise than armchair theory. 
That is, a philosophical ethics or ethical theory that is self-formative in its own right, thus 
constituting a “vital life activity” in and of itself (10).  
With Frodeman and Briggle’s remarks about the dire state of contemporary 
philosophy in mind, it seems fair to suggest that Brewer’s Aristotelian project is invested 
in both knowing and doing the good, and restoring philosophy as vital practice, rather 
than a mere area of expertise. And with Prichard’s conception of legitimate moral 
philosophy in mind, Brewer seeks to de-emphasize the significance of progress within 
moral philosophy, and emphasize the rich work of digging deeper into ethical phenomena 
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that are always and already a part of our everyday lives—thoroughly examining our 
concerns and corresponding activities, bringing them to lucidity, and then seeing if they 
stand up to reflective scrutiny (10).  
I will focus my analysis here on two crucial threads within Brewer’s complex 
text: 1) his notion of dialectical activity, and 2) his notion of universal self-affirmability. 
The first is Brewer’s response to what he understands to be an inadequate conception of 
the human agency; the second is Brewer’s elucidation of the fundamental role of others 
within an Aristotelian ethical schema.  
Dialectical activity. For Brewer, the predominant conception of human agency—
the “world-making” conception of agency—is that in which human action is ultimately “a 
species of production,” the meaning of which derives from the “state of affairs [those 
actions] are calculated to bring about” (12). Even actions that are done for their own sake 
are done so that they occur; under this schema, human action is always oriented toward a 
future state of affairs or world that they aim to bring about—something outside of the 
present.  
The alternative to this is what Brewer calls the “evaluative outlook,” finding its 
roots in the ancient and medieval Platonic and Aristotelian tradition. This outlook 
involves a conception of the nature of human action as always stretching toward some 
sense of what is good for human beings to be. This conception of human nature and 
action need not involve calculated production, as it includes actions that are valuable in 
themselves, stressing that we can be motivated without being able to identify an 
achievable state of affairs (13).  
	 127	
For Brewer, the “world-making” conception of agency plagues contemporary 
ethics, and is problematic because it is insufficient in its depiction of desire and the role 
of practical thinking in the fulfillment of desire. This is partially due to the fact that it 
searches for “generic causal explanations for the events we call human actions” (13). 
That is, causal in the sense of one billiard ball causing another billiard ball to move—a 
linear transfer of energy from state A to aimed-future state B. This causal explanation of 
motivation misses a key aspect of what is involved in A’s relation to B, that is, the 
justification for (rather than causation of) B: what made the action worth doing? With 
Macintyre’s rendering of the emotivist subject in mind, the world-making view limits the 
subject to a form of desire that represents attitudes toward propositions, e.g., I will go 
dancing Friday night, and that these sorts of desires are guided by the “direction of fit” 
between the world and the proposition’s object of desire, e.g., that I bring it about that I 
go dancing on Friday night (14). This explanation for action can always be traced back to 
a belief in the world or state of affairs that one desires to bring about: the pre-approved 
proposition.  
It seems obvious that this conception of desire is at least in some sense bankrupt, 
failing to adequately describe certain aspect of what it is to desire another person, or what 
it is to desire to fully engage in an activity—and this is Brewer’s point. This conception 
of desire is far too shallow, reducing human agency to calculation, empirically observable 
behavior. For Brewer, “To be an agent is to set oneself in motion (or to try to do so, or to 
adopt the intention of doing so) on the strength of one’s sense that something counts in 
favor of so doing so” (28). The more linear, world-making picture misses the dynamism 
involved in being drawn toward a particular state of affairs that cannot be reduced to the 
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fact of that state of affairs, thus banishing “all evaluative content from desire.” Evaluative 
content here means reasons or values, i.e., that which is understood to be good, 
worthwhile, desirable in the object itself (rather than in our projected perception of the 
object) (26). Evaluative content is what bestows action with meaning, lighting up the 
explanation for the doing in the first place—an explanation that often involves a 
multiplicity of reasons; desires are not merely random urges to make a state of affairs 
true, or a calculated execution of a plan.  
Brewer’s point is that human agents have a far richer teleological structure than 
spontaneity or calculation. There is a multiplicity of values one seeks to envelop oneself 
in when engaging in a given activity. And while the infinite variety of reasons-values one 
has for engaging in a particular activity makes it seem as though our desires are 
“fractured into a succession of different actions,” Brewer vindicates the unity (e.g., going 
dancing on Friday night) involved in a given cluster of values with his notion of 
‘dialectical activity’. This term covers activities that are taken to be valuable in 
themselves, including “all those activities whose point lies in an intrinsic goodness that is 
to some considerable degree opaque to those who lack experience with the activity, but 
that tends to unveil itself incrementally as one gains first-hand experience with it” (39). 
Examples of this include kindling a friendship, initiating an intimate love relationship, 
parenting a child, striking up conversation with a stranger, or deepening our appreciation 
of an unfamiliar genre of music (39). These activities are, as Brewer puts it, self-unveiling 
in the sense that “each successive engagement [with the activity] yields a further stretch 
of understanding of the goods internal to the activity, hence of what would count as 
proper engagement in it” (37). (In the case of going dancing Friday night, the cluster of 
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values could involve, hearing music you love, being with your friends, traveling to the 
city, meeting new people, etc.; and each time you go, the cluster grows each time you 
engage in the activity as you gain a deeper understanding of all the dimensions that you 
enjoy.)  
The ‘dialectical’ aspect of these activities denotes the movement of digging 
deeper and deeper into the phenomena at hand, more fully immersing oneself in the 
activity by diving into the cluster of values associated with it—unimpeded by calculation. 
This is to say that each time we fully engage in the activity, our sense of its value 
becomes richer, and our understanding of the activity itself is augmented. The 
‘teleological’ aspect of dialectical activities refers to the sense one has of what it is to 
fully engage in or excel at the given activity (40). This is the ‘good sought’ (telos), albeit 
not a good sought somewhere beyond the activity itself, but rather by and through 
intimate engagement with the activity itself. Vital to dialectical activity is that the good 
sought is ultimately an appreciation of the activity as engaging in the activity; the point is 
not to produce something/bring something about in the future. Dialectical activity is a 
facet of every human life. These types of activities are things that we all do—and desire 
to do. The intrinsic goodness is at first ‘opaque’ for those lacking experience with the 
activity, but becomes more and more illuminated with experience. Their value derives 
from experience, engagement.  
I think it is reasonable to suggest that dialectical activity so construed constitutes 
Prichard’s conception of legitimate moral philosophy as the activity of digging 
deeper/placing ourselves into our practices and values, so as to perpetually illuminate the 
phenomena at hand, to understand it better. For Brewer, in addition to dialectical activity 
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being a key aspect of who we are, engaging in dialectical activity is a major aspect of the 
task of moral philosophy and the moral philosopher, as is universal self-affirmability (as 
we will see below).  
Echoing Aristotle and Macintyre, Brewer contends that we only fully grasp the 
value of an activity upon recognizing and understanding its “place in a full and 
flourishing human life” (41). Otherwise, those activities can be pursued in excess, at the 
expense of other activities involved in a good life. Living a good life, by Brewer’s 
account, is the most comprehensive dialectical activity—something that is the work of a 
lifetime, and involves experience, understanding, and pleasure understood as losing 
oneself in one’s activities. Through experience in our activities, we are constantly gaining 
a better understanding of what living a good life means. This coming-to-understanding 
constitutes what both Macintyre and Brewer take to be the narrative unity of human life: 
the quest for eudaimonia.  
Moreover, for Brewer, practical thinking’s proper activity is fully grasping (by 
immersing oneself in) what one is doing in a way that brings one, moment by moment, 
closer to the ideal form [of the activity] in “whose light it is understood” (87). The 
activity of practical thinking is, therefore, dialectical (rather than calculative) by nature; it 
is constituted by an infinite approach toward the perfectibility as fullness of engagement 
in the activity is at hand. It is being riveted, which involves a crucial dimension of 
passivity (not simply active willing). Or in other words, it is an unreserved diving in—a 
surrender of oneself to the activity, rather than a willed calculation of what state of affairs 
the action ought to bring about.  
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The paradigmatic case of dialectical desire-activity is the loving desire for 
another—that is, the love for another that involves full engagement in the other before 
oneself, to the point of time, calculation, etc., melting away. It is a full gift of the self as 
present, now (63), before the other: inching ever-closer to that other in the sense of 
learning more, understanding more, and subsequently loving the other more. To desire an 
object in the sense that Brewer is committed to is not a desire to bring about some 
calculated end, bur rather a desire to understand and appreciate by being-with that object 
as fully, attentively, openly as possible. The pleasure involved in being-with someone 
you love is, again, the paradigmatic case of pleasure involved with engaging in any 
dialectical activity (e.g., reading a book, writing poetry, hiking, etc.). It is a pleasure best 
described as leaping or falling into the activity at hand, to the point of being unable to 
think about anything other than intensifying the activity: to be more fully with the other.  
With Aristotle’s notion of the unimpeded nature of the pleasure associated with 
virtue in mind, Brewer defines taking pleasure in an activity as engaging in it “while 
having only one occurent desire: a desire to the engage in that activity for its own sake” 
(119).80 As Brewer puts it, engaging pleasurefully in a given activity (including the other) 
involves paying tribute to its intrinsic goodness so clarified (48). When desiring another, 
the object of desire is of course not one’s own future psychological states, but rather 
something wholly otherwise than oneself. This “attention-arresting” mode of appreciation 
is best characterized as the activity of “unselfing.” In this intense appreciation, we are 
																																																								
80 Brewer continues, “one need not fulfill this attentional condition perfectly in order to take pleasure in an 
activity. Pleasure comes in degrees: we find mild enjoyment in some activities and boundless pleasure in 
others” (119). To experience pleasure is “relishing or savoring one’s doings.” And of course, as in the case 
in Aristotle, virtuous activity—practical thinking included—involves precisely this.  
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removed from all distractions, especially the “most banal and obsessive human 
distractions: the self” (64).  
Desire so construed extends us beyond our self-concerns, as we yearn to bring the 
activity’s intrinsic goodness into deeper focus (64). Complete and utter absorption in the 
activity is key. The pleasure involved in the loving desire for another—again, 
paradigmatic of the pleasure involved in any dialectical activity, varying only in 
degrees—is marked by the “mesmeric attraction,” the pull to what is wholly present 
before oneself: an instance of goodness in the world that incites celebration (63). To 
desire the other is “to be a willing self-exposure, a free opening to another’s gaze through 
which one permits oneself to be known in hopes of being appreciated and at the risk of 
being scorned” (63). Paraphrasing Brewer’s apt description, the loving desire we have for 
one person has a very different object from the loving desire for another person. Each 
force of desire is singular, particular, as each is related to a different cluster of reasons 
and values. Echoing Aristotle, all of our respective desires are singular, particular, each 
related to its own cluster of reasons and values, albeit with eudaimonia in sight.  
Universal self-affirmability. With Brewer’s notion of dialectical activity in mind, 
we can now turn to his notion of universal self-affirmability. Vital (and unique) to 
Brewer’s retrieval of the self is his elucidation of the account of friendship that we find in 
Aristotle, specifically as reclamation of friendship as a necessary condition of virtue.  
Friendship based on the good—for Brewer, ‘character friendship’—is central to 
the good life, as it is only through character friends that we are able to develop better 
evaluative outlooks in life (‘evaluative outlook’ referring to our sense of what is 
admirable/‘good’ and contemptible/‘bad’, e.g., immigrants should be treated with equal 
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dignity in the United States—this is good). In Brewer’s terms, an evaluative outlook is “a 
person’s characteristic sense of the evaluative features of actual or possible human 
doings” (244). An evaluative outlook is subjectively self-affirming when the subject is 
able to approve of the outlook at hand (i.e., when we are okay with what that outlook is 
suggesting to us); an evaluative outlook is interpersonally self-affirming if at least two 
people are able to approve of the outlook at hand; and an evaluative outlook is 
universally self-affirming if it affirms “all possible embodiments of the same outlook, 
whether in its possessor or in others” (244). For instance, the evaluative outlook that 
children should be forced to work at age 12 might have subjective or interpersonal self-
affirmability, but clearly lacks universal self-affirmability, as plenty of people would 
contest this evaluation. Evaluative outlooks lacking universal self-affirmability warrant 
extensive conversation, so as to hash out whether or not the view in mind really warrant 
admiration or approval—and why.  
 Thus, for Brewer, hearkening to Aristotle, others ultimately provide a window of 
insight into the way in which we understand phenomena and what the implications of 
those understandings might be. In isolation, we cannot see every angle. When we self-
reflect, our minds tend to take the same routes, and draw the same conclusions. The role 
of the other is to show us aspects that are not apparent to us (we are not transparent to 
ourselves), and thus deepen our understanding of the outlook at hand. Others help us 
hone our understanding of virtue and vice—exposing vulnerabilities, blind spots, 
strengths, and surprising connections. Beyond this, others challenge us to help ensure that 
our reasons and values are sound, and that they are conducive to living well. It is, 
therefore, by way of character friendships that we are able to build confidence in our 
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conception of goodness via “mutual approval of the admirable,” which is a form of 
mutual self-awareness (242). Thus, the activity of refining our ethical judgments is 
marked by a shift from subjective self-affirmability to universal self-affirmability—and 
the only way to do this is through conversation with as many character friends as 
possible. It is through character friendship that we immunize disordered thinking, 
unclouding our moral vision through dialogic deliberation (266).  
 Because virtue, within an Aristotelian framework, is ‘uncodifiable’ (there are no 
hard and fast rules), universal self-affirmability is crucial, as this particular dialectical 
activity is the way in which moral outlooks come to be both shared and refined; it is the 
way in which common distortions in thought resulting from emotions, feelings, etc. are 
remedied. As Brewer writes:  
There is a dialectical relationship between the attainment of virtue and participation in 
these particularly valuable sorts of human relationships. We cannot enter into the relevant 
sort of friendship unless we already have a glimmer of appreciation for fine action. Yet as 
we kindle and deepen human relationships of this ubiquitous sort, our evaluative outlooks 
are reshaped so as increasingly to be affirmable as good from all relevant social 
perspectives. Indeed, such relationships cannot move into close approximation of their 
own defining telos unless participants become more virtuous. Hence it can be said both 
that these relationships are schools of virtue and that they are rewards of virtue. Virtue, 
then, emerges as a concomitant of an exceedingly valuable kind of human relationship 
that is not possible in its absence. It also makes possible a valuable sort of 
wholeheartedness in one’s activities. (240) 
 
Thus, friendship is both intrinsically valuable and vital to virtue. Proper friendship, as 
Brewer stresses, is grounded in theorein—focused contemplation on an object of 
understanding—in the sense that the love for other (ultimately the other’s nous, their 
desire to strive toward goodness) constitutes an originary source of appreciative attention. 
It is in attending to that other that one is able to amplify the range of dialectical activities 
“that one can accompany and appreciate with appreciative attention” (242). Intimate 
relationships like these are what help us understand aspirations and admirations; 
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character friendships are lifelong sources of “an ethical education that tends toward 
outcomes that are both eudaimonistic and recognizably moral” (244).  
By Brewer’s account, character friendship does not require two completely 
virtuous souls, as it can occur between unequal friends (insofar as the goodness is 
proportioned to its object). Distinct to his notion of character friendships is that they can 
and do evolve; they are not simply instances of static mutual admiration. Essential to 
character friendship is that the other has intrinsic value. This is what differentiates 
character friendship from friendships based on pleasure and utility, as those sorts of 
friendships involve relationships in which the other has instrumental value: they are 
merely a means to one’s own pleasure or gain. As we saw in Chapter 2, these sorts of 
friendships are tenuous. The moment the pleasure or use ceases, the friendship dissolves, 
as the friendship is not grounded in the intrinsic value of the other, but what the other 
provides for oneself. Or in other words, their value is contingent on their service of each 
party’s respective self-interest, that is, the perceived/hoped-for effects (be it pleasure or 
utility).  
This is again why character friendships are vital to the refinement and practice of 
dialectical activity, as it is through loving another for their own sake—having one’s 
attention arrested by the other—that one is able to understand value in a sense that is 
otherwise than production-oriented/based on perceived optimal effects. Echoing 
Macintyre, Brewer reiterates the fact that prudence today is marked by production-
oriented, efficient self-interest (253). (Producing more for oneself.) This is contemporary 
Western virtue. And as Brewer stresses—underscoring Macintyre’s original despair—the 
culture one is embedded in conditions one’s sense of virtue and vice (265). Hence the 
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need to retrieve a conception of the self that is otherwise than production-oriented/driven 
by perceived optimal effects, insofar as we want to resist reducing human life to being 
programed toward a pre-determined state of affairs.  
 Character friendship, then, is constituted by dialogic assessment in practical 
thinking, and is fostered by a mutual admiration of the other’s sense of the good (253). 
And as we saw in Chapter 2, for Aristotle, this dialectical activity is vital to clarity. 
Mutual admiration allows each friend to give credence to the other’s voice (concerned 
about the other’s approval), and is what enables one to trust the other enough to offer 
one’s own evaluative outlook to be inspected, scrutinized, or praised. This trust involves 
not knowing if your perspective will remain the same as it was when the conversation 
started, and being uncertain about where the conversation will go, what resolution might 
be reached. Brewer continues:  
We can assess and refine [the idiosyncratic portions] of our sensibility by dialectical 
alteration between expressing them in action and conversation, and interpreting the words 
and actions of our friends as further sources of evaluative insight. At its best, this is a 
mutual and continuously reiterated process, one that displaces each friend from the 
confines of his or her existing commitments and concerns, and permits them to discern 
the outlines of newly evolving concerns in the person of the other. This mutual, 
dialectical alteration is the process by which a distinctive, shareable sensibility comes to 
have a determinate and increasingly articulate form. (254) 
 
Thus, a distinct, external perspective that we deem trustworthy is the way in which we 
work toward proper self-love and proper love of the others (257). And for Brewer, these 
two activities need not be in antagonism the way modern philosophy sets them out to be. 
They are only at odds if self-love is understood in the production-oriented sense, in which 
others are simply obstacles that need to be manipulated in order for one’s desires to be 
satisfied. Brewer takes pains to illustrate (I think, convincingly) that this picture is two-
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dimensional, missing the intrinsic, non-effect oriented value we find in others and our 
activities.  
 To return to Prichard’s point that the only way to understand morality is to get 
ourselves into situations that occasion obligation, talk to those who have been in those 
situations, or imagine ourselves in those situations (letting our moral capacities do their 
work), Brewer’s conception of character friendship is without question a means of 
facilitating this. It is through character friendship—something that actually constitutes a 
very common, day-to-day activity—that we “attempt to deepen our understanding of the 
difference between the tactless and the candid, the tactful and the dishonest, the kind and 
the over-indulgent, the generous and the profligate, the magnanimous and the pompous, 
the deeply felt and the maudlin or sappy, the self-confident and the conceited, the self-
respecting and the self-indulgent, the prudent and the cowardly or spineless, the brace 
and the rash, the accommodating and the servile” (276). These conversations unveil 
understanding, provide lucidity, and illuminate value.  
And as Brewer concludes, the real value of understanding—the activity of gaining 
insight into “why things are as they are, or how they cohere in larger patterns of order or 
coherence” (302)—lies in the actualization of that understanding itself, both in one’s own 
life and the in the lives of other, especially as it pertains to living a good life (308-9). 
Understanding constitutes the intrinsic value of practical thinking, philosophical 
reflection on ethics, and friendship. 
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3.4 NEOARISTOTELIAN INSIGHTS 
To summarize what has been established thus far: in the wake of the claim that moral 
philosophy has not only become stifled, but rests on a methodological mistake, we find a 
revival in Aristotelian virtue ethics that is at least partially motivated by a desire to 
recollect and thus salvage key dimensions of who we are. Echoing Brewer, this 
motivation is itself motivated by the understanding that each of us presupposes an 
understanding of what it is to be a human agent. And whether or not that understanding 
has been made explicit, each of us acts in light of that understanding. For example, if I 
understand myself to be an isolated creature, desperately trying to stay afloat all by 
myself, my actions will follow suit. And as such, I am less likely to trust others, and more 
likely to do what I can, by whatever means possible, to sustain myself.   
As we saw above, the rise of Aristotelian virtue ethics in 20th-century Anglo-
American philosophy is a direct response to the residual Enlightenment-inspired ethos in 
contemporary moral philosophy. On the one hand, this response involves an attempt to 
shift away from 1) the theoretical preoccupation with action (rather than character); 2) 
morality being marked by either duty or the ends justifying the means; 3) the drive to 
locate a ‘view from nowhere’; and 4) the impulse to provide an argument for why one 
ought to do their duty—as though, hearkening to Aristotle, an argument alone could push 
one into a more virtuous mode of being. On the other hand, this response involves an 
attempt to address the state of moral philosophy as it is practiced in the Anglo-American 
West, questioning the task of moral philosophy and the moral philosopher. 20th-century 
virtue ethics seeks to address the disordered state of moral philosophy by contesting 1) 
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the prioritization of knowledge production; 2) the arcane, if not obscure state of the 
discipline; 3) the results-oriented and anti-contemplative values that permeate not only 
academia, but our culture at large;81 and 4) paraphrasing Macintyre, the way in which 
moral philosophy has become insignificant in society and marginal in the academy.82 
Insights. Both Macintyre and Brewer directly address the theoretical, practical, 
and existential worries above. Sociologically speaking, Macintyre’s diagnosis of the 
dominant social, economic, and political order of morality in the (Anglo-American) 
Western world is on point, and his re-construction of the causal-chain that led to it is 
nothing short of illuminating. Whether or not the roots of the crisis are precisely as 
Macintyre depicts it, his diagnosis provokes us to reflect on who we are, where we are 
headed, what we value, and why. The Enlightenment’s suspicious attitude toward religion 
and all of its associated baggage (teleology included) did in fact mark the beginning of a 
new anthropocentrism (epitomized in Kant’s Copernican turn)—a new anthropocentrism 
in which reason could serve as the measure of what we should and should not do, 
regarding the appeal to anything ‘outside’ of oneself as a moral shortcoming.  
																																																								
81 It seems clear that the trouble with the theoretical emphasis on products and results is that is perpetuates 
(if not only implicitly) a conception of who we are that is chiefly governed by results-driven, anti-
contemplative activities—contemplative in the Aristotle’s sense of the word qua being arrested by 
something, cherishing that something for its own sake. This is an activity that has nothing to do with 
calculation or aiming for a future state of affairs, but rather a pleasure-filled diving into the here-and-now. 
And as we saw in Chapter 2, the calculative dimension of who we are is merely one dimension; there are 
other dimensions of the self that need nourishing (none of which at the expense of nourishing the others, 
balance is key). Beyond this, as we saw in Chapter 1, Kant’s conception of embracing the moral law 
involves the cessation of calculation, the cherishing of the moral law for its own sake. That is, the active 
letting go of what is not in our control (hypothetical future state of affairs), and finding power in identifying 
with what is already there. One cannot help but think of the stoic mantra (Epictetus) to not seek to have 
events happen as you want them to, but instead want them to happen as they do, and your life will go well.  
Peace comes with understanding what is beyond oneself as something that cannot be shaped and shifted 
into something determinate—including the others, each of whom is also and end in themself. 
82 Robert Frodeman and Adam Briggle, “When Philosophy Lost Its Way,” in New York Times, “The Stone” 
(January 11, 2016). 
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Macintyre’s account of Kant’s failure is important. Despite the fact that, as argued 
in Chapter 1, Kant is challenging the temper of his time, Macintyre’s crucial point is that 
Kant was, no doubt, operating within a problematic paradigm: one in which the 
individual is understood as atomized—separate from the whole, from any sort of telos, 
and from any sort of context. Although Kant does grant teleological impulses (toward 
happiness) within each and every one of us, insofar as we are human, those human 
impulses are of course best understood as inferior to our rational impulses (self-
conceited, intrinsically immoral), and far too contingent to safeguard anything like justice 
or equality. Macintyre’s grim depiction of the liquated emotivist self—the birth child of 
the modern era, including Kant’s moral project—underscores the way in which (whether 
or not it was intended) the Anglo-American self—the individual—has been both 
theoretically and practically disconnected from its community, its purpose, and, perhaps 
most disastrously, its desires. Its chief value is to acquire more for itself, and its extreme 
isolation has pushed it to understand itself as at war with the others. The self so 
understood is a self that needs more, but needs no one.  
Macintyre’s retrieval of the teleological or narrative dimension of human 
identity83 is significant, as it reminds us of our need to appeal to a web of contexts 
(stories, activities, etc.) that we find ourselves enmeshed in when attempting to answer 
who we are, where we are headed (what sort of person should I to become?), what we 
value, and why? Macintyre’s claim is that the teleological framework that we find in 
Aristotle is vital to working ourselves out of our de-contextualized state of affairs. 
Macintyre reminds us that there is an aspect of ourselves that inevitably strives for unity, 
																																																								
83 Like Martha Nussbaum’s and Paul Ricoeur’s, among others.  
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coherence, as we are selves on the way to happiness: ordered (or disordered) with that 
absolute end in mind. For Macintyre, therefore, it is ultimately this teleological 
understanding of who we are that grants us access to our desires, our purpose, and our 
community (in addition to bridging all of the theoretical gaps that the modern age 
chiseled open). Macintyre I think rightly contends that Aristotle gives us the tools we 
need to re-emphasize character and the good of the individual and the whole, as well as 
the relationship between the good and our activities.  
 Brewer fine-tunes and builds upon Macintyre’s account, elaborating on the first 
distinction that we find in Aristotle’s Ethics. That is, the distinction between instrumental 
goods and absolute goods. Brewer’s critique of the ‘world-making’ conception of human 
agency (and concomitant favoring of the ‘evaluative outlook’) should be understood as 
underscoring the problem with limiting human action to instrumental motivation, as this 
comes at the hefty price of neglecting (if not forgetting altogether) the vital role of non-
calculative activities, i.e., absolute goods. Brewer resurrects the significance of absolute 
goods through his notion of dialectical activity, by which he retrieves the notion of 
goodness as intrinsic value: something deeply appreciated for its own sake, like someone 
we love—valuing them for no other reason than being who they are. The bottom line for 
Brewer, as was the case with Kant, is that we are more than machinery, calculators, 
searching for more.  
Beyond this, Brewer elucidates both Aristotle’s and Macintyre’s teleological 
conception of the self in a significant way. He re-describes telos as immersing oneself 
ever deeper into a given activity. Dialectical activity, as Brewer coins it, involves an 
infinite unveiling of the activity itself—that is, an infinite approach toward a fuller 
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expression of the activity, being more enraptured by it. This activity does not involve 
seeking to bring about some further state of affairs, or calculating the means to some pre-
determined end, but instead involves being present to the activity itself, for its own sake, 
desiring only to augment it (in awe), to make the experience fuller (in appreciation). In 
the case of universal self-affirmability, character friends engage in conversations that 
seek to understand the phenomena at hand, unsure about ‘where’ the conversation is 
headed.  
Brewer takes pains to distinguish his notion of universal self-affirmability from 
Kant’s ‘universalizability test’ (the moral law), stressing that although both are meant to 
“ensure a form of practical thinking that can be affirmed or acceptable…from the vantage 
point of any human being” (282), there are important points of disanalogy:  
• First, unlike the Kantian categorical imperative, universal self-affirmability is not dealing 
specifically with maxims or principles of action, but is instead dealing with evaluative outlooks 
(282). For Brewer, Kant’s perspective of what constitutes moral action is far too restrictive, 
limiting moral reflection to reflection on principles. The Aristotelian position allows for more 
moral content: that is, anything pertaining to value.  
• Second, the mode of employment that we find in Kant is monological (in that it takes place within 
one’s reflective consciousness), whereas universal self-affirmability is necessarily dialogic (283). 
This point is vital, as it emphasizes the role of the other in practical deliberation, ultimately 
rendering it a shared activity that hinges on experience and exchange.  
• Third, although Kant acknowledges the need to take the others into consideration when 
attempting to decipher what to do, the rigidity of the a priori project is again too limiting (284).  
For Brewer (drawing from Aristotle), experience is not only valuable, but is also vital to character 
friends working to affirm or disaffirm a given evaluative outlook. Beyond this, the tools we have 
to evaluate evaluative content (echoing Macintyre) are the stock of narratives and values that arise 
within a given culture/political/economic context, including one’s unique history or place within 
those narratives. Clearly, this means that the activity is to a certain extent ‘subjective’, but in the 
sense that subjective-contingent facts augment one’s understanding of the phenomena, as other 
forces/dimensions/angles are taken into consideration. This is all to say that ‘reason alone’ is not 
enough.  
 
Although, as Brewer points out, moral thinking is undelegable—it is something assigned 
to oneself, in relation to one’s individual context—the others are vital mirrors who 
illuminate our blind spots, and suggest new ways of understanding things. This 
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Aristotelian point, while again perhaps obvious, is crucial. Brewer’s account provides an 
invigorated rendering of the dialectical method that elucidates the ethos of Aristotle’s 
ethics (as an alternative to the modern ethos), as well as a truly practical appropriation of 
that method.  
 Building. Although Macintyre and Brewer make strides in their respective 
reclamations of who we are—underscoring that we are more than dis-ordered self-
interested selves at odds with altruism, while actually preserving various aspects of the 
spirit of Kant’s moral project—I want to highlight a few key points that are worth 
expounding, and will ultimately be expounded in the next chapter.  
  Although the narrative dimensions of who we are, i.e., our tendency to find order, 
coherence, an intelligible plot, are difficult to contest, there is a risk that comes with 
assuming that there is a quasi-providential undercurrent to everything we do—especially 
from within the emotivist evaluative outlook, in which activities are, for the most part, for 
the sake of something else. This is risky because seeking to bring about states of affairs 
involves projecting a desired future state, which involves having in mind some end 
beyond the activity itself, thus stifling the ability to be present.  
Beyond this, our understanding of the ultimate end toward which we aim—
happiness, flourishing, living well—is the byproduct of our social/political/historical 
situatedness. More specifically, this understanding is a byproduct of the ways in which 
values/virtues are inculcated in society. Thus, the emotivist self and its subsequent values 
derive from the way that self has been socialized, politicized, and educated. This is to say 
that the stories that dominate Western culture (in the United States) are those that foster 
an alienated understanding of oneself—an understanding that effectively disconnects one 
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from their community, and drives one toward a survivalist mentality of perpetually 
seeking to take and make more for oneself.  
How, then, are we to facilitate the re-imagining of our understanding of ourselves 
in a way that liberates us from liberalism’s prized individualism? Hearkening to 
Anscombe’s theses, it seems that it is important to consider the relationship between 
‘philosophy of psychology’ and moral education, which shapes our understanding of who 
we are, in turn shaping what we desire and do. If the impulses of meritocracy, for 
example, are what we teach, we should of course expect ourselves to be at war with our 
neighbors, because within this outlook, the other ‘getting ahead’ signifies that you are 
effectively ‘falling behind’ in the race for more. As we saw in Chapter 2, education at 
both the inter-personal level (between friends) and the public level (as a value dimension 
of society) is key. Without virtuous education, there is no possibility for virtue. It is 
ultimately through education that injustice can be mitigated. And how? By nurturing 
virtues that involve cherishing a certain understanding of moral judgment. And ‘previous’ 
to this, fostering a sense of self that is otherwise than self-interested. That is, a self that 
embraces dialectical activity as moments of identifying with oneself as what is other than 
oneself—relinquishing the sovereignty of self-concern by opening up to what is 
otherwise than oneself. The seeds of this movement are in fact present in Kant (especially 
in his phenomenology of respect), though his insistence on (reflective) reason alone 
taking us there is problematic for the reasons discussed in this chapter.  
How, then, do we begin to value this mode of being? Education. And more 
specifically, a model of education grounded in an understanding of the self as dialectical 
activity, and an understanding of teaching as an important instance of character 
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friendship. Key is that introspection and reason alone will not turn anyone toward 
morality, and that logic in itself does not breed virtue. Moral philosophy, as sketched by 
Prichard, does little more than push the philosopher to recoil inside the calculative 
dimension of herself in search of the next-best argument—all too often losing the forest 
for the trees. The value of virtue comes from others, and is instilled in each of us by way 
of conversation—be it from the stories we are told, or the conversations that help us 
understand new encounters, new thoughts, new feelings, new activities, or even old 
encounters, old thoughts, old feelings, old activities.  
As we saw in Chapter 1, for Kant, conversation is a vital “cultivator of virtue and 
a preparation for its surer practice,” and is itself is guided by the pursuit of clarity, truth. 
The health of society hinges on conversation, which, for Kant, hinges on honesty and no 
reservation. As we saw in Chapter 2, Aristotle’s position is no different. It is through 
dialectic understood as engagement with the insights of others that we can inch ever-
closer to truth itself; moreover, in its most complete form, friendship—the greatest of all 
external goods—centers on the activities of loving and activating the rational element 
within oneself and the other by exercising reason through dialogue, discussion, 
conversation. Though not explicit in Aristotle, based on the what was argued in Chapter 
2, the habituation of conversation is vital—that is, conversation understood as opening 
oneself to what is other than oneself (e.g., another person’s perspective), listening to the 
phenomena, and then working to understand-with the other. As Macintyre very briefly 
touches upon, at our core, we are communicators, receiving from and transmitting to 
others. “Conversation is the most basic form of human transaction in general.” And 
Brewer of course incorporates this insight into his conception of character friendship and 
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universal self-affirmability, conversation serving as an exemplary form of dialectical 
activity.   
Returning to Macintyre’s meditations in After Virtue, are Aristotle and Nietzsche 
our two theoretical alternatives? Is Aristotelian virtue ethics the only radically different 
ethical tradition that does not fall prey to Nietzsche’s indictment or the woes of 
emotivism? Is the Aristotelian self the self that will ‘free’ us from our state of disorder? 
Given the fluidity between Aristotle and Kant, it seems clear that the Aristotelian self is 
not so different from the Kantian self; their respective projects’ emphases are simply 
different. Kant is interested in locating the ground for a proper ethics; Aristotle is 
interested in better understanding the good that each of us desire, insofar as we are 
human. In order to facilitate a re-imagining of our understanding of ourselves that 
liberates us from individualism, a more radical shift might be in order.  
With this, we can turn to Emmanuel Levinas’s radical re-rendering of who we are, 
paying close attention to his understanding of communication and conversation, which 
may help us re-consider our understanding of ourselves, as well as our understanding of 
the task of moral philosophy, the moral philosopher, and moral education. Levinas’s 
account is perhaps more ‘Kantian’ than it is ‘Aristotelian’, though his insights, as we will 




4.0  CHAPTER 4: THE DISRUPTED SELF 
In like manner the good may be said to be not only the author 
of knowledge to all things known, but of their being and 
essence, and yet the good is not essence, but far exceeds 
essence in dignity and power.  
Glaucon said, with a ludicrous earnestness: by the light of 
heaven, how amazing! 
            –Socrates, Plato’s Republic, 509b-c 
 
This chapter will build upon the insights gleaned in the first three chapters by providing a 
critical interpretation of Emmanuel Levinas’s account of the self: first, by analyzing his 
account of subjectivity as ‘substitution’ (a trope demonstrating what he means by 
metaphysical desire), and then by analyzing his account of conversation—in particular, 
‘the saying’s’ relation to justice. I will end by suggesting that in addition to providing an 
innovative approach to the problems in moral philosophy (specifically, the question of 
how we ground morality), Levinas’s vindication of ethics exudes the spirit of Kant as 
portrayed in Chapter 1, while resonating with key insights from Aristotle, especially as 
retrieved in contemporary Aristotelian ethics.  
My ultimate claim is that despite various dimensions of contemporary Aristotelian 
virtue ethics resonating with what we find in Levinas, Levinas’s conception of the self as 
disrupted—being-for-the-other—goes further than contemporary neoaristotelians in their 
radical retrievals of ethics by insisting on a deposed, rather than self-governing, 
understanding of who we are. This is to say that Levinas seeks to provide a sense of the 
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self that is not primarily self-legislating (autonomous), or unified by a coherent quest for 
the good (teleological). For Levinas, the self, even ‘prior to’ its face-to-face encounter 
with the other, was not, is not, and never will be an island unto itself. And although 
autonomy (the self understood as a self-legislator) and narrative coherence (the self 
understood as an individual on a unique, unified quest for the good) are incontestable 
modes of being, for Levinas, they are antithetical to ethics.84  
4.1 LEVINAS’S MOTIVATIONS  
With a critical eye toward the atrocities of the 20th-century, Levinas’s seminal text, 
Totality and Infinity, notoriously begins with the claim that “one would readily agree that 
it is of the upmost importance to determine whether we have been duped by morality” 
(21). He then links the suspension of morality to the ever-present possibility of war:  
Does not lucidity, the mind’s openness upon the true, consist in catching sight of the 
permanent possibility of war? The state of war suspends morality… In advance its 
shadow falls over the actions of man. War is not only one of the ordeals—the greatest—
of which morality lives; it renders morality derisory. The art of foreseeing war and of 
winning it by every means—politics—is henceforth enjoined as the very exercise of 
reason. Politics is opposed to morality, as philosophy to naïveté. (TI, 21)  
 
For Levinas, morality disrupts political ambition (the desire to win, and gain more) in the 
same sense that philosophy (the desire for wisdom) disrupts naïveté. That is, just as 
Socrates, in his pursuit of wisdom (and work as a gadfly), interrupts the naïveté of his 
																																																								
84 The interpretation of Levinas that is provided in this chapter is deeply indebted to Richard Kearney’s 
innovative, imaginative, and timely work on ‘carnal hermeneutics’. I was fortunate enough to participate in 
his first graduate seminar on the topic, and to witness his masterful hermeneutic investigation and 
reclamation of a phenomenon that has been underemphasized (if not outright ignored) in the Western 
philosophical tradition. I am grateful to him for spearheading such an original conversation, and for inviting 
his graduate students—myself included—to engage in rich, ongoing conversations with him on the topic.   
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interlocutors (e.g., pushing them to examine the phenomena that they take for granted), 
morality, too, interrupts one’s political pursuits by throwing an “objective order from 
which there is no escape” (TI, 21) into question (e.g., the pain in the face of a child being 
separated from their ‘undocumented’ mother, prompting one to refuse to participate in 
the executive order to separate them). Morality so construed is most easily understood 
through Kant’s formula of humanity,85 which involves safeguarding the others as ends 
that should not be exploited, manipulated, or totalized.86 This involves a resistance to 
making definitive (totalizing) claims about the other—claims that result from assuming 
that there is nothing more to understand. As we saw in Chapter 1, morality, contrary to 
war, preserves the possibility of justice, and also serves as a response to the political 
precept that one ought to use whatever means necessary to secure a given end.87 
It is helpful to understand the question of whether we have been duped or 
deceived by morality as an echo of Kant’s questioning of whether the supreme, absolute, 
universally necessary moral principle that he seeks may, in the end, be nothing more than 
a chimera: a theoretical dream among philosophers. Levinas’s (rhetorical) worry is that if 
we have in fact been duped by morality, and morality is in fact nothing more than a 
dream or myth among philosophers, then war is our inevitable and total reality. And if 
war is in fact our total reality, then morality is rendered ‘derisory’, because war, by its 
very definition, intends the usurpation of the other. And this necessarily entails the 
consumption and/or transformation of what is different (e.g., an ideology, like 
																																																								
85 James Mensch, Levinas’s Existential Analytic: A Commentary on Totality and Infinity (Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press, 2015), 19-20. 
86 To ‘totalize’ the other is to encapsulate them into a presumed category or concept (e.g., X is a racist). 
87 Contrary to everything political, justice involves the cessation of calculation, thus securing the freedom 
of every being (insofar as its rational). As Kant stresses, locating ‘good’ and ‘bad’ in experiential 
consequences is the most real threat to morality itself, as this renders the good something brought about: a 
future state of affairs, a consequence of action. 
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‘communism’, or a category of people, like ‘communists’) into a rendition of the warring 
force (e.g., an ideology like ‘democracy’, or a category of people, like ‘democrats’). In 
war, there is a conqueror (as Levinas puts it, ‘the same’, which refers to a certain 
understanding of the self) and a conquered (the other). And in war—in obedience to an 
objective order from which there is no escape—the other is to be destroyed, overthrown, 
or assimilated in some way, leaving no room for morality.    
The most important point for Levinas is that if reality is in fact war, and morality 
is nothing more than a fiction, then what we are tragically duped into is an alienated 
understanding of ourselves as ‘soldiers’, who are perpetually at war with the others and 
ourselves. As Levinas puts it, war “destroys the genuine identity of the same” by driving 
the same to reduce anything and everything other into an extension of itself (TI, 21); war 
drives its soldiers into an isolated and production-oriented mode of being (struggling to 
produce more of the same, motivated by the need to self-preserve and persevere), which, 
as we saw in Chapter 3, is part and parcel of a disordered understanding of the self that is 
alive and well in the Anglo-Saxon West, and that Aristotelian virtue ethics is both 
contesting and attempting to overturn. This understanding of the self is disordered in the 
sense that it has forgotten the fact that it is constituted by the other, and exists (is 
animated) by virtue of the other. The self, for Levinas, is not in any sense causa sui. And 
Levinas, like Brewer, is committed to phenomenologically contesting the reigning 
conception of the self (as causa sui, self-legislative, and results-oriented), convinced that 
if we do not, we will be stuck playing roles in which we no longer recognize who we 
really are. 
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Levinas is ultimately interested in evoking an understanding of morality that is 
not merely something that philosophers hope for, or a principle that we can argue 
ourselves into endorsing but is instead something extant—ontologically preserved in 
‘metaphysical desire’ for the other, which, for Levinas, is the most essential dimension of 
who we are—‘beneath’ oneself understood as a self-aware ego, which again, by 
Levinas’s account, denotes the reigning self-reflexive conception of who we are (self-
conscious, self-aware, etc.).  
Echoing Prichard (and Aristotle), no argument or proof, in itself, is ever going to 
convince us to be moral. We do not simply reason our way into moral being. Morality 
involves something affective, immediate, intuitive, and inconclusive, as there is no one-
size-fits-all guide to moral difficulties. Perhaps most vital to Levinas’s account, 
reverberating Prichard’s point in “Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?” is that the 
commands of reason will not deliver our duty to the other. The ‘ground’ of morality is 
not hiding somewhere within reason understood as argumentation. For Levinas, the 
source of ethics is sensible, lived. And sense always refers to the other, which is 
‘revealed’ (albeit concealed from cognitive consciousness) in the face-to-face encounter, 
conversation, and the unremitting proximity of the other to me. It is important to point 
out that in addition to referring to the other person, ‘the other’ ultimately denotes any 
disruption that pulls us out of our reflective, self-conscious selves 88  (projects, 
productions, reflections, and expectations). Therefore, the other can also be understood as 
																																																								
88 For Levinas, consciousness denotes an understanding of cognition that involves perceiving, intending, 
intuiting concepts or essences, and offering them to retention (memory) and protention (anticipation of the 
future). Consciousness is the process by which we thematize phenomena, and store those themes for 
ourselves for future use. This can be understood as theoretical reason, reflection, introspection, discursive 
reasoning, speculative reason, etc. I will use these terms somewhat interchangeably to signify the 
conceptual mode of knowing that relies on memory and expectation.  
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the new, the unknown, the unpredictable, or the future, as all of these entail indeterminate 
content—otherwise than the simple presence of the self to itself (TI, 35). 
Very generally speaking, Levinas’s project is best understood as a critique of 
what he calls Western philosophy’s history of ‘egology’, which for him has reached its 
apex in the phenomenologies of Husserl and Heidegger. ‘Egology’ here refers to what 
Levinas takes to be a theoretical preoccupation with understanding truth is some thing—
an articulable essence—that can be located somewhere ‘within oneself’ by way of self-
conscious reflection (OB, 103). Levinas’s project can, therefore, be interpreted as a 
critique of a tendency within a particular strand of Western philosophy89 to narrowly rely 
on first-personal reflection in its efforts to locate the truth of being: e.g., the cogito 
(Descartes), the a priori structures of cognition (Kant), intentionality as consciousness 
of… X (Husserl), what is constitutive of Dasein (Heidegger), etc. Levinas is instead 
committed to an understanding—or better, undergoing—of truth that involves divesting 
the self-conscious self.   
By Levinas’s account, what is missing from the Western philosophical tradition is 
1) a concrete understanding of morality that looks ‘out’ (to what is beyond oneself), 
rather than looking ‘in’ (to the structures of cognition), and 2) a notion of moral 
responsibility that has nothing to do with the will (e.g., responsibility as an altruistic act 
of the will, or form of accountability). Levinas is interested in establishing ethics as first 
philosophy (metaphysics), which is to say that for Levinas, being ought to be understood 
																																																								
89 ‘Western philosophy’, as employed by Levinas, is an extremely problematic category. Levinas is most 
explicitly taking 20th-century transcendental philosophy to task (and the traditions that influenced it, e.g., 
various threads within Greek philosophy), but is important to stress that not every tradition within what 
constitutes Western philosophy falls prey to his critique.  
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ethically, and responsibility—rather than being a willed decision or a debt to pay—is 
woven into the fabric of who we are.  
Levinas is not, therefore, offering a prescriptive account of ethics, or a robust 
defense of a moral theory, but is instead providing an evocative, phenomenological 
account of what it is to be. For Levinas, morality is not a synthetic a priori formula for 
right action, a calculation of how to proceed in any and every situation, or a series of 
emulable qualities exhibited by the one who has practical wisdom (the Aristotelian 
phronimos). Ethics is first philosophy in the sense that it conditions the science of being 
qua being, knowledge qua knowledge, etc., and in the sense that we are ontologically 
determined by the other(s).  
With this in mind, the key questions guiding Levinas’s work are: does all meaning 
proceed from essence? Does subjectivity draw its own meaning from essence? And is the 
meaning of subjectivity brought out of a struggle for existence? (A refusal of death? A 
hope of escaping the ‘end’?) (OB, 176). The various elements of these questions need to 
be carefully parsed, but as we will see below, his answer to all of these questions is no. 
4.2 THE LEVINASIAN SELF 
Does all meaning proceed from essence?90 Levinas begins “The Exposition” of his 1974 
text, Otherwise Than Being, by stressing that the philosopher’s task is to seek and express 
																																																								
90 I am going to, for the most part, limit my analysis here to Levinas’s rendering of subjectivity as 
substitution in Otherwise Than Being. While an incredibly difficult text, it is less bound to the language of 
Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology, and thus less confined in its depiction of what it is to be. 
Beyond this, the other in Otherwise Than Being is primarily autre rather than autrui, ultimately signifying 
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truth: “Truth, before characterizing a statement or a judgment, consists in the exhibition 
of being. But what shows itself, in truth, under the name of being? And who looks?” (23).  
As Levinas describes it, the history of Western philosophy asks ‘what’ shows 
itself in truth? What is the real? And he then points out that the request for a ‘what’ 
inevitably leads toward an answer that “is already wholly enveloped with being, has eyes 
only for being, and already sinks into being. Concerning the being of what is, it wants to 
know what it is” (23). The point here is that the answer to the question, what is it? is 
always known and expressed by way of the ‘essence’ that appears, is disclosed, is 
intelligible (24). Moreover, the answer to the question, who looks? is also  always 
‘known and expressed by way of essence—meaning that the ‘who’ inevitably devolves 
into an essence, as essence is what is manifest to reflective cognition.  
To better understand what Levinas has in mind when he references ‘essence’ or 
‘being’ (in relation to the Western philosophy’s history of egology), and why it is a 
problematic place to locate truth, it is worth turning to Book Zeta in Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics—specifically his analysis of what the ‘what’ refers to when we ask: what is 
it?91  
																																																																																																																																																																					
the other more broadly, i.e., not restricted to the other person (as is predominantly the case in Totality and 
Infinity).  
91 Given the fact that Brentano was one of Husserl’s key mentors, and that Brentano was himself immersed 
in the Aristotelian tradition, it is helpful to turn to Aristotle to glean some of the inspiration behind 
phenomenology as a discipline. Beyond this, Husserl’s “return to the things in themselves” as a means of 
finding a way out of the epistemological absurdities that have plagued modern philosophy (i.e., its attempt 
to connect or find a point of coordination between a heterogeneous “inner” and “outer” (whatever those 
“inner” and “outer” may be) no doubt parallel Aristotle’s critique of the metaphysical absurdities associated 
with ‘Platonism’. Husserl’s project is in some sense a modern recasting of Aristotle’s critique of the 
Platonists in Book Alpha and Book Zeta of the Metaphysics. Utterly perplexed by the way in which the 
eternal, self-subsisting, unified Platonic Forms cause/contribute to/relate to/coordinate with the ever-
changing world of flux and difference (A.9.991b1-10; Z.8.1033b20-5, etc.), Aristotle dismisses the 
dualistic model of Form (as it inevitably leads to the Third Man argument, among other absurdities) and 
substitutes it with concept of form that is immanent in the things of experience—granting “appearances” or 
experience itself the primacy it deserves qua giver of meaning. Although they are taking very different 
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In the Metaphysics, Aristotle commits himself to a thorough investigation of 
being itself (what is being qua being?), and explicitly refrains from deeming any 
particular mode of being as the only case of its kind, though he is determined to uncover 
what being is in its most fundamental, true sense. In Book Zeta, which is notoriously 
difficult and unsatisfying,92 Aristotle argues that “the term ‘primary’ or ‘first,’ or ‘prior to 
all others’ is used in many senses, yet a substance is primary in every sense: in formula, 
in knowledge, and in time. For of the other categories no one is separable, but only 
substance” (Z.1.1028a33-5). For example, the attribute brown is an aspect of ‘substance’ 
(ousia), and denotes a real mode of being, but only in a partial or accidental sense, as it is 
always understood in relation to, or predicated of, given substance (e.g., this brown cat, 
this brown banana, etc.). Substance, on the other hand, is not an attribute of anything, and 
‘stands alone’ as the primary definition of being, toward which all other senses of being 
are related. Without substance, a thing would not be at all, nor would it be what it most 
fundamentally is, because substance constitutes a thing’s essence: what it is to be that 
particular thing. The Aristotle of Book Zeta is therefore committed to the fact that 1) 
being in the most fundamental sense is substance, 2) that essence is a key way of 
understanding substance, and 3) that substance (even when understood as essence) 
denotes what it is to be a particular thing, rather than a universal predication. To be is to 
be a particular this (tode ti), and despite sharing common properties with other things 
																																																																																																																																																																					
approaches to very different problems (and thousands of years apart from each other), both thinkers are 
keen to the unbridgeable gap problem, and turn to the things themselves as they are given in experience, 
understanding essence qua immanent in experience, to perception. Both thinkers also recognize that matter 
how hard one tries, one can never “glue” two metaphysically heterogeneous actualities together. The 
solution must reside in an essential relation between two modalities of the same thing – and for Husserl, it’s 
clear that this “same thing” is consciousness itself.  
92 See Lesher, 1971; Loux, 1991; Yu, 2003; and Weigelt, 2007.  
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(e.g., both Socrates and Plato being philosophers), to be is to be one (e.g., Socrates). That 
is, a singular one that is recognizably different from other beings.  
For Aristotle, then, the principle of being must involve that which differentiates 
one thing from another, meaning that difference itself is vital, as the tode ti (this 
particularity thing here, e.g., this man, Socrates) denotes, or points towards, what makes 
something what it is, and thus distinct from everything else. Although ‘form’ as primary 
substance/separable this (again, denoting the essence of a thing, making it what it is) 
seems to be the answer that Aristotle is looking for in Zeta (answering the question: what 
is substance?), Aristotle stresses that how form denotes primary substance is unclear, as it 
the most perplexing feature of substance (Z.3.1029a33). As we saw in Chapter 2, part of 
form’s perplexity is attributed to the (alleged) Platonic conception of form as a universal 
One over many. The ‘problem of universals’—a major preoccupation in medieval 
philosophy—questions the ontological status of universals, e.g., Man itself or Beauty 
itself or Justice itself. That is, whether universals are self-subsisting entities (out there, 
somewhere, in the difficult to access, really real intelligible world), or instead exist qua 
immanent in their particular instantiations (as Aristotle would have it).  
For Aristotle, much is at stake with the ontological status of universals, as 
language is grounded in concepts. In the last aporia in Book Beta, Aristotle writes:  
We must raise these problems, then, concerning the principles, and also whether the 
principles are universal, or, as we call them, individuals. For if they are universal, they 
will not be substances; for none of what is common signifies a this but only a such, and a 
substance is a this. And if a common predicate is a this and can be exhibited, Socrates 
will be many things: Socrates himself, and a man, and an animal, and indeed each of 
these indicates a this and a unity. If the principle is universal, then, these results follow; if 
they are not universal but exist as individuals, they will not be known; for all knowledge 
is universal. So, if there is to be knowledge of them, there will be, besides these 
principles, other which are prior and are predicated of them universally. (B.6.1003a7-18) 
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The thrust behind the aporia is that we can only know, define, and articulate what it is to 
be by way of universal concepts. These are what are manifest to speculative reason as 
truth. Substance, however, as Aristotle stresses over and over again, necessarily denotes a 
particular this—different and thus distinct from everything else. Therefore, if substance 
qua particular this is what a thing most fundamentally is, there cannot be any knowledge 
or articulation of what it is, which would make the pursuit to determine what being is a 
bit of a lost cause, as language, grounded in universality, will inevitably fail to articulate 
what is particular or singular. The point here is that language-thought, in its efforts to 
capture the truth of a given thing, cannot help but (in Levinas’s jargon) totalize a given 
phenomenon: reducing it to a particular theme, which inevitable falls short of capturing 
what a thing most essentially is (as an actual, existing thing, distinct from other things).  
One of the problematic conclusions in Book Zeta is that, insofar as language goes, 
the ability to determine and articulate what substance most fundamentally is fails, 
because a this cannot be known or defined—at least not to theoretical reason. Although 
Aristotle insinuates throughout Zeta that this thing’s essence, or what it is to be that 
particular thing, is peculiar, singular, distinct to that thing,93 essence can only be known 
and expressed in terms of a universal such, i.e., a concept, inevitably failing to explicate 
the peculiarity of thisness, thus rendering the tode ti ungraspable. Essence, while pointing 
to something particular, is inevitably intelligible, said, thematized, and conceptualized as 
something universal. And again, this thematization is what makes it known, grasped, an 
object of cognition. Given this aporia, Aristotle decides to switch gears (in Books Eta 
																																																								
93 As he puts it, “The essence of a particular thing and that thing itself are one and the same, and not 
accidentally so” (Z.6.1031b19-21), and, “Of things which are primary and are stated by themselves, then, it 
is clear that each of them and its essence are one and the same. Evidently, the sophistical refutations of this 
position and the problem of whether Socrates and the essence of Socrates are solved in the same way” 
(Z.6.1032a5-10). 
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and Theta), and instead investigates being in terms of act and potency, ultimately 
conceding that being in the most fundamental sense is activity (e.g., the activity of being 
this particular cat here).  
So, how does this relate to Levinas’s project? Levinas is ultimately criticizing 
Western philosophy’s bias toward the intelligible and articulable, i.e., the mode of being 
that is present to reflective cognition (essence). This critique is helpfully understood as a 
restitution of Aristotle’s initial commitment to extant singular beings as the principle of 
being, though Levinas will attempt to dig ‘deeper’ than Aristotle’s tode ti.  Levinas is 
convinced that the sense of being that has been favored in Western philosophy, following 
Aristotle, is that of essence, which is, as Levinas puts it, phenomenality fixed in a tale, a 
narrative (OB, 39); essence is memorable, and can be thus named. This is not to say that 
essence stands before or represents some truer entity behind it, but rather that the way in 
which being appears to speculative/theoretical reason is universal, predicable—
resounding in logos, and temporally extended within and before consciousness. As he 
writes:  
Essence is not only conveyed in the said, it is not only “expressed” in it, but originally—
though amphibologically—resounds in it qua essence. There is no essence or entity 
behind the said, behind the Logos. The said, as a verb is the essence of essence. Essence 
is the very fact that there is a theme, exhibition, doxa or logos, and thus truth. Essence is 
not only conveyed, it is temporalized in a predicative statement. (OB, 39) 
 
Beyond this, Levinas also points out that what is implied in our understanding of essence 
as that which makes a given thing what it is (without which it would cease it be), is that 
essence is understood as interest. That is, an interest to continue being what it is. In 
Aristotelian terms, essence as interest could be understood as the telos of a given thing: 
the desire that a thing has to keep on doing what it does, and to ultimately augment what 
	 159	
it does (by doing it in an ever-fuller way)—not only with the aim surviving or continuing 
to be, but with the ultimate aim of flourishing in that being. That is, most fully 
actualizing, by virtue of itself, what it is for it to most fully be, e.g., an acorn becoming a 
tree, a child becoming a well-reasoning adult.  
While Levinas, much like Kant, is not contesting this ‘teleological’ feature of 
reality (i.e., that things really do persist in interest, the desire to keep on being what they 
are, and to enjoy existence and all of the pleasures it entails), Levinas is more concerned 
with what nourishes that interest in the first place, and thus seeks to reclaim another form 
of desire, metaphysical desire, as that which animates, inspires, incarnates (what appears 
to reflection as) essence (OB, 68-69).  
Again, Levinas is not proposing to have discovered a really real ‘noumenal’ 
reality subsisting behind essence (OB, 45), but instead seeks to unveil our primordial 
desire for the other: the desire that constitutes one’s existence. Key for Levinas is that 
metaphysical desire is not a desire that spawns from our finitude (desiring to bring about 
something that we lack), nor is it a desire to return to the origin (this is self-conscious 
reflection, a willed return to oneself), but is instead an insatiable desire that overflows 
“beyond everything that can complete it” (TI, 34), “sought in the Other, but by him who 
lacks nothing” (TI, 62). It is the desire that ignites wonder (being awestruck by something 
different than one had thought before), and philosophy’s love of wisdom; it is desire 
without agenda, projected goals, or ‘foreseen’ ends. It is a desire that nourishes itself with 
its hunger (TI, 34), driven by a pull toward that which one cannot foresee, and without 
any promise of resolution, only the promise of encountering something new. It is the 
desire that fuels, as Aristotle puts it, our tendency to reach out in understanding. That is, 
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our desire to shed light on that which seems so close that we can taste it, but somehow 
manages to fall through our fingertips when we reflect on what it is (e.g, the tode ti).  
Vital to Levinas’s account is that the ‘opening’ between the desirer and the 
desired is never closed. Metaphysical desire, as Levinas construes it, is preserved by the 
conjunction—the ‘and’—that inhibits the desirer and desired from constituting a closed 
system (a totality in which the two are ultimately one). It is this opening that preserves 
the hunger that gives desire its motor. It is helpful to think about the fissure between the 
desirer and desired through the example of a rich, ongoing conversation between two 
friends, in which the two friends’ perspectives are never fully fused in to one—at least 
not to the point of one utterly ceasing to be different, as the this would then cease to be a 
relation between one and the other, and would instead denote a relation between one and 
oneself. This is to say that one never fully possesses, grasps, or attains the other’s 
perspectives or interpretations in their entirety. The labor involved in understanding 
another never ends because the other is never fully exposed: there is always something 
more, something surprising, something new, something other than what is currently 
known. Metaphysical desire denotes that pull toward the other; the ‘opening’ between 
oneself and the other denotes the chasm between what is known and what is unknown.  
Sensibility: the subject as subjected. With his critique of essence in mind, 
Levinas writes, “Oneself is a singularity prior to the distinction between the particular 
and the universal” (OB, 108). For Levinas, the Aristotelian tode ti is already in some 
sense manifest, thematized, something that I can designate, whereas the singularity that 
he has in mind does not appear as something that we can grasp conceptually. Levinas 
calls this mode of knowing ‘sensibility’, which signifies the experience of understanding 
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via ‘brute’, immediate contact, prior to conscious schematization (e.g., enjoying food, 
basking in the heat of the sun, hearing the sound of music, feeling your feet in the sand, 
being engrossed in a beautiful sunset, etc.). Sensibility is the experience of being in one’s 
skin, en-fleshed, touching or being in contact things. Echoing Aristotle in Book II of De 
Anima, to be is to be tactile and sensate. To be alive is to touch what is outside of us, to 
be in relation-to…X; and to touch is to be utterly exposed, at perpetual risk.  
For Levinas, sensibility—most essentially constituted by flesh and touch, 
“‘epidermal’ vulnerability”94—denotes who we most fundamentally are. We are, first and 
foremost, embodied and sensing: ‘subjects’ subjected to what is outside of ourselves, 
constantly fissured and interrupted. This is a conception of the self that is ultimately 
affected and constituted by the world, rather than affecting and constituting the world (as, 
for instance, Kant would have it).95  Sensibility signifies the openness, undergoing, 
susceptiveness of one’s flesh—pure exposure without dwelling or ‘somewhere’ to hide: 
skin laid bare. For Levinas, it is in this sense that sensibility signifies my irreplaceability 
as one-for-the-other, or put differently, my responsibility for the other. My response-
ability—that is, my responsiveness, by default, to the experiences that I undergo—cannot 
be given to somebody else, e.g., someone else cannot feel the water on my feet in 
precisely the same way that I do, or experience the taste of a juicy peach in precisely the 
way that I do. It is in this sense that sensibility-as-responsibility constitutes me (distinct 
																																																								
94 This is Bettina Bergo’s illuminative term, taken from her entry on Levinas in the Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy.  
95 Kant notoriously states, “Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind” 
(A51/B76). Levinas is contesting precisely this point, stressing that this there is a gnosis that is otherwise 
than perception, intentionality, and conscious identity. Levinas is describing what it is to intend an object 
that exceeds our intentions. That is, a non-spatial, non-temporal, non-cognitive content: that is, the infinite. 
It is the encounter with something offering more than we can formulate in our intentions, requiring us to 
readjust our interpretation, or understanding, over and over again.   
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from other beings). In ontological terms, sensibility serves as the ‘principle of 
individuation’.  
For Levinas, the sensible self denotes the veracity ‘prior to’ truth as essence, 
though ontologically speaking, they are two sides of the same ‘coin’) (OB, 143). 
Sensibility marks the forgetting of self-concern, albeit not by an act of the will, but as 
being seized—held hostage, persecuted—by the other. This seizure from self-concern, by 
Levinas’s account, constitutes freedom in the most authentic sense: that is, freedom as the 
relinquishing of self-concern, rather than freedom as a self-determining act of the will:  
Freedom is animation itself, breath, the breathing outside air, where inwardness frees 
itself from itself, and is exposed to all winds. There is exposure without assumption, 
which would already be closedness. That the emptiness of space would be filled with 
invisible air, hidden from perception, save in the caress of the wind or the threat of 
storms, non-perceived, but penetrating me even in my retreats of inwardness, that this 
invisibility or this emptiness would be breathable or horrible, that this invisibility is non-
indifferent and obsesses me before all thematization, that the simple ambiance is imposed 
as an atmosphere to which the subject gives himself and exposes himself in his lungs, 
without intentions and aims, that the subject could be a lung at the bottom of substance—
all this signifies a subjectivity that suffers and offers itself before taking a foothold in 
being. It is a passivity, wholly a supporting. (OB, 180)   
 
To be clear, the affective undergoing of sensibility is ‘prior to’ the “I think,” or reflective 
self-consciousness’s representation of objective content to itself. The self as sensibility is 
a self exposed to, immersed in, and in contact with what is outside of reflective 
consciousness. The sensible self is a self without will, without intention, without a 
projected end or aim in mind. The self of sensibility is moved by, and thus responsible 
for, as responsive to, what is outside of itself. And again, this is a notion of responsibility 
that has nothing to do with resolve or accountability, but rather the impossibility of 
evading assignation by the other.  
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To think about this notion of responsibility more concretely, consider that our 
bodies are subject to a host of forces outside of ourselves. This affective exposure is 
immediate (e.g., being rained on, being burned by fire, struggling to breathe because the 
air is thick, experiencing the sweetness of a ripe peach, etc.), and this exposure leaves us 
vulnerable to both suffering and enjoyment (OB, 63). Sensibility is thus constituted by 
pure absorption, e.g., enjoying the refreshing temperature of the sea on a hot day, and 
attending only to that feeling (being there) without reflecting on it. As Levinas writes:  
The immediacy on the surface of the skin characteristic of sensibility, its vulnerability, is 
found as it were anaesthetized in the process of knowing. But also, no doubt, repressed or 
suspended. By contrast with this vulnerability (which presupposes enjoyment differently 
than its antithesis), knowing, being’s disclosure to itself, marks a break with the 
immediate, and in a certain sense an abstraction. The immediacy of the sensible which is 
not reducible to the gnoseological role assumed by sensation is the exposure to wounding 
and to enjoyment, an exposure to wounding in enjoyment, which enables the wound to 
reach the subjectivity of the subject complacent in itself and positing itself for itself. This 
immediacy is first of all the ease of enjoyment, more immediate than drinking, the 
sinking into the depth of the element, into it incomparable freshness, a plentitude and a 
fulfillment. It is pleasure, that is, the complacency in itself of life loving life even in 
suicide. The complacency of subjectivity, a complacent experience for itself, is its very 
“egoity,” its substantiality. (OB, 64)  
 
Key for Levinas is that sensibility, in perpetual proximity to what is other than oneself, 
has the structure of being-one-for-another. ‘Proximity’ is Levinas’s way of describing the 
contact that is not already parsed into a duality of receptive sensor (known subject) and a 
received sensed (determined object). Proximity denotes our immediate exposure to and 
experience of things other than ourselves, as well as the non-indifference one has toward 
what is next to, up against, in contact with oneself, which can of course be be enjoyable 
or painful (OB, 90). Key is that we only experience ourselves in reflection (concerning 
ourselves with ourselves). When immersed in experience, what we experience is activity: 
the reflective self ultimately disperses into the activity itself (e.g., feeling cool in the sea). 
We can of course reflect on the experience, but once reflection starts, one realizes one 
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was ‘lost’ in the experience: consciousness realizes that the conscious self was nowhere 
to be found.  
Sensibility so construed plays a vital role in Levinas’s schema, because 
ontologically speaking, its structure is that of living-from-the-other, albeit existing-for-
the-other: absolutely exposed. Sensibility denotes the affective undergoing that is 
intrinsic to existence. To be ‘nude’ in one’s skin is to exist for, to be moved by, what is 
other than oneself (e.g., feeling the heat of the sun, or the sweetness of a peach). As 
Levinas writes, “The expression ‘in one’s skin’ is not a metaphor for the in-itself; it refers 
to the recurrence in the dead time or the meanwhile which separates inspiration and 
expiration, the diastole and systole of the heart beating dully against the walls of one’s 
skin” (OB, 109). What is inseparable from who one is is one’s corporeality (OB, 78),	96 
which is ultimately animated, inspired, incarnated from without, e.g., being birthed into 
existence by another, inhaling and exhaling air, being nourished by food, etc. We are 
each uniquely who we are by virtue of being incarnated by something other than 
ourselves; the other animates us, beginning with birth.  
Self-consciousness: the subject as agent. For Levinas, self-consciousness is the 
result of experiencing the insecurity intrinsic to sensibility.97 That is, the risk of being 
wounded, of experiencing pain, that inescapably accompanies exposure. This is 
ultimately a risk that sensibility does not notice until it is wounded in a way that drives it 
to retreat, so as to attempt to avoid future suffering. To avoid future suffering requires 
calculation: identifying means that will secure the identified end (i.e., avoiding pain).  
																																																								
96 That is, to be this particular set of flesh and bones.  
97 As Levinas writes, “Enjoyment is the very production of a being that is born, that breaks the tranquil 
eternity of its seminal or uterine existence to enclose itself in a person, who in the living world is at home 
with itself” (TI, 147). 
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Consciousness is therefore born once one’s vulnerability is recognized and 
reflected upon. Its anxiety about the possibility of future pain drives it to withdraw from 
the world upon which it depends, and thus build a dwelling to try and escape the anxiety 
of the morrow—‘the morrow’ signifying the unpredictability of the future, what is not 
determined. Once it retreats into its newfound dwelling, it begins to recollect itself 
(marking the birth of time, and self-concern), shifting into the world of intentionality, 
conscious perception. One’s hands and eyes begin to take and comprehend, to gather and 
master. This marks the transition from the self as sensibility to the virile self of 
representation, which, as Lisa Guenther puts it, “represents itself as having given birth to 
the world in itself and to itself;” it is the I that has “the ability to represent itself as it were 
causa sui… as if it had even chosen its own birth,” characterized by “…the eternal 
temptation of the one who dwells in a home, who can lock the door and peer out the 
window…to see without being seen.”98 This dwelling is ultimately consciousness: the 
interiority of self-reflection, the schematization of inner experience, and the 
multiplication of identity.  
The important takeaway here is that by Levinas’s account, inner experience (self-
consciousness, the “I”) is necessarily conditioned by outer experience (the world). This is 
metaphysically significant; self-consciousness—including the first-personal experience of 
time as past, present, and future—does not come first. For Levinas, following an under-
appreciated point in Kant’s theoretical work,99 outer sense is ontologically prior. Levinas 
																																																								
98 Lisa Guenther, The Gift of the Other: Levinas and the Politics of Reproduction, (Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 2006), 62.  
99 It is important to point out that Kant’s tweak in the B-edition of the first Critique involves him making 
this precise point, albeit by arguing for a relation of dependency between our a priori intuitions (space and 
time) in his refutation of psychological idealism (which is ultimately an attempt to prove the objective 
reality of outer intuition). As Kant writes, “However harmless idealism may be considered in respect of the 
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tips his hat to Kant by underscoring that the Copernican revolution’s crucial insight is 
that being is determined on the basis of sense (Kant’s Transcendental Aesthetic), rather 
than sense being determined on the basis of being (OB, 129).  
Thus, the self as sensibility (outer sense) marks who we are in the most 
fundamental sense, whereas the self as self-conscious reflection (inner sense)—the self of 
predications, judgments, propositions, and calculations—is the result of anxiously being 
thrust back onto oneself because of the fear of future pain. It is important to stress that the 
subject as subjected (sensibility) and the subject as agent (self-consciousness) ultimately 
represent two sides of the same coin, two modes of being—the later marked by a retreat 
from the world in the hopes of constructing new worlds within reflection. These ‘new 
worlds’ are worlds in which one has (a perceived sense of) control over reality, fostered 
through careful calculation of efficient means to pre-determined ends based on memory 
and anticipation (e.g., avoiding intimate relationships to avoid the pain that might come 
with those relationships ending).  
																																																																																																																																																																					
essential aims of metaphysicians, it still remains a scandal to philosophy and to human reason in general 
that the existence of things outside us (from which we derive the whole material of knowledge, even for our 
inner sense) must be accepted merely on faith, and that if anyone thinks good to doubt their existence, we 
are unable to counter his doubts by any satisfactory proof… This consciousness of my existence in time is 
bound up in the way of identity with the consciousness of a relation to something outside me, and it is 
therefore experience not invention, sense not imagination, which inseparably connects this outside 
something with my inner sense. For outer sense is already in itself a relation of intuition of something 
actual outside of me, and the reality of outer sense, in its distinction from the imagination, rests simply on 
that which is here found to take place, namely, its being inseparably bound up with inner experience, as the 
condition of its possibility… But though intellectual consciousness does indeed come first, the inner 
intuition, in which my existence can alone be determined, is sensible and is bound up with the condition of 
time. This determination, however, and therefore the inner experience itself, depends upon something 
permanent, which is not in me, and consequently can be only something outside me, to which I must regard 
myself as standing in relation. The reality of outer sense is necessarily bound up with inner sense, if 
experience in general is to be possible at all…” (B xl). Key for Kant is that inner experience is conditioned 
by outer experience, so even though the only thing we can be ‘sure’ about is inner experience (time), this is 
ultimately determined by what is outside of myself. Kant’s thesis is that the mere, but empirically 
determined, consciousness of my own existence prove the existence of objects in space outside of me 
(space denoting permanence, time-determination) (B276).  
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Substitution: the self as being-for-the-other. With these two dimensions of the 
self in mind (pre-conscious and conscious activity), Levinas uses the trope of 
‘substitution’ to further express what he means by being-for-the-other (metaphysical 
desire); ‘for’ here signifies the deposing of self-concern. Key for Levinas is that 
substitution is not an act of the will, i.e., you ought to substitute for your neighbor 
because you owe them, but a metaphor that aids us in understanding ourselves as 
perpetually disrupted from our self-conscious selves in our metaphysical desire to attend 
to what is otherwise than reflective consciousness.    
By Levinas’s account, substitution, like sensibility, is responsibility, albeit 
understood as the self’s responsive-ness to what is other than itself. That is, a response-
ability to others from which one cannot resign, because it was not a willed decision in the 
first place. There was no business deal, no contract; the other was already on the scene, 
hosting, when each of us arrived. Substitution is a way of describing the unrelenting 
proximity of the other(s) to me. I am always and already surrounded—held hostage—by 
the other: the other obsesses me, insofar as I am. This is something that I cannot be 
indifferent to, though my response can be that of hostility or hospitality: fleeing from the 
other I fear, attempting to control or eliminate the other, or opening myself, welcoming 
the other. And again, the other refers to a disruption that pulls us out of our reflective, 
self-conscious selves, e.g., a stranger wanting to have a conversation with you while you 
are working on an article in a coffee shop, or a turkey crossing the road and stopping 
traffic when you are late for work, or the humidity making you stop in your tracks and 
forget where you were headed. In each of these cases, the other seizes you, and you 
substitute your self-concerned self for the other, to be-for-the-other.  
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Beyond this, substitution denotes the ever-present freedom from the anxiety that 
plagues reflective self-consciousness:  
Substitution frees the subject from ennui, that is, from the enchainment to itself, where 
the ego suffocates in itself due to the tautological way of identity, and ceaselessly seeks 
after the distraction of games and sleep in a movement that never wears out. This 
liberation is not an action, a commencement, nor any vicissitude of essence and of 
ontology, where the equality with oneself would be established in the form of self-
consciousness... (OB, 124-5) 
 
Thus, rather than being a limitation on one’s freedom, responsibility is better understood 
as that which frees the subject from being trapped inside one’s head, paranoid about the 
future, obsessed with the regrets from the past. Responsibility saves us from our self-
interested, production-oriented, calculating selves. And for Levinas, questions like, why 
does the other concern me? Am I my brother’s keeper? What is Hecuba to me? What do 
we owe each other? Only have meaning if one has already supposed that one’s self (my 
happiness, my contentment) is the only matter of concern for itself. Only in this 
hypothesis is it incomprehensible that the other would concern me, or that I would need 
to hunt for reasons to care for my neighbor (OB, 117). Levinas challenges this 
hypothesis, and reminds us that responsibility is not about paying off a debt that you owe, 
but literally offering yourself (your appreciative attention). 
Crucial to Levinas’s account is that responsibility (that is, the responsiveness 
built-in to sensibility) is prior to every willed decision, constituting what ought to be 
understood as an original freedom. As Levinas puts it, we are most free when we give 
ourselves to the other, (OB, 115). On this, Levinas writes:  
To be without choice can seem to be violence only to an abusive or hasty or imprudent 
reflection, for it precedes the freedom non-freedom couple, but thereby sets up a vocation 
that goes beyond the limited and egoist fate of him who is only for-himself, and washes 
his hand of the faults and misfortunes that do not begin in his own freedom or in his 
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present. It is the setting up of a being that is not for itself, but is for all, is both being and 
disinterestedness. (OB, 116-7)  
 
As Kevin Houser puts it, we are not beings who are also responsible (dodging the 
naturalistic fallacy), we are beings made of responsibility.100 For Levinas, responsibility 
is an ontological category; answering without prior commitment; as Levinas puts it, is 
“human fraternity itself” (OB, 117). And again this is sensibility, i.e., the immediate 
response to what it not oneself, including (but not limited to) other persons. 
Responsibility so construed is prior to modern philosophy’s willed freedom (positive 
freedom for Kant), which is to say that metaphysically speaking, the will is always and 
already conditioned by something other than itself—and the call to respond is 
immediately apprehended. Although our experience of decision-making might (and often 
does) provide the illusion that one constitutes oneself by and for oneself, Levinas’s point 
is that every aspect of our being is constituted by what is ‘outside’ of us.101  
Metaphysical desire. Substitution is a helpful way of understanding what Levinas 
means by metaphysical desire, ‘during’ which we are seized, held hostage, obsessed by 
the other to the point of losing oneself. We substitute ourselves for the other; reflection 
ceases, and a new sense of temporality commences: a temporality that does not involve 
holding the past (memory) and future (anticipation), but instead living without 
consciousness of time. One is wholly overcome, and reflective content disappears from 
the scene. To substitute is to experience a lapse of linear time (what Kierkegaard would 
																																																								
100 Kevin Houser, “Levinas and Analytic Philosophy: Towards an Ethical Metaphysics of Reasons,” in the 
Oxford Handbook of Emmanuel Levinas, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 10.  
101 For example, the meal that nourishes me is from my community (farmers, distributers of their goods, 
etc.), the language that helps me share the world with other people is a gift from my community (even the 
voice inside of my head is not my own), my education is a gift from my teachers (public education itself 
being a gift from the state), my privilege is a gift from my parents (especially my grandparents who 
immigrated to this country with the hope of a better life). The list goes on. Everything we are is constituted 
by what we are not, albeit re-integrated into ourselves as the fabric of who we are. 
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call the fullness of time); it is to contract oneself to sensibility, exposure, a cessation of 
speculation. The self is effectively not keeping track of itself anymore:  the agenda is 
surrendered, the projects foregone, and the concern for the past and the future is 
forgotten, suspended. Although Levinas’s language is far more hyperbolic than Brewer’s, 
it seems similar to what Brewer has in mind with dialectical desire. Dialectical desire 
involves a lack of concern for oneself—an obsession for what is otherwise. It is complete 
and total devotion, cherishing, and appreciation. Essential to this experience is that one 
forgets what one is doing because one is what one is doing, void of any sort of reflection 
on what is happening or what is going to happen.   
Levinas goes so far as to describe substitution as traumatic—that is, the traumatic 
effect of persecution, being harassed by the other, to the point of divesting, dispossessing, 
outdoing, forgetting oneself. He appropriately describes this obsession as anarchy, in the 
sense that the self is seized from its self-governance (Kantian autonomy), and from any 
sort of predictable consistency. Levinas’s claim is that our arche is precisely that 
anarchy, and the recurrence of oneself as perpetually responding to self-disruption by the 
other.  
Crucial to Levinas’s account is that the other does not let one rest. Consciousness 
is constantly menaced, haunted, obsessed by the other—interrupted by what is ‘outside’ 
of itself: disturbed, left speechless, awestruck, torn from its tasks and projections. This 
obsession by the other is distinct from the restlessness of anxiety, as anxiety thrusts us 
back on ourselves—driving us to dwell in reflective consciousness, and attempt to control 
all of the aspects of being that cannot be controlled. The disquiet provoked by the other is 
a provocation that undoes what ‘belongs’ to me (my memory, my anticipations, my 
	 171	
identities, my goals) by calling me to be outside of myself.102 As Levinas understands it, 
this divesting, immolating, exciding, dispossessing, contracting of the conscious self (and 
all that it ‘possesses’) is the response to being summoned as someone irreplaceable, 
called to empty out for the other, called to make room. And again, this is not the other 
limiting oneself (and one’s respective pursuits), but, as I understand it, bringing one to 
greater fullness and joy: the joy of being with the other(s), and free from the shackles of 
self-conceit—open to the new, the unpredictable, the surprising.  
What Levinas is emphasizing is that we are in fact most at home with ourselves 
when we are giving ourselves to the other, being-for-the-other. We are most at home in 
responsibility, exposure, overflowing, and giving-over ourselves in generosity. For 
Levinas, metaphysical desire is the original goodness of creation (OB, 121). That is, 
creation construed as birth, overflow, bounteousness, gift. This original goodness 
(responsibility, substitution) is being-for-the-other, literally existing for each other. It is 
the extraordinary forgetting of death—that is, being without regard for death, imprudently 
exposed—as the ego has already divested itself, lost concern for itself, delivering itself to 
something different. As he writes, the good chooses me before I can be in a position to 
choose (OB, 122); no one is good voluntarily, no one is enslaved to the good. We are 
good by virtue of responsibility, which is not just an ethical aspect of being, but “the non-
place in which ontology is situated” (OB, 140). For Levinas, to be is to respond to the 
unknowable that disrupts our flow of consciousness. The good is precisely that 
disruption, that anarchy—accusing, calling one into question, and summoning one to 
sincerity.  
																																																								
102 As Levinas writes, “In substitution my being that belongs to me and not to another is undone, and it is 
through this substitution that I am not ‘another’, but me” (OB, 127). 
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Quoting Levinas, “The plot of the good is the plot of substitution” (OB, 137). The 
good is the source of non-indifference, being pestered, provoked, from without. 
Substitution signifies the outdoing of unity—that is, the anguish of (self-reflection’s) 
breakup that is a movement into fullness. It is ultimately through responsibility that one is 
able to “catch sight of and conceive of value” (OB, 123). As Levinas writes, “the 
proximity of the neighbor in its trauma does not only strike up against me, but exalts and 
elevates me, and, in the literal sense of the term, inspires me. Inspiration, heteronomy, is 
the very pneuma of the psyche” (OB, 124). It is by virtue of the other that one is filled up, 
urged to give, to create, to speak, to live—literally able to breathe in. Giving, creating, 
living, speaking in the face of the other constitutes the me that is otherwise than a 
graspable identity. And for Levinas, to believe that one rests, in isolation, on nothing but 
oneself is nothing short of tragedy.  
4.3 SUBSTITUTION AS ‘SAYING’ & THE SAYING’S CALL FOR JUSTICE 
The saying. To return to the questions guiding Levinas’s project, Levinas provides an 
account of language that locates the source of meaning (ultimately the source of being) in 
‘the saying’, rather than ‘the said’, i.e., what is manifest in essence.  
Language plays an important role in Levinas’s work, because language is the 
fundamental way in which we relate to what is other than ourselves. Language enables us 
to share our ‘private’ or singular experiences with others,103 and we do this by disclosing 
																																																								
103 Anna Strhan writes that conversation is used by Levinas “to describe the relation between self and 
Other, which maintains a separation between the two terms,” as language, for Levinas, demonstrates our 
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sensibility in ‘the said’, or essence. Language grounds thought, the world, and 
community; all of which are offered by the other to me—first and foremost, through 
speech (as is obviously the case for the child learning how to express itself and share 
thoughts with others). For Levinas, the first fact of being (responsibility) is confirmed in 
speech, as language denotes a being relating to more than it contains—responding to the 
other by reaching out for the other.  
Thus, for Levinas, ‘the saying’ denotes the breakup of inwardness/reflection, the 
“abandon of all shelter,” the risky exposure to the trauma that wounds and the joy that 
births: one’s skin laid bare in proximity to the other (OB, 49). To say is to respond before 
being called, to deliver oneself over (ceding ego), or as Levinas puts it, to hold open 
openness itself—to give over one’s appreciative attention, to ‘give into’ metaphysical 
desire. Saying so construed is communication or conversation, which is best understood 
as an openness that is not concerned with a particular agenda of things to be said—an 
offering that is not in search of recognition (OB, 119). To say is (confusingly) not to say 
anything in particular, but rather to depose oneself of the ‘sovereignty’ associated with 
Kant’s autonomy of the will (OB, 59). For Levinas, saying is a passive gesture in the 
sense that it is not an act of the will, the byproduct of reflection, or an assertion of one’s 
truth. To say is to make a gift of one’s own skin, ultimately safeguarding (as we will see 
below) the possibility of a truth that is not ideology (OB, 136).  
																																																																																																																																																																					
relationship with alterity. Anna Strahn, “‘Bringing Me More Than I Contain…’: Discourse, Subjectivity, 
and the Scene of Teaching in Totality and Infinity,” in Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vol. 41, No. 3 
2007: 411-30, 413. Quoting Levinas, “To approach the Other in conversation is to welcome his expression, 
in which at each instant he overflows the idea a thought would carry away from it. It is therefore to receive 
from the Other beyond the capacity of the I, which means exactly: to have the idea of infinity. But this also 
means: to be taught. The relation with the Other, or Conversation, is a non-allergic relation, an ethical 
relation; but inasmuch as it is welcomed this conversation is a teaching [enseignement]. Teaching is not 
reducible to maieutics; it comes from the exterior and brings me more than I contain” (TI, 51). 
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With structuralism in mind, Levinas describes ‘the saying’ as the diachronic (or 
better, anarchic) dimension of language that perpetually informs, but ultimately betrays 
language as synchronic language system of significations.104 The saying denotes that 
which does not fit neatly into the language system—the residue, so to speak, which, 
while not expressed in the system itself, drives the subtle changes that occur within the 
language system over time, ultimately influencing its rules. Crucial to Levinas’s account 
(contra Saussurian structuralism) is that plurality, rather than homogeneity lies at ‘the 
heart’ of language. That is, a plurality of tongues (or better, skins)—inter-related ones—
that contribute to the language system so construed. The common plane of a universal 
system of relations (the language system) is what is wanted, “yet to be constituted” (TI, 
73). What makes language language is the fact that agreement or sameness is not given: a 
fundamental dimension of otherness remains, is yet to be discussed, so to speak.105 What 
																																																								
104 In regard to Ferdinand de Saussure’s proto-structuralist account of language in the Course on General 
Linguistics, Levinas is challenging neither his distinction between la langue and la parole, nor his 
distinction between the synchronic and diachronic dimensions of le langage. For Levinas, the language 
system qua system of relations (Saussure’s answer to the question: what is the essence of language?) is the 
common or universal plane in which we participate. Similar to Saussure, Levinas recognizes the law that 
pertains to thematized world of la langue, as well as how crucial it is for community, world, and justice. 
However, for Levinas, law is not grounded in la langue. In Saussurean terms, la langue (for Levinas) takes 
its cue from la parole and is thus dependent on la parole. Furthermore, while the synchronic dimension of 
language in a Levinasian world maintains all of the qualities that Saussure gives it (homogeneity, 
systematicity, universality, law-like nature, etc.), for Levinas, the synchronic is necessarily subordinate to 
the alterity of the diachronic, as the language system only exists by virtue of a plurality of speaking subjects 
that are not me. But, for Saussure, the synchronic is thought to function independently of speaking subjects, 
despite the fact that speaking subjects are what, at least in some sense, define or condition synchrony: 
speaking subjects are what participate in and, to borrow Levinas’s term, thematize the world of language. 
Even though the signifier (speaking subject) is not signified by the sign, the language system itself is 
necessarily conditioned by a plurality of speaking subjects. For Levinas, the world (consciousness, thought, 
justice, the phenomenological experience of the “I”) is always and already conditioned by the Other. The 
difficulty that inevitably follows from Saussure’s separation and subsequent subordination of la parole from 
la langue, i.e., how one aspect is able to subsist and effectively ground a ‘system’ without the other, is part 
of the risk that he was willing to take in the name of systematicy. It is important to note, however, that 
Saussure recognizes Levinas’s point regarding the inexorable influence of la parole early on in the Course 
when it is unclear how Saussure will be able to overcome the interdependence of various dual objects of 
language (la langue/la parole, static system/evolutionary process, etc.).  
105 “But to make of the thinker a moment of thought is to limit the revealing function of language to its 
coherence, conveying the coherence of concepts. In this coherence the unique I of the thinker volatizes. The 
function of language would amount to suppressing “the other,” who breaks this coherence and is hence 
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makes language language is a plurality of ones sharing experience—signifying to each 
other—all co-directed toward the same thing, co-construction meaning and values 
together.106  This co-construction (what is collected in ‘the said’) is of course the 
byproduct of conversation, but vital to that co-construction is a directedness toward the to 
whom that speaks.107 
To use the language of transcendental philosophy, conversation could be 
understood as the condition for the possibility of such co-construction, denoting the 
meaning of language before language scatters into words (OB, 150). By Levinas’s 
account, conversation is most essentially the experience of transcendence, “a traumatism 
of astonishment” (TI, 72). And ethics hinges on this fundamental linguistic revelation: 
our encounter with language is our most basic experience of being proximate to what is 
different. This cannot be reduced to the transmission of spoken or written words, as one’s 
hand being touched by another is an instance of precisely this. Language as saying is the 
other’s gifting of the possibility of universality, community, and justice (TI, 76); it is 
through saying that I offer myself to the other and the other offers to myself. To say is to 
interrupt egoism, welcome the world, and lay “the foundation for a possession in 
common” (TI, 76).108 In conversation, I am called to respond—an existence called into 
																																																																																																																																																																					
essentially irrational. A curious result: language would consist in suppressing the other, in making the other 
agree with the same! But in its expressive function language precisely maintains the other—to whom it is 
addressed, whom it calls upon or invokes. To be sure, language does not consist in invoking him as a being 
represented and thought. But this is why language institutes a relation irreducible to the subject-object 
relation: the revelation of the other. In this revelation only can language as a system of signs be constituted” 
(TI, 72).  
106 For an excellent account of this phenomenon in relation to Heidegger (who Levinas is clearly in 
conversation with) see: Irene McMullen, Time and the Shared World: Heidegger on Social Relations, 
(Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2013).  
107 Houser, p. 6.  
108 Levinas thus modifies Saussurean structuralism’s vernacular in his treatment of language by recasting 
the “signifier” as the speaker or issuer of the “sign” (the sign signifying what Saussure would call the 
signifier), and recasting the “signified” as the meaning that is “never a complete presence,” a meaning 
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question—called to justify myself, speak for myself, and also called to host the other’s 
justification, to hear what the other has to say, to receive what I cannot get myself: to be 
taught. As Mensch aptly puts it, in conversation we open a space for the other to have her 
say, thus opening ourselves to a response that may put our sense of things (or in Brewer’s 
terms, our evaluative outlook) into question, requiring reinterpretation. Although those 
communicating seek to better understand each other, ‘the goal’ is not to unite 
interlocutors that are separated in discourse. What is vital is that there is always more to 
be understood: the work of conversation is never over. This is precisely what safeguards 
the possibility of a truth that is not ideology—the repetition of a given creed without a 
move to understand that creed.  
Conversation, then, is not a stable economic exchange of things said—that is, one 
making her truth manifest, and then the other making her truth manifest without any 
element of co-construction, tacitly agreeing to disagree; each bearing witness to 
themselves before the other, effectively talking over each other—but rather “saying 
holding open its openness, without excuses, evasions or alibis, delivering itself without 
saying anything said. Saying saying saying itself” (OB, 142-3). Conversation is above all 
listening: an orientation marked by infinitely open, humble, passive reception. To 
communicate is to go outside of oneself to the other, to approach the other without 
knowledge (of what they will say or how you will respond) or blindness (to the difference 
between the other and oneself). Communication is, as Levinas puts it, the adventure 
																																																																																																																																																																					
simultaneously revealed and concealed via expression (TI, 96). Crucial for Levinas is that the signifier is 
not signified by the sign in the way the sign signifies the signified. As he writes, “The Other, the signifier, 
manifests himself in speech by speaking of the world and not of himself; he manifests himself by proposing 
the world, by thematizing it” (TI, 96). Thus, the signifier is, in a sense, never separated from the sign, as 
language reminds me that I am not alone, always already possessed by the Other, but in another sense the 
signifier is utterly separated from the sign insofar as the signifier is not what is, in the Saussurean sense, 
signified by or connected to the sign. 
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involving uncertainty, a dangerous life, a fine risk to be run—exposing oneself at the risk 
of misunderstanding or being misunderstood, and a lack or refusal of communication 
(OB, 120).  To communicate is to seek first to understand, rather than to be understood. If 
one’s priority is to be understood, than the to whom is forgotten, and the saying is 
absorbed by the said.  
As Levinas writes, “to require that a communication be sure of being heard is to 
confuse communication and knowledge, to efface the difference, to fail to recognize the 
signification of the one-for-the-other in me” (OB, 167). This is to say for communication 
to be communication, understanding the other takes precedence over the need to be 
understood. Moreover, a known-agenda cannot be sought, as this would then be rhetoric, 
manipulation, rather than communication. Thus, for communication to be 
communication, it must be born out of hospitality—what is signified in the simple 
gesture, “after you.”  
Another way of understanding communication so construed is as sincerity, albeit 
not the sincerity of Kant’s duty to be honest, but a delivering over of oneself without 
saying any thing in particular. That is, the saying dedicating itself to the other: an 
exposure signifying, “Here I am” (OB, 143). ‘Saying’ announces peace to the other in its 
desire to listen to the other—in its desire to exhaust oneself in exposure, in being-for-the-
other. Conversation so construed is another way of understanding metaphysical desire as 
appetite that does not spring from lack. For conversation to be conversation, one cannot 
be preoccupied with one’s own projects, concerns, etc., as this inhibits listening. 
Experience is a testimony of this. Though by Levinas’s account, even when one is not 
listening, one is still not indifferent before the other, whether or not one chooses to hear 
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what the other has to say. This is precisely why saying is not an act of the will, but 
something that is always and already the case, despite the fact that one can choose to 
fixate on their own concerns, rather than the voice of another.  
Levinas insists on the priority of the diachronic dimension of language, as 
language is always from and for another. Signs are to someone, which necessarily 
involves a facing relation, or orientation toward another.109 As Houser points out, this 
facing relation (the saying) is the most basic feature of language, and it entails 1) 
answerability (synonymous with responsibility), as well as 2) the issuing of ambiguity. 
Answerability as responsibility conditions the functioning of all speech, and marks the 
passive dimensions of oneself (vulnerable) before another in conversation, while the 
issuing of ambiguity marks the active dimension of offering a position to be interpreted 
and ultimately undone by those receiving it. As Levinas repeats over and over again, the 
said is always undone by the saying. And as Houser underscores, this happens because in 
issuing a position or statement, one is called to attend to it by responding to clarificatory 
demands, 110  assisting (like a midwife) in the birth of what is disclosed, undone, 
disclosed, undone, and so on. Houser points out that when the saying is absorbed in the 
said, we lose the “thick” or affective dimension in which everything said is anchored: the 
relation of proposing to, “with its open-ended-ness, non-assertiveness, potential 
awkwardness, tentativeness.”111  
																																																								
109 Houser, 11.  
110 Ibid., 9.  
111 Ibid., 12. 
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As Houser argues, reason-giving follows the same logic.112  When providing 
reasons or justifying positions, beliefs, or behaviors, one does so from a facing relation. 
When asked to justify ourselves, we respond by checking in on the factors that play a role 
in fixing our beliefs and offer them to another—again, making those reasons vulnerable 
to clarificatory demands, which ultimately gives one further access to one’s reasons, 
which are always less clear to oneself then one would like. As Houser stresses, reasons 
exist as expressions to others. They do not ‘exist’ before being expressed. They are 
birthed into existence by virtue of being responsible for—responding to—the other. 
Reasons are thus expressions of qua derived from responsibility (as who we are); they are 
how we share ourselves with and are accountable before others. To offer a reason is to 
offer one’s labor, and invite the other to join one in one’s thinking—ultimately subjecting 
oneself to the interlocutor putting those thoughts into question. The important point is 
that this gesture is ethical, an offering, hospitality—being seized by the other, being-for-
the-other, gifting to the other. Reasons find their origin in responsibility itself, born out of 
the point from which I express those reasons: that is, to whom I express them. Because 
thought searches for order and arrangement, we share reasons to build a common ground, 
to work toward something objective and universal, albeit not stagnant.  
 In regard to the saying being responsible for the birth of thought, crucial to 
Levinas’s account (echoing Aristotle) is that thought lives in language. But what does 
this? This means that knowledge always refers to what is said, manifest, essences, 
rendering the saying something ‘outside’ of knowledge’s parameters. But what does this 
mean? It means that ‘the saying’—here understood as diachronic, anarchic, interruption, 
																																																								
112 Key is that ‘reasons’ are not synonymous with ‘demonstrative proof’. Reasons are an invitation to 
understanding something better, or to make something clear.  
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transcendence, holding open openness itself—denotes the aspect of conversation that is 
unknown, unpredictable, new, other. Thinking finds its ‘ground’ in the perpetual 
interruptions that provoke its efforts toward clarity, objectivity, measurement, and order 
(analogous to the language system finding it source in the plurality of tongues that 
influence and shape its function and flow).  
 In addition to Aristotle’s dialectical method, which has been discussed at length, 
the most obvious example of this activity is the ‘Socratic method’ as illustrated in Plato’s 
dialogues, in which one offers their understanding of a given phenomenon (e.g., justice), 
and the other (Socrates) questions that understanding: demanding elaboration, 
clarification, justification. In this process, the original definition dissipates and a new one 
is offered, and then the process ensues in the pursuit of a deeper understanding of the 
phenomenon at hand. What is manifest, said, is the proposed essence, and what allows 
that manifestation to take place is the interruption (of consciousness, order, organization) 
by the other. This process involves both listening to the other (saying), and responding, 
gifting, offering oneself not only in holding open the space for conversation, but in saying 
‘a said’, too. The saying and the said are not too separate events, causally related like two 
billiard balls, but rather two aspects of the metaphysical relation that Levinas has in mind. 
Crucial is that the ‘source’ of thinking, reasoning, is the ethical event: that is, the 
experience of encountering something from without, something other, which seizes us 
and pushes us to break away from ourselves (as conscious reflection), thus reminding us 
that the subject, the self, is always subjected. The truth of conversation is the encounter.  
Justice. For Levinas, the search for measurement, intelligible arrangement, and 
order (synchrony) in conversation is the work of justice. Justice is the way in which we 
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realize ethics, the good—judging and measuring among things that are ultimately 
incommensurable (‘equal’ only in their difference, their singularity). This is to say that 
justice denotes not just our responsibility for the other (substitution, who we are), but also 
our responsibility to the other in word and deed; that is, our responsibility to offer what is 
ours, to distribute our resources, so to speak: to offer our position, perspective, to speak 
our piece, our ‘said’. By this account, justice is in fact the offspring of the good, birthed 
from responsibility, the need to respond. To recap, the saying’s interruption of self-
consciousness is 1) the call to listen, to open one’s categories to being called into 
question (to have one’s thought shattered), to invite the other have her say, and to then 2) 
respond to that ‘said’ with one’s own said, justifying oneself in light of the other’s 
interpretation, ultimately working together to construct something new, a new 
understanding.  
As Mensch aptly puts it, the first gift to the other is speaking the world to the 
other (e.g., holding a child right after its born). This gift is justice, the urgency of a 
response to the other.113 If the other is silenced or ignored so that I do not have to 
respond, I attempt to eliminate the possibility of putting myself into question, thus 
inhibiting me from learning anything, or from following anything other than my own 
train of thought.  
This oblivion in one’s own perspective is another way of understanding injustice 
as the need for more of one’s own, pleonexia. This can also be understood as the 
movement of ideology: the unchecked quest of a being (or institution) so convinced by its 
own logic that it fails to hear anything outside of itself. Or rather, fails to understand truth 
																																																								
113 Mensch, 112.  
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as constituted by a movement outside of oneself and one’s ordering of things. This failure 
marks the attempt to ignore metaphysical desire, substitution, responsibility—who one 
is—instead committed to the execution of the projection of one’s principle, eliminating 
anything otherwise, anything new. 114  To avoid ideology is, therefore, to embrace 
disruption from oneself, to undergo the movement from saying to the said, which is a 
movement that has no agenda. As Levinas poses to Kant: “But the problem is that one 
can ask if a beginning is at the beginning, if the beginning as an act of consciousness is 
not already preceded by what could not be synchronized, that is, by what could not be 
present, the unrepresentable, if an anarchy is not more ancient than the beginning and 
freedom” (OB, 165).  
In addition to this, justice also emerges when one’s proximity to others becomes a 
problem, which can be understood in at least two different ways: either 1) when one is 
tasked to offer something to the other after being called into question (determining how 
to respond), or 2) when there are multiple others (or as Levinas puts it, when a third party 
enters), and one is tasked to consciously sort out how to give oneself, taking oneself into 
consideration, too. Crucial to Levinas’s account is that proximity to the others 
																																																								
114 As Levinas writes, “Does not the coherent discourse, wholly absorbed in the said, owe its coherence to 
the State, which, violently excludes subversive discourse? Coherence thus dissimulates a transcendence, a 
movement from one to the other, a latent diachrony, uncertainty and a fine risk. Are the renderings of the 
logical text mended by logic alone? It is in the association of philosophy with the State and with medicine 
that the break up of discourse is surmounted. The interlocutor that does not yield to logic is threatened with 
prison or the asylum or undergoes the prestige of the master and the medication of the doctor: violence or 
reasons of the State of an approach ensures to the rationalism of logic a universality and to law its subject 
matter. The discourse then recuperates its meaning by repression or mediation, by just violence, on the 
verge of the possible injustice where repressive justice is exercised. It is through the State that reason and 
knowledge are force and efficacity. But the State does not irrevocably discount folly, not even the intervals 
of folly. It does not untie its knots, but cuts them. The said thematizes the interrupted dialogue or the 
dialogue delayed by silences, failure or delirium, but the intervals are not recuperated. Does not the 
discourse that suppresses the interruptions of discourse by relating them maintain the discontinuity under 
the knots with which the thread is tied again? The interruptions of the discourse found again and recounted 
in the immanence of the said are conserved like knots in a thread tied again, the trace of a diachrony that 
does not enter into the present, that refuses simultaneity” (OB, 170).  
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(substitution) in itself is not a problem to consciousness. Substitution is the dispossessing 
of reflective self-consciousness, a forgetting of ego that is best understood as a sort of 
oblivion: there is no calculus to be solved. One is given over, subjected entirely to desire. 
When seized by desire, as Levinas understand it, one is not asking oneself any questions, 
as one is not asking oneself anything: self-conscious reflection dissolves.  
It is, therefore, the emergence of the third party that ‘wakes’ consciousness, 
reflection, introspection, and problems to be solved. As Levinas writes: 
The third party introduces a contradiction in the saying whose signification before the 
other until then went in one direction. It is of itself the limit of responsibility and the birth 
of the question: What do I have to do with justice? A question of consciousness. Justice is 
necessary, that is, comparison, coexistence, contemporaneousness, assembling, order, 
thematization, the visibility of faces, and thus intentionality and the intellect, and in 
intentionality and intellect, the intelligibility of the system, and thence also a copresence 
on an equal footing as before a court of justice. Essence as synchrony is togetherness in 
place. Proximity takes on a new meaning in the space of contiguity. But contiguity is not 
a “simple nature.” It already presupposes both thematizing thought and a locus and the 
cutting up of the continuity of space into discrete terms and the whole—out of justice. 
(OB, 157) 
 
Thus, as an expression of responsibility, justice involves asking how to give my things 
away, not asking how to protect my assets.115 The ‘limitations’ involved in justice are not 
limits to one’s self-interest, but limits based on one’s finitude. I can only give so much 
(and only have so much time to do so), and my ‘lot’ is important, too, as I am one among 
the others. These are facts that cannot be denied.  
Essential to Levinas’s account, however, is that it is the forgetting of oneself (in 
being-for-the-other) moves justice. For justice to be justice it cannot be the movement 
toward a projected agenda, security for oneself, or a manipulation toward sought-
outcomes, but instead an expression that flows from sincerity before the other. Unique to 
																																																								
115 Michael H. Gillick, “The Place of Justice in the Thinking of Emmanual Levinas” (doctoral dissertation, 
Marquette University, 2004).  
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Levinas’s account is that justice is not primarily attempting to harmonize an original 
antagonism set up by nature, as this would imply that justice is birthed from war (driven 
by securing one’s place in the sun). Justice instead gauges the outdoing of oneself to the 
others—a gauging birthed in conversation, as described above. It is in justice that we find 
the birth of community. That is, the common ground, logos, discovered in conversation.  
The task of philosophy. For Levinas, justice so construed is the task of 
philosophy (moral and otherwise): making things appear with an intelligible arrangement, 
providing reasons for this to be so, and then probing and undoing that arrangement in an 
attempt to retrieve what has fallen through the cracks, and reclaim some dimension of 
what is not readily manifest in the words we write and speak. As he writes:  
Thematization is then inevitable, so that signification itself shows itself, but does so in the 
sophism with which philosophy begins, in the betrayal which philosophy is called upon 
to reduce. This reduction always has to be attempted, because the trace of sincerity which 
the words themselves bear and which they owe to saying as witness, even when the said 
dissimulates the saying in the correlation set up between the saying and the said. Saying 
always seeks to unsay that dissimulation, and this is its very veracity. (OB, 152) 
 
The ‘sophism’ with which philosophy begins is the business of conclusively taking ‘this 
as that’ by way of proving it to be so, which necessarily involves having the conclusion 
in mind and using whatever means possible to arrive at that conclusion. The ‘veracity of 
the saying’ is that it cannot be wholly contained in a theme. (E.g., in the Republic, each 
definition of justice that is offered, including Socrates’s, somehow fails, misses 
something—containing an element that guarantees its own destruction.)   
This is to say that the work of philosophy involves providing themes and 
assessing them, digging deeper, working to understand them more, with no (determined) 
end in sight. This can be understood as constructing problems, creating questions. The 
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more philosophy understands, the more ambiguous a given phenomenon becomes (e.g., 
the Platonic dialogues ending in aporia after covering so much ground, only ostensibly 
making progress). This ambiguity is what perpetually reclaims the element of 
transcendence that bleeds into essence; “Transcendence owes it to itself to interrupt its 
own demonstration…[it] requires ambiguity, a blinking of meaning which not only a 
chance certainty… it needs the diachrony that breaks the unity of transcendental 
apperception” (OB, 152). Thus, transcendence (that which is otherwise than the ‘simple’ 
presence of the self to itself) and our desire for transcendence, being-for-the-other 
(substitution), is the perpetual reminder that sought-unity (coherence) is consciousness’s 
projection—a projection that is not the whole story.  
Levinas takes pains to describe transcendence as the ‘immemorial past’, so as to 
point toward what cannot be pulled to the present by way of memory because it is 
precisely what cannot be remembered. And why can it not be remembered? Because 
being-for-the-other, substituting, is otherwise than self-consciousness, ‘outside’ of 
consciousness’s retention. When ‘given over’ to desire, oneself as self-aware ego is 
divested, dispossessed, seized. And again, the knowledge or thinking involved in being-
for-the-other belongs to sensibility. It is a desire that has no object, a desire that knows 
not what it seeks, a desire that deepens desire without fulfilling it, always hungry for 
more (TI, 34). And this desire for more desire never ceases in the way that it does when 
executing a particular goal.  
Philosophy, therefore, seeks to make transcendence immanent , to make it appear 
in word and deed, though this process is constantly undoing itself. It is in this sense that 
philosophy, as the work of justice, is not goal or product-driven, but persists in the 
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repetition or renewal of metaphysical desire, perpetually moving back and forth from the 
ethical encounter (being-for-the-other) to essence (what is said), reinterpreting and 
recalibrating essence in light of essence’s deconstruction. As Levinas continues:  
Philosophy serves justice by thematizing the difference and reducing the thematized to 
difference. It brings equity into the abnegation of the one for the other, justice into 
responsibility. Philosophy, in its very diachrony, is the consciousness of the breakup of 
consciousness. In an alternating movement, like that which leads from skepticism to the 
refutation that reduces it to ashes, and from its ashes to its rebirth, philosophy justifies 
and criticizes the laws of being and of the city, and finds again the signification that 
consists in detaching from the absolutely one-for-the-other both the one and the other. 
(OB, 165)  
 
Levinas’s project itself can be seen as a criticism of the ‘laws of being and of the city’, 
finding again the signification that consists in detaching from the ‘absolutely one-for-the-
other’ both the one and the other. Attempting to remember, recollect that which cannot be 
thematized or remembered in the sense of being brought to reflection’s attention.  
Levinas’s point is that the history of philosophy has been a refutation of 
transcendence (OB, 169), and it must be because philosophers try to bring coherence, 
order, systematicity to that which strikes them, confounds them, moves them, inspires 
them in the first place. Philosophy begins in precisely that wonder. That is, the 
(metaphysical) desire that drags me from myself as concerned about myself to a state of 
being-for-the-other.  
 It is important to note that justice, as Levinas construes it, can of course be 
understood in a more political sense (literally figuring out how to distribute resources, 
contesting laws, unmuting the voices of the oppressed, etc.), but also ought to be 
understood as movement back and forth between the disruption and re-collection that 
constitutes conversation. Philosophy’s task is to safeguard thinking from the delusion that 
truth has been discovered once and for all. Philosophy’s task is to break it up, to contest 
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that order—or better, to not take that order for granted, even if it is at the risk of 
incoherence and uncertainty. If philosophy is understood as the activity that begins in the 
sort of wonder that seizes one from oneself (disrupting one’s concern for oneself), 
ultimately driving one to justify, organize, arrange, bring clarity to that disruption (the 
justificatory state), then philosophy is the work of justice as derived from responsibility. 
That is, the work that moves one from being responsible-for-the-other to being 
responsible to-the-other; the work of justifying or revealing one’s justificatory state in 
conversation, and not resisting the uncertainty that accompanies the breakup of a 
particular mode of self-legislation, as this uncertainty is what allows for the possibility of 
an existential shift, a new way of understanding things, a new mode of being, and an 
excise of the old. That is, to welcome—in hospitality—the death that necessarily 
accompanies birth, change.  
Crucial for Levinas is that this shift is never the result of an act of the will. It is 
not induced through careful reflection and introspection, and cannot be provoked by 
oneself. These shifts are birthed from communication, conversation, which involves 
listening to (rather than turning away from) what is always and already most proximate to 
us, in contact with us: the other. Philosophy’s task is to remind us that self-disruption is 
the work of the good.  
4.4 THE SPIRIT OF KANT & THE INSIGHTS OF ARISTOTLE 
So, how does Levinas’s account relate to Kant, Aristotle, and neoaristotelian ethics? 
Despite the fact that on the face of it, the resonances among these diverse accounts are by 
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no means self-evident, upon taking a closer look, there are essential connections that are 
worth making. My claim is that Levinas’s project exudes the spirit of Kant, but also 
implicitly reclaims key insights from Aristotle, especially as retrieved in contemporary 
Aristotelian accounts.  
Kant. What seems clear is that Levinas, like Kant, is interested in safeguarding 
morality as something more than just a chimera, and to not only preserve the possibility 
of peace, but also to wake us up (from our self-incurred dogmatic slumber) to an 
understanding of desire that involves something other than the satisfaction or fulfillment 
of a projected end. This is to say that for both thinkers, ethical desire cannot be based on 
contingent future goals or projected ends, but is instead something present, here, now.  
For Kant, this ‘desire’ (though Kant of course would not call it that) is ultimately 
a desire for freedom in oneself and the others (the autonomy of the will) that 
simultaneously involve the ‘striking down’ of self-conceit (the self as hypothetical 
projections to be fulfilled). This is our desire for justice. For Levinas, this desire is a 
desire for the other that simultaneously involves the divesting of oneself (the self-
reflective self). For Kant, this movement is a painful, albeit exalting—coming to self as 
member of the kingdom of ends. For Levinas, this movement is inspiring—animating the 
self, as oneself (as sensibility) is fundamentally a pure undergoing, responding as 
responsible for the other(s). For Levinas, it is in the undergoing of metaphysical desire 
that we substitute the others for ourselves, divested of reflective content altogether. When 
undergoing metaphysical desire, one is simply not concerned about or reflecting upon 
oneself.   
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Key for Kant is that a disinterested, purely rational mode of being is who we 
really are: that who involving an understanding of the others-as-oneself (humanity), 
which is ultimately something that cannot be understood empirically or grasped as a 
concept in the same way that other concepts can be grasped (precisely because there is no 
intuited-empirical content). Levinas of course does not depict the self in precisely this 
way. He instead appeals to sensibility, and locates metaphysical desire not only at the 
heart of our being (sensibility), but as the source of being and any meaning there within.  
Beyond this, for Levinas, ethics is not the movement of understanding the others 
as oneself, but rather understanding oneself as the others—and this order of relation is 
crucial. Ethics is not about consumption, assumption, assimilation, but rather difference, 
singularity. And while assimilation or absorption of the other into oneself is likely not 
what Kant had in mind, his language can often suggests otherwise, e.g., with the 
homogeneity implied in humanity. Further, Kantian freedom still presupposes an 
adherence to rules within consciousness. And for Levinas, this is war-like by its very 
nature, as obeying oneself inevitably makes one deaf to anything that falls outside of 
reflection’s schematics.   
Crucial is that both thinkers are committed to a sense of morality that involves 
holding open a space for transcendence—and again, transcendence in the sense of what is 
not immanently present to conscious reflection, thus disrupting self-conceit. Although 
Levinas does not construe the ‘self’ as a being caught between two worlds, like Kant, he 
emphasizes that we are more than the production-oriented, predictable, self-aware modes 
of being that have been over-emphasized by the temper of production-oriented (if not 
obsessed) times. For both Kant and Levinas, morality involves the cessation of (means-
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ends) calculation before what is other. That is, embracing (or even leaping into) the 
unpredictable, the new, the unanticipated. And this also involves being honest about our 
relation to phenomena: we have no control over the consequences of what we push into 
the world, thus rendering honesty an important virtue. Levinas goes further than Kantian 
honesty in his account of sincerity, stressing that above and beyond the importance of 
being honest with the others, vital is holding open a space for the other to have her say, 
and to respond to what she says. It is not about having one’s truth heard, but rather 
participating in truth through conversation, alteration among singulars, as this is the 
work of justice. What Kant missed, therefore, is the significance of answerability (‘the 
saying’), which is fundamentally receptive.  
Within this vein, the most crucial difference between the two thinkers is of course 
that for Levinas, morality is not an act of the will. For him, ethics cannot involve an 
active choice on the part of the subject (choosing altruism), and he instead insists on an 
ontological understanding of moral responsibility. This is to say that the crucial 
distinction for Levinas is not between acting from duty and acting in accord with duty, 
but instead between willing the good and being subjected to the good. For Levinas, we 
have no choice in the matter, and the question of whether we should be just is resolved in 
the sense that our responsibility to the others is ‘there’ from the beginning. We are always 
and already responsible; the other has made its claim on each and every one of us, 
whether we are comfortable with it or not—mirroring Kant’s fact of reason.  
This is to say that despite ourselves, the other affects us—obsesses us—from the 
start (OB, 129). We can choose to be otherwise (concerned predominantly with 
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ourselves), but morality itself is not a choice. The subject is, from minute one, subjected. 
As he writes:  
Obedience precedes any hearing of the command. The possibility of finding, 
anachronously, the order in the obedience itself, and of receiving the order out of oneself, 
this reverting of heteronomy into autonomy, is the very way the Infinite passes itself. The 
metaphor of inscription of the law in consciousness expresses this in a remarkable way, 
reconciling autonomy and heteronomy. It does so in an ambivalence, whose diachrony is 
the signification itself, an ambivalence, which, in the present, is an ambiguity. The 
inscription of the order in the for-the-other of obedience is an anarchic being affected, 
which slips into me “like a thief” through the outstretched nets of consciousness… This 
ambivalence is the exception and subjectivity of the subject, its very psyche, a possibility 
of inspiration. It is the possibility of being the author of what had been breathe in 
unbeknownst to me, of having received, one knows not from where, that of which I am 
the author. In the responsibility for the other we are at the heart of the ambiguity of 
inspiration. The unheard-of saying is enigmatically in the anarchic response, in my 
responsibility for the other. (OB, 148-9) 
 
Although Kant is pushing up against an understanding of morality as an undergoing—
being called, in the experience of respect (for the moral law), to let go of self-conceit—he 
nonetheless holds fast to a sense of autonomy that involves consciously constituting 
oneself morally, commanding the will to be good. That being said, what is clearly latent 
in Kant’s account of respect is that despite the fact that respect occurs within me—
bringing me to the moral law within myself—I am not the origin of that affect. It is 
ultimately the moral law in another that shakes me from without, awakening what lies 
‘within’ myself. As Levinas suggests, what we find in Kant is the reverting of 
heteronomy to autonomy: I become the origin because the origin is forgotten, as it is not 
available to memory, or conscious reflection (OB, 148). 
What I hope to have illustrated is that Kant’s attempt to provide a phenomenology 
of respect could be understood as an attempt to describe the diachrony that Levinas has in 
mind: that is, the disruption that shakes us lose from consciousness (as memory of past 
and projection of the future), humbles a proud ego, and delivers us to ourselves as for-
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the-others: as sensibility. The misstep that Kant makes is concluding 1) that I am the 
origin of ethics as the willed exercise of the autonomy of the will, and 2) that key is 
gaining self-mastery over myself to ensure my self-worth as an iteration of the worth of 
the others. Kant is so concerned with the will being unbound by externalities (as these 
externalities are the source of war), that despite his efforts to avoid construing ‘man’ as a 
island, in removing man from any and every ‘externality’, man is in fact left with nothing 
but himself and his will (as unmoved mover).   
The most important point to take away from Levinas’s project is that I am not the 
origin of ethics, I am not the origin of myself, and any obsession with one’s own self-
worth, one’s own existence (before death), and one’s own-destiny is derisory, tragic, even 
comic, as it is a ‘willed’ forgetting of the good, which will never cease to disrupt us in 
our self-interested pursuits insofar as we exist. The good is precisely the forgetting of 
oneself in being-for-the-other, substituting for the other, being otherwise than in-sync 
with an agenda; in Levinas’s words, the extraordinary forgetting of death that is not 
ignorance of death. The good, which is the source of all meaning whatsoever, flows from 
the breakdown of unity and consistency. I will never find it within myself, and it is not 
something I am on the way to. The good is immanent (as transcendent) in the encounter 
with the other. And while encountering the good can be traumatic, the ‘pain’ is not 
painful in itself—we simply judge it to be so. Learning may involve suffering, but it is a 
suffering soon forgotten in the joy of relinquishing self-concern and truly being-for-the-
other.  
Again, I think it is reasonable to claim that Kant is pushing up against this 
conception of the good by locating the good in the good will’s identification of itself with 
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the moral law, but his commitment to autonomy and the moral law as a tangible maxim 
does not go as far as Levinas in identifying the ‘source’ of goodness outside of reflective 
consciousness. As Brewer puts it, Kant’s account is problematic in that it is limited to 
principles of reflection, is monologic, and is non-experiential—which inevitably loses 
sight of the significance of the influence of others, as it is the a priori work of one’s 
reason and reason alone.  
 Aristotle. Although Levinas is not explicitly engaging or critiquing Aristotle or 
Aristotelian virtue ethics, he is engaging-critiquing-building upon a method in philosophy 
that emerges from a re-engagement with the insights of the Aristotelian tradition, aiming 
to return to phenomena—the things in themselves—and (contra Kant) sever all ties with 
transcendence. That being said, there are clear points of agreement between Levinas and 
the interpretation of Aristotle provided in Chapter 2, and there are illuminating 
resonances between Levinas and contemporary reclamations of Aristotelian virtue ethics.  
 First and foremost, although Levinas is not providing a prescriptive account of 
ethics, the question of “what if one does not feel what Levinas describes? Or put 
differently, what if one is not compelled by the other?” is often posed to Levinas. As 
Claire Katz convincingly argues in Levinas and the Crisis of Humanism, it is not enough 
to say that Levinas is simply telling us the way that things are (whether we realize it or 
not). The crucial point and often-overlooked point is that the Levinasian subject is 
ultimately developed as such. Katz stresses that when addressing questions about how to 
“gain certainty” about the authority of the face or the other, or why we are our brother’s 
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keeper, moral education is the elephant in the room.116 As she puts it, if we do not 
appeal to moral education, then we are left (in Levinas) with an account of innate feelings 
or arguments that either compel us or not. Katz’s argument is that we obviously do not 
emerge into the world as adults, and Levinas is in fact describing the experience of an 
adult who understands certain values, and who has not been duped into believing that the 
care of self can overcome death, or that the sovereignty of ego is a healthy orientation 
toward reality.117 Katz bolsters this claim by appealing to Levinas’s work on Jewish 
education, and his insistence that education is fundamental to the formation of a subject 
who is not simply a being-for-itself.118 This orientation must be cultivated, which means 
that the concrete ‘ground’ of moral being is education, as this is where moral sensibility, 
i.e., the nourishing of metaphysical desire, is fostered.  
As was illustrated in Chapter 2, education in virtue is the single most important 
thing: the condition for the possibility of eudaimonia is excellent education, which is 
itself a species of justice. This involves fostering the proper orientation toward desire, 
i.e., fostering the proper ordering of the soul. As Katz point out, for Levinas, teaching is 
more than a mere trope.119 The teaching relation—the ethical relation—is fundamental to 
the project’s coherence, and key to his philosophical project.120 One does not simply 
choose to become Levinasian (ethics, as Levinas understands it, is not a willing duty 
instead of inclination). One is educated, reared, and nurtured in a way that cultivates the 
desire that drives us to undo ourselves—the desire to forget ourselves. Without this sense 
																																																								
116 Claire Elise Katz, Levinas and the Crisis of Humanism (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2013), 
89.  
117 Katz, 78. As Katz writes, the turn to self-preservation is a function of the sickness that plagues 
humanity. When a being is healthy, it can give up its grip on self-preservation. 
118 Ibid., 161.  
119 Ibid., 128.  
120 Ibid.  
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of desire, ethics has no meaning. This is not to say that ‘adults’ who are not already 
‘inside’ what Levinas is describing have no hope of accessing it, but rather this mode of 
being is fueled affectively through discourse, being disrupted from oneself. 
As Katz concludes, education does not simply make the new possible, but is itself 
the emergence of the new, of something other.121 As was shown above, conversation-
communication (as Levinas understands it) is what allows for the possibility of an 
existential shift. And despite the fact that Levinas is not interested in shaping the 
Aristotelian self (the properly habituated self that was presented in Chapter 2), this 
insight resonates with Aristotle’s understanding of how we come to virtue: through good 
friends, education, loving others who are invested in guiding us toward a healthy soul. 
Our being depends on the other(s) not just practically, but ontologically.   
 Within this vein, the most important resonance between Aristotle and Levinas is 
the significance of conversation-communication. For Aristotle, this serves as one of the 
most important human goods, and for Levinas, this is the good. Aristotle understands it as 
the vehicle to virtue, and I think it is safe to say that Levinas agrees, though Levinas 
emphasizes that it is the diachronic dimension of communication—that which teaches—
which serves as the sources of all meaning whatsoever: truth being the alteration among 
singulars that takes place in conversation. Again, Aristotle’s methodology hinges on this 
same understanding of truth in the sense that clarity is only achieved dialogically-
dialectically: that is, through engaging other perspectives and interpretations, and then 
challenging them and allowing them to challenge your own point-of-view. This 
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movement is essential to virtue. Otherwise, we are fallaciously trapped within a narrow, 
first-personal lens.  
Beyond these points about education and communication-conversation, 
Aristotle’s insistence on the fact that we are moved by existing particulars (these are what 
we desire) is clearly retrieved in Levinas, as is Aristotle’s general commitment to the 
most concretely experienced dimensions of being. Despite the fact that Levinas is 
committed to ‘transcendence’ (in the sense of what is not manifest as essence), he is not 
actually describing something that is entirely absent (in the sense that it does not exist). It 
is absent to reflective consciousness, but is experienced sensibly in our encounter with 
what seizes us from self-concern.  
Hearkening to Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Aristotle is well aware of the significance 
of that which is not immediately manifest to reflective thought, as this is what 1) denotes 
being in the most fundamental sense, and 2) serves as the ‘source’ of desire. This is 
where Levinas’s insistence on sensibility is key. Through sensibility we affectively press 
up against what is other—this contact itself signifying the experience of being seized by 
what is otherwise than reflective self-consciousness. The essentially receptive (or better, 
open) nature of sensibility, as well as the vulnerability, susceptibility, exposure that 
receptivity entails, is vital to both Aristotle and Levinas’s respective accounts. It is 
precisely in utter openness to unpredictability, fluctuation, and the unanticipated that one 
is seized, arrested, captivated by something otherwise than oneself—and called to 
respond in a way that cannot be anticipated. This response-ability sits at the heart of 
ethics. Responsibility in this ontological sense is ethical. To be is to be called to respond 
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by the other; to be is to be interrupted from self-concern (by the other person, by the 
environment, by hunger, etc.)  
Neoaristotelian ethics. In contemporary neoaristotelian accounts, we find a 
reclamation of 1) the significance of metaphysics (as informative to ethics); 2) a robust 
sense of goodness/the good; and 3) the importance of narrative and conversation. Though 
Levinas may seem like an unlikely ally (particularly in the sense that he is not providing a 
description of human agency), his account of ethics complements the majority of these 
objectives—especially those that relate to the troubled state of moral philosophy, as we 
will see in the concluding chapter.  
 1. As was illustrated above, the reclamation of metaphysics is without question 
alive and well in Levinas’s project. Levinas’s focus is on providing an ethical depiction 
of reality, which, much like Macintyre points out in relation to Aristotle’s ethics, 
eliminates the isàought issue raised by Hume, as the ‘prescriptive’ dimension is housed 
within a notion of what it is to be (that is not statically descriptive). For Levinas, being is 
ethical; to be is to be subjected, responsible, perpetually un-selfed, beginning with the 
most basic sensory responses to stimuli outside of oneself. To be is to be-in-relation-to-
the-other, immersed in a web of inter-relations, always and already facing what is other 
than oneself. As has been stressed over and over again, for Levinas, responsibility is 
ontological. It is not a choice or the product of reflection. 
Echoing what we saw in Chapter 3, the theoretical emphasis on production is 
itself the result of a perpetuation of a sense of self that is predominantly results-oriented 
and anti-contemplative: that is, ignoring doings that are done for their own sake, i.e., 
activities that are otherwise than calculated activities, oriented toward a projected future 
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state of affairs. This lends itself to an atomized understanding of oneself—man as an 
island—rendering community a problematic duty (painful altruism), as it infringes on 
one’s pursuit of securing more for oneself i.e., needing more, but needing no one. 
Levinas is of course concerned with the perpetuation of this sense of self because it is 
precisely in the fixation with production that one loses sight of the good, meaning we 
may in fact have been duped by morality, accepting war as our only reality, i.e., 
understanding the others as nothing more than obstacles. But fortunately, the good is not 
a willed choice.  
2. It seems clear that both the common good and the good as something desired, 
rather than something painfully chosen from duty, are restored in Levinas’s project, 
though in markedly distinct ways. For Macintyre, part of what has been lost in modernity 
is the significance of the unity of human life, understood as a narratively unified quest for 
the good. (Answering: what sort of person am I to become?) The thrust behind 
Macintyre’s restoration of unity is the restoration of telos: the ordering of oneself toward 
desired ends. Levinas is of course not seeking to provide an account of the good that we 
are on our way to—the result of a complete and unified life—as this is at least ostensibly 
a life lived for-itself. Nor is he interested in safeguarding narrative identity, as this, too, 
emphasizes the ego-driven side of the coin: the pursuit of an intelligible ordering, which 
is, in the end, neatly packaged with a bow, as it quells my anxiety about my salvation 
(what is in store for me).  
Crucial to Levinas’s account is that the good is precisely what interrupts me from 
any unified pursuit, above all, my quest for happiness. Although striving for coherence is, 
without question, a vital dimension of who we are (for Levinas, this is the work of 
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justice), ethics is not about an absolute end that we are striving toward, but rather the 
desire that drives us out of ourselves to reach out toward the other: the disruption of our 
various pursuits toward coherence, both enriching and stifling clarity. Key is that these 
pursuits are inconclusive, and the good is precisely the disruption that preserves the lack 
of conclusiveness. For Levinas, there is no providential undercurrent intimating that one 
day, at long last, the kingdom of ends—justice, peace, happiness—will be ours. This is 
not even something that we should hope for, as hope so construed ultimately tempts us to 
build agendas based on the state of affairs that we would like to bring about. And again, 
agendas are what bring one to the realm of political ambition, which by its very nature 
attempts to mute morality, i.e., any disruption of well-calculated schemas of means and 
ends (objective orders from which there is no escape).  
In addition to this, as is the case in the neoaristotelian case studies analyzed in 
Chapter 3, the role of desire is fundamental to Levinas’s account, as substitution 
(metaphysical desire) is the good. Goodness is precisely the desire to stretch beyond 
oneself as ego. Brewer’s elaboration of what we find in Aristotle and Macintyre speaks to 
this point, and I think could be understood as exemplifying what Levinas has in mind. 
Brewer retrieves the notion of goodness as intrinsic value, something deeply appreciated 
for its own sake, as we do with someone we love: valuing the other for no other reason 
than their being who they are. Telos denotes the unimpeded immersion of oneself deeper 
and deeper into the appreciated activity; dialectical activity denotes the infinite approach 
toward a fuller expression of the activity, being more enraptured in the joy of being the 
activity. This unimpeded immersion of oneself in a given activity necessarily involves the 
divesting of self-conscious reflection. Otherwise one would not be able to be there, fully 
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attending to the activity, as the process of reflection pulls one into themselves and away 
from their surroundings.  
Brewer aptly describes this un-selfing (for Levinas, the divesting of the self) as 
attention arresting, being riveted, utterly absorbed, engrossed, caught up in what one is 
doing—paying tribute to intrinsic goodness. When desiring (the good), it is impossible to 
reflect or project—digging into memory or projecting into the future—as you are no 
longer a concern for yourself. Your only concern is the activity. There is no sense of 
where, specifically, that activity is headed (based on the past), no knowledge of a future 
state, but simply the mesmeric attraction to what you are undergoing and the desire to 
experience more of that undergoing. Based on the description that Brewer provides, 
paying tribute to the intrinsic goodness so clarified is precisely unhindered, unrestrained 
activity, meaning there is no conscious fixation on a determined end outside of being-in, 
being-with, activity itself. As Brewer points out, love for the other is what constitutes the 
original source of appreciative attention. Being enraptured by another (whether it is a 
friend or a lover) is paradigmatic of losing sense of time, one’s projects, one’s memories, 
etc. Love of another provides the ‘architecture’ of dialectical activity and its associated 
desire.  
This description of dialectical activity clearly resonates with Levinas’s account, 
and Levinas goes so far as to claim that the self is most fundamentally dialectical activity. 
That is, substituting oneself for the other. Key for Levinas is that desire so construed is 
literally what animates us, inspires us: both in the sense of the warmth of the sun 
enlivening us, and in the sense of conversation delivering the urge to open up, give, and 
create. I think that Brewer’s account of desire is strikingly similar to what Levinas has in 
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mind in his depiction of substitution: the receptive movement of un-selfing, divesting, 
dispossessing. But again, this is not something a human agent chooses to do, but instead 
denotes the way in which we are perpetually pulled by the good, despite ourselves. The 
good is an affective undergoing. Levinas is, therefore, more concerned with recovering 
the claim that the other has on each and every one of us—and this claim being the 
original liberation (freedom) from reflective self-consciousness, as well as the source of 
all meaning whatsoever. There is a strong sense in which Levinas’s project does the work 
of exposing the pervasiveness of dialectical activity, as Brewer intends to do, but for 
Levinas, without it, we cease to be.  
Although it seems reasonable to suggest that Brewer would not necessarily 
disagree, Levinas’s position is even more radical than Brewer’s. Brewer asks what a 
given agent sees in a given activity such that it made sense of him to engage in it. I.e., 
what confers value upon our doings? Levinas’s answer is the other. Our desire for the 
other is the most fundamental dialectical activity. And the self, at its ‘core’ is precisely 
this: a being divested of retention and protention (all forms of reflective ‘self-identity’), 
including narrative unity as the unified pursuit of happiness.  
3. The importance of conversation is the most crucial resonance with Levinas’s 
project, though Levinas is not interested in narrative, or any fixation on achieving 
coherence within one’s own life. Moreover, despite the fact that he does not provide a 
robust account of friendship, the significance of character friendship (as a source of not 
only enhancing a wholehearted appreciation of goodness being seized by goodness, but 
also opening us to new angles, interpretations, ways of thinking) is mirrored in Levinas’s 
account of communication, specifically as it relates to justice. Conversation involves a 
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disruption from oneself, ultimately assisting us, as Brewer describes, in refining our 
judgments, immunizing disordered thinking, and unclouding moral vision. For Brewer, 
character friendships are schools of virtue in this fashion, illuminating things that we 
cannot see, pushing us to think otherwise.  
Similarly for Levinas (as we saw above), conversation is the work of justice, 
insofar as it involves precisely the sort of refinement, immunization, and unclouding that 
Brewer has in mind. Brewer fleshes this out in terms of dialogic practical thinking that is 
fostered by a mutual admiration of the other’s sense of the good, ultimately allowing each 
friend to give credence to the other’s voice, thus enabling one to trust the other enough to 
offer one’s own evaluative outlook to be inspected, scrutinized, or praised—not knowing 
if one’s perspective will remain the same, uncertain about where the conversation will go. 
This ‘dialectical alteration’ is the vehicle for constructing a shareable sensibility, 
something in common, and making that more and more clear, coherent, though that work 
is never done; coherence and clarity are always interrupted, as truth is not static. 
Levinas’s insight, which is present in Brewer’s account as well, is that conversation so 
construed requires exposure—the outdoing of oneself—and being open to embodying a 
new understanding of things. This new understanding, is always and already a gift from 
the other, and the work of the good.  
The key distinction between Levinas and what we find in neoaristotelian virtue 
ethics is that narrative unity—happiness as the unified task of a lifetime, a coherent 
ordering of oneself—does not have the final word. And with this in mind, we can turn to 
critiques of Levinas, and a final defense of the significance of ‘self-disruption’ in ethical 
development, especially as incited through conversation.   
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5.0  CHAPTER 5: SELF-DISRUPTION 
This refusal of death in fact measures the depth of its 
inwardness in essence, or its interest. The belongingness to 
being is in fact not a rest in a harbor of peace; the dialectic of 
being and nothingness within essence is an anxiety over 
nothingness and struggle for existence. From the irony of 
essence probably come comedy, tragedy and the 
eschatological consolations which mark the spiritual history 
of the West, in which to the ultimacy of the concept and the 
death of the subject is opposed the hope of escaping the end.  
   –Levinas, Otherwise Than Being, Or Beyond Essence, 176 
 
In light of the ‘crisis’ (and neoaristotelian response to that crisis) that was sketched in 
Chapter 3, Chapter 4 claimed that in Levinas, we find a fresh vindication of ethics that 
challenges Western philosophy’s preoccupation with self-concern, albeit without relying 
on anything like willed agency (Kant), or a unified quest for the good (Aristotle and 
contemporary virtue ethics). For Levinas, morality is not something we are on the way to, 
or the coherent task of a lifetime, but a lived sensibility, an affective undergoing—the 
fission of self-consciousness, which he describes as metaphysical desire, substitution, 
being-for-the-other.122 Moral sense, for Levinas, necessarily comes from without; I am 
not the source of moral value. Morality is not something I lack and am therefore seeking 
to actualize, or self-constitute. It is not something to be found within reflective, conscious 
																																																								
122 In her wonderful and comprehensive article, “Ontology, Transcendence, and Immanence in Emmanuel 
Levinas’s Philosophy,” Bettina Bergo supports the reading of Otherwise Than Being that I provide in 
Chapter 4, insisting that unlike what we find in Levinas’s earlier works, in OB we find a “hermeneautic 
phenomenology of transcendence-in-immanence,” i.e., “the condition for the possibility of intentionality in 
passive sythesisis” (141-43). For more, see Bettina Bergo, “Ontology, Transcendence, and Immanence in 
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cognition, and it is not something we can locate within narrative coherence and order (for 
him, essence). Morality is instead something that I am always and already undergoing. 
The self as sensibility is most essentially ethical: immediately exposed and drawn toward 
that which affects it.  
The aim of this concluding chapter is threefold. First, I will address two salient 
critiques of Levinas. Second, in light of my responses to these critiques, I will underscore 
the significance of ‘self-disruption’ in ethical development—inspired by Levinas’s re-
imagining of ‘the good’, but also as latent in 1) Kant’s account of the moral self, 2) 
Aristotle’s account of the virtuous soul, and 3) the teleological account of the self that we 
find in contemporary virtue ethics. And finally, I will briefly discuss moral philosophy’s 
relation to moral cultivation, with a view toward the significance of self-disruption and its 
relation to justice as described in Chapter 4. 
5.1 CRITIQUES OF LEVINAS 
1. Paul Ricoeur. Levinas is frequently criticized for the hyperbolic nature of his 
writing—a style that he employs for the sake of provocation. His insistence on the 
radical infinite separation-distance-distinction-difference between ‘the self’ and ‘the 
other’ can evoke an understanding of ethics that seems like a violent irrelation, in which 
the self is both assaulted and enslaved by an utterly uncognizable other, leaving no room 
for the possibility of reciprocity or friendship.  
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In his 1996 text, Oneself as Another,123 Paul Ricoeur criticizes Levinas along 
precisely these lines in an effort to strengthen his own ethical theory, which finds itself 
predominantly situated within the Aristotelian and Heideggerian traditions. The text is 
marked by an extraordinary effort to bring ethical projects within the Continental and 
analytic traditions into conversation, while developing a hermeneutics of the self and 
‘petite ethics’ for that self. I will begin by providing an overview of Ricoeur’s eclectic 
position to contextualize both his critique of Levinas and my response to that critique.  
Brian Treanor neatly summarizes Ricoeur’s somewhat complicated notion of 
narrative identity, beginning with Ricoeur’s key distinction between who we are and what 
we are; the former denoting our ipse-identity (selfhood or self-constancy), latter denoting 
our idem-identity (sameness).124 These are the first two fundamental dimensions of the 
Ricoeurean self, and as Treanor notes, the former (self-constancy) is perhaps more 
interesting than the latter, as it involves something beyond mere persistence through time 
(“e.g., when I wake up, how do I know I am the same person who went to sleep the night 
before?”). 125  Treanor characterizes ipse-identity as the less abstract dimension of 
selfhood, which is ultimately where we turn to answer to the question: who is 
responsible? Ipse-identity is influenced and permeated by otherness or externalities (e.g., 
history, culture, tradition, community, and environment), rendering it the ethical 
dimension of oneself, which deals with others and institutions. As Ricoeur writes:  
Self-constancy is for each person that manner of conducting himself or herself so that 
others can count on that person. Because someone is counting on me, I am accountable 
for my actions before another. The term “responsibility” unites both meanings: “counting 
on” and “being accountable for.” It unites them, adding to them the idea of response to 
																																																								
123 I will use parenthetical references for Oneself as Another for this portion of the text.  
124 Brian Treanor, Emplotting Virtue: A Narrative Approach to Environmental Virtue Ethics (Albany, NY: 
SUNY Press, 2014), 111.  
125 Ibid., 112.  
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the question “Where are you?” asked by another who need me. This response is the 
following: “Here I am!” a response that is a statement of self-constancy. (165)  
 
The ethical dimension of ipse-identity involves what Ricoeur calls attestation, intimately 
bound up with credence and trust (299).126 The self’s response, “Here I am!” is what he 
calls the ethical moment of imputation, as the self is prompted by the call of another. 
Informed by Heidegger’s account of Dasein potentially being attested by conscience, 
Ricoeur explains that attestation marks the shift from the imagination’s notion that it can 
try anything to the voice that says, “everything is possible, but not everything is 
beneficial to others and yourself” (167). When attested, the self understood as activity 
(constituting itself as a spontaneity with infinite possibilities) shifts to the passive, naked 
self’s declaration: here is where I stand. Where one stands is where “one’s feet are 
planted” (or in Brewer terms, one’s ‘evaluative outlook’) when called by the other. This 
‘call’ by the other relates to self-constancy in the sense that how one attests expresses 
who they are ethically.  
How, then, should we attest? And how does this relate to narrative identity? 
Ricoeur mentions a host of figures that contribute to his ethical model, but it is perhaps 
best characterized as a dialectic between the Aristotelian and Kantian ethical/moral 
paradigms. Ricoeur defines our ethical intention as: aiming at the “good life,” with and 
for others, in just institutions (172). The “good life” involves striving to become the 
																																																								
126 It is worth noting that Ricoeur acknowledges and concedes Macintyre’s account, as it mirrors what we 
find in After Virtue. For Macintyre, the two key features of narrative identity are: 1) that I am “what I may 
justifiably be taken by others to be in the course of living a story that runs from my birth to my death; I am 
the subject of a history that is my own and no one else's, that has its own peculiar meaning” (After Virtue, 
217); and 2) that I am accountable and can ask others for an account.  Macintyre stresses that narrative and 
accountability are vital in assisting us in the ordering of goods (decision-making). They condition our 
capacity to do. The quest for the good (narrative unity) is a quest qua education: hearing the accounts and 
stories of others, so as to facilitate both an understanding of the sort of character that we seek to be, as well 
as a deeper understanding of ourselves. The good life is a life spent seeking the good, and recognizing that 
we are not simply what we choose to be.  
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phronimos, characterized by an ability to deliberate well about means and ends, 
determining “at the same time the rule and the case, by grasping the situation in its 
singularity” (175). Ricoeur explains that the good life is “the nebulous of ideals and 
dreams and achievement with regard to which a life is held to be more or less fulfilled or 
unfulfilled” (179). This is marked by the “unending work of interpretation applied to 
what seems to us to be best with regard to our life as a whole and the preferential choices 
that govern our practices” (179). Insofar as one perdures through time (as self-conscious), 
one is called to interpret, judge, act, reinterpret, judge, act, and so on, until we cease to 
be. 
The second part of Ricoeur’s definition of ethical intention (with and for others) is 
best described as solicitude: being concerned for (as open to) others. Moving away from 
Levinas’s allegedly asymmetrical “irrelation” between oneself and the other, Ricoeur 
instead turns to Aristotle’s account of friendship, extracting what he calls Aristotle’s 
ethics of reciprocity, marked by a “fragile balance in which giving and receiving are 
equal” (187-8). Ricoeur is careful not to reduce reciprocity to an economy among equals, 
and relies on Martha Nussbaum’s notion of the “fragility of goodness” to capture the 
dual-vulnerability of oneself and another that does not assimilate the other’s suffering 
into oneself, but allows for the affective “flesh of feeling” among selves (192). This is 
what Ricoeur calls the search for equality among inequality. As is the case for Aristotle, 
giving takes precedence over receiving, albeit never at the expense of one’s flourishing. 
With Levinas’s notion of the other as absolutely other than oneself in mind, Ricoeur 
describes the relation among individuals as that of similitude; similitude necessarily 
preserves plurality (to be similar is to still be different from that which you are similar to) 
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and sets the condition for promise and trust (because the others are like me). Establishing 
similitude in this way allows for “the esteem of the other as a oneself and the esteem of 
oneself as an other,” without reducing plurality or difference into homogeneity or 
sameness (194).127  
 By Ricoeur’s account, morality enters the realm of ethics to further protect “the 
respect for others and for ‘oneself as another’” (203). Self-respect, for Ricoeur, is the 
expression of self-esteem (aiming at the good life) “under the reign of the moral law” 
(204). It maintains the delicate balance between similitude and difference, and promotes 
each individual’s ability to achieve the good life. For Ricoeur, the destruction of self-
respect is the destruction of one’s power-to-act, which, in its most extreme cases, would 
institute the depths of evil (220). Thus, Ricoeur’s riff on the Kantian categorical 
imperative is: “Act solely in accordance with the maxim by which you can wish at the 
same time that what ought not to be, namely evil, will not exist” (218). Crucial for 
Ricoeur, however, is that morality is always governed by the achievement of the good 
life. Others play a crucial role on the road to happiness, though, contra Levinas, it is 
ultimately lack or neediness (our vulnerability, our being wounded) that drives us to the 
other (185). Key for Ricoeur, like Kant, is that self-esteem derives from esteeming others 
as oneself, i.e., capable of starting something in the world, of acting for a reason, of 
hierarchizing priorities, and of evaluating the ends of actions (193). Ricoeur footnotes 
that this (esteeming others as oneself) is the “secret” of the commandment to love thy 
neighbor as thyself (194).  
																																																								
127 The final dimension of Ricoeur’s ethical intention (just institutions) is the more systematic, political 
preservation of solicitude within the community. Solicitude, safeguarding the singularity of each individual 
and an economy of reciprocal equality, therefore, manifests itself as justice at both the micro and macro 
level in the community. Striving to fulfill the three dimensions of the above-sketched ethical intention 
characterizes what Ricoeur calls self-esteem. 
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Thus, for Ricoeur, to constitute oneself as an ethicomoral self is to understand that 
who we are is the result of self-constancy, and that self-constancy implies 1) a perpetual 
need to re-constitute that who, and 2) the perpetual occasion, at every moment, for self-
transcendence, i.e., ethical transfiguration. These two processes involve deciphering what 
activities constitute eudaimonia, perpetually moving back and forth between particular 
events and the particularity of one’s life as a whole (179). This hermeneutic process 
(what Ricoeur calls “critical phronesis”) not only hones one’s ethicomoral sensibility, but 
also contributes to the perpetual revision of the mores that are working toward more just 
communities, i.e., communities moving away from social discordance (war) toward 
social concordance (peace). Key is that the ‘critical’ dimension of critical phronesis is 
always an expression of solicitude, undergirded by a standard of radical openness. This 
means that the constitution of oneself as another always seeks to recognize and preserve 
the other in their singularity (perhaps best exemplified in Levinas’s “après vous”).  
With this sketch in mind, the differences between Ricoeur and Levinas should 
already be somewhat clear, but as Ricoeur writes:  
E. Lévinas’s entire philosophy rests on the initiative of the other in the intersubjective 
relation. In reality, this initiate establishes no relation at all, to the extent that the other 
represents absolute exteriority with respect to an ego defined by the condition for 
separation. The other, in this sense, absolves himself of any relation. This irrelation 
defines exteriority as such...it is in the accusative mode alone that self is enjoined. And 
the summons to responsibility has opposite it simply the passivity of an “I” who has been 
called upon. The question then, whether to be heard and received, the injunction must not 
call for a response that compensates for the dissymmetry of the face-to-face encounter. 
(189) 
 
Most problematic for Ricoeur is that Levinas’s ‘other’ abruptly summons the self to 
responsibility (calling for obedience to duty by seizing, persecuting, holding one hostage, 
etc.) in a way that precludes the possibility of reciprocity, or receiving anything from the 
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other. He also stresses that because the other is nowhere to be found (phenomenally 
speaking), oneself and the other are effectively not in relation. For Ricoeur, a responsible 
response to the other’s call is “presupposing a capacity for reception, of discrimination, 
and of recognition that, in [Ricoeur’s] opinion, belongs to another philosophy of the 
Same to which the philosophy of the Other replies” (339), i.e., Ricoeur’s. In addressing 
Levinas’s notion of substitution, Ricoeur asks who is hostage to the other (340)? And 
wants to maintain that this who, contra Levinas, is a benevolent spontaneity, a conscious 
individual agent who can and should discriminate: “And what are we to say of the Other 
when he is an executioner? And who will be able to distinguish the master from the 
executioner, the master who calls for a disciple from the master who requires a slave?” 
(339).  
Ricoeur points out that he is well aware of the fact that Levinas’s language is 
deliberately hyperbolic to evoke “the effect of a break with regard to the idea of 
exteriority in the sense of absolute otherness” (336). And it can be inferred from this (and 
his deep admiration for and employment of Levinas’s conclusions) that he understands 
his perspective as a corrective to Levinas’s view,128 providing the necessary space for 1) 
a truly reciprocal relation between the self and the other, and 2) a notion of otherness 
residing within consciousness itself: namely, conscience (the other within myself that I 
consult while making decisions) (341).  
 So, how might Levinas respond to this critique? First, it is crucial to point out 
that Ricoeur’s project seeks to ground otherness within consciousness—something 
																																																								
128 Michael H. Gillick does a fantastic and comprehensive job illustrating the problematic between the two 
thinkers in his dissertation, “The Place of Justice in the Thinking of Emmanuel Levinas” (doctoral 
dissertation, Marquette University, 2004). Many of his critiques resonate with my own, though his 
objectives are very distinct.  
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understood by the active self—which is the precise standpoint that Levinas seeks to 
‘overcome’. For Levinas, I am not the source of morality (it is not a principle that I can 
locate within reason, or a value I can locate within myself). And what we find in Ricoeur 
is something reminiscent of Kantian morality, despite its attentiveness to vulnerability, in 
which I locate the value of the other. Levinas is not concerned with the experience of two 
self-concerned individuals in relation to each other, but rather the moment that self-
consciousness identity ceases to be.   
Second, while Ricoeur’s notion of attestation (“Here I am!”) is reminiscent of 
Levinas’s notion of sensibility (pure exposure, nakedness before the other), Ricoeur 
stresses that the moment of imputation marks the shift from the imagination’s notion that 
it can try anything to the voice that says, “everything is possible, but not everything is 
beneficial to others and yourself” (167). When attested, the self understood as activity 
(constituting itself as a spontaneity with infinite possibilities) shifts to the passive, naked 
self’s declaration: “here is where I stand. In Levinas, this process is inverted, so to speak.  
Levinas is not describing Kant’s moral encounter, i.e., the prohibition we place on 
ourselves (as autonomous individuals) when realizing that we share this world with 
others, and are for that reason called to consider that we cannot and should not do 
anything and everything we would like to do. As Ricoeur puts it, when we are attested, 
considering the benefit of the whole, oneself included, becomes paramount, and thus the 
way we consciously—willingly—respond to this dilemma (between my spontaneous 
interests and the interests of others) defines the ethical dimension of who we are. Ricoeur 
is describing practical reason’s response to an impasse to self-interest.  
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For Levinas, morality is not simply the willed prohibition of self-interest or the 
halting of absolute spontaneity.129  (This gets us no further than Kant.) Levinas is 
committed to overthrowing self-consciousness as a fundamental mode of knowing, 
instead advocating a form of affective consciousness or ‘pre-conscious’ being that is 
otherwise than self-aware, i.e., an expiation or divesting of oneself, albeit not by result of 
the will. It is the experience of being captivated from without. This is to say that 
Ricoeur’s account involves consciously deciphering how to be with the others in a way 
that enhances one’s self-esteem, i.e., maintaining the self as an object of concern for 
itself; and by Levinas’s account, this type of activity involves a sort of plotting that 
inevitably amounts to an assertion of power. And why? Because in order to determine 
how to proceed, one must possess criteria (truth values) by which one is able to make that 
sort of decision. As Ricoeur puts it, how are we to judge the other (as good or bad) if they 
are beyond consciousness’s grasp? Levinas would insist that that sort of discrimination, 
while an undeniable feature of our existence, is not ethics, but rather calculation—always 
and already governed by a pre-figured end, a state of affairs one would like to bring 
about. How we respond (in the sense of what future state of affairs we bring about) is not 
what defines us. What defines us is whether or not we listen—and the will is only 
involved when one shirks, in fear, away from the other, the unknown.  
Third, the most radical dimension of Levinas’s perspective is that ethics is 
otherwise than or beyond moral judgment (of good and evil), as these necessarily 
																																																								
129 That being said, it is important to underline that in Totality and Infinity, Levinas notoriously describes 
the face as commanding, “Thou shall not kill,” suggesting (albeit inconsistently) that the face-to-face 
encounter marks the moment in which absolute spontaneity is put into question from without. Although the 
content itself does not radically change, Levinas sings a slightly different tune in Otherwise Than Being, 
avoiding language that depicts the prohibitive halting of conscious activity, instead favoring language that 
describes the passive undergoing of metaphysical desire—the inspirational experience of being-for-the-
other (substitution, metaphysical desire).  
	 213	
presuppose truth standards by which one can effectively discriminate. The ethical, for 
Levinas, is not the power of discernment. The good is the movement of being seized from 
self-concern by opening to new value, i.e., what is otherwise that what one contains 
within oneself. A more concrete way of understanding this is that the good is precisely 
the openness that allows one to hear what the other has to say: that lets the other to make 
her case—open to the possibility of learning something new, and changing one’s 
perspective. The good is suspending disbelief, which requires surrendering 
presuppositions, admitting that you may not know, that you may be wrong. In other 
words, the good is undergoing of existential shift understood as being pulled away from 
oneself, led to new terrain, bare before an utterly affective experience. Key here is that 
self is not the measure of the good; ‘the good’ is a way of describing our capacity to be 
affected in ways that we cannot determine in advance. As Claire Katz puts it, to be seized 
by the good is to be “unable to harden one’s heart to the other.” That is, to listen 
unconditionally. 
Beyond this, the golden rule (self-esteem deriving from esteeming others as 
oneself) as any sort of ethical standard would, by Levinas’s account, be problematic, as it 
presupposes self-concern as the standard by which we are to consider how to treat others. 
Ethically speaking, the self (me as an individual) is not an object of concern: I am 
responsible for the other regardless of how he responds to me or what I wish for myself. 
If I am principally concerned with what I have determined that I want for myself, how 
can I truly be open to the possibility of something that is otherwise than what I have 
already determined is best for me? 
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Fourth, in regard to Ricoeur’s claim that what Levinas provides is ultimately a 
non-relation between oneself and the other that effectively precludes the possibility of 
reciprocity and friendship, it is important to understand what that relation between self 
and other is. What does Levinas have in mind? As we saw in Chapter 4, Levinas is 
describing the experience of (metaphysical) desire, in which the self is not interested in 
itself, no longer a self-conscious individual, but is instead wholly for the other. This is 
best understood as the experience of being ‘lost’ in what you are doing: forgetting about 
yourself, who you’re with, why you’re doing what you are doing, what specifically is 
happening between the other and yourself, where you are headed, how long you will be 
or have been engaging in the activity, etc., as answers to all of these question require one 
to consciously reflect on the activity rather than being engrossed in the activity itself. In 
reflection, one’s appreciative attention is re-directed toward oneself (being in ‘their own 
head’), rather than the experience.  
A good example of this is getting lost in a conversation. The moment you stop 
having the conversation (asking what time it is, how long you’ve been talking, what 
conclusions you two have reached, how each other feels, whether you are getting enough 
from the other, etc.) you are effectively not ‘lost in’ the activity anymore, but are instead 
re-collecting it, which is a different activity altogether. For Levinas, those questions are 
not ethical, but practical—within the ‘realm’ of justice, in which measurement and the 
search for order ensue. Moreover, measured reciprocity requires expectations, and a 
quantification of what is owed to each, which again, may be practical—and even just—
but not ethical. For Levinas, ethics is asymmetrical in the sense that there are no 
expectations for getting something in return. If you are having a conversation with the 
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hope of acquiring something (getting the other to agree with you), the conversation 
devolves to rhetoric and manipulation because there is a goal is in sight, i.e., what one 
expects to get in return for the time spent conversing.  
Asymmetry so construed is not antithetical to friendship based on the good as we 
find it in Aristotle or as retrieved in contemporary virtue ethics. The fundamental 
openness that Levinas has in mind is vital to being able to share and augment your world 
with someone else. It is a necessary condition for the sort of friendship that cannot be 
reduced to simply furthering one’s self-interest. If one is chiefly concerned about 
reciprocity, it is worth asking whether the friendship is in fact equal or based on the good.  
Fifth and finally, as Levinas understands it, when utterly engrossed in something 
(substituting for the other) one experiences a different order of time altogether, during 
which there is no room for deliberation, calculation, and evaluation because the past and 
the future drop out of the picture. From the perspective of consciousness, the past is 
forgotten, and the future is lived rather than projected. Ricoeur may be correct in stating 
that insofar as we perdure through time, we are called to interpret, judge, act, reinterpret, 
etc., but the mode of temporality that he has in mind is key. If I am engrossed in 
something, I am not judging my experience, but am undergoing mesmeric attraction. 
From the perspective of consciousness, this might seem like enslavement, but from the 
perspective of the affective undergoing, it is liberation from self-conscious concern and 
diving into what you desire and truly enjoy. We are only ‘enslaved’ by the other in the 
sense that we are captivated, enthralled, and riveted—so much so that we forget about 
ourselves (and our projects) despite ourselves.  
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This point is important because depending on how ‘strong’ one’s will is, 
metaphysical desire (as Levinas describes it and as it is actually experienced) can be 
agonizing, traumatizing, violent, risky, imprudent. This brings us to Ricoeur’s notion of 
ipse-identity, i.e., the kind of person that I want to become (which requires some form of 
prudence and measure). Ricoeur envisions an ethics that is aspirational. To be ethical is to 
aspire to goodness. This is notably Aristotelian, but problematic in that it presupposes an 
understanding of that good that we are on the way to. As Socrates puts it in the Republic, 
understanding the good as prudence (as the refined do) involves being prudent about the 
good (505b), which means that a pre-supposed understanding of the good is employed 
when one determines how to actualize the good, i.e., how to be prudent (as the phronimos 
is). Thus, to live in a way that is predominantly governed by concern over the kind of 
person that I want to be is a life that favors a particular type of self-projection: holding 
the ‘ideal’ in place as that toward which we constantly aim.  
Now, Ricoeur would by no means suggest that this ideal is stagnant (as we are 
dynamic unities, and our understanding of things is perpetually influence by our 
interpretation of what is ‘external’ to ourselves), but it seems clear that acting in light of a 
projected ideal necessitates an activation of the will. And why? Because aiming at the 
good life with and for others in just institutions involves determining the means to 
achieve that end—even if the end is perpetually evolving. In general, means-ends 
schemas (holding a big picture in sight) involve calculation by the will. How else will 
you achieve the end that you seek? Again, the radical move we find in Levinas is that 
practical reason, by its very nature, involves a certain awareness of and ownership over 
oneself and what one brings into the world, i.e., self-mastery. Self-mastery involves some 
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notion of self-perfection (precisely becoming the master of oneself in a particular 
manner), which is to say that self-mastery involves an ideal mode of being (e.g., 
minimizing harm and maximizing pleasure, obeying the moral law) that we are on the 
way to becoming, and that we intentionally strive to bring about when facing difficult 
practical decisions. This means there has to be a self that one is concerned about.  
That being said, Levinas does not deny that we partake in practical reason, and 
that we experience a projection of ourselves within reflection (though this ‘self’ is merely 
a projection, or even a fiction), but insists that the movements of practical reason are by 
their very nature economic, for which ethics has no business. This is where Levinas does 
in fact go further than Kant. Any measure whatsoever falls outside of ethics. Self-conceit 
cannot even accidentally be the motivation for ethics because there is no self-concerned 
self involved in morality. Morality denotes where I ‘end’ and we ‘begin’. Brewer 
provides an account of practical reason that does not completely fall prey to this 
criticism, though in the end, Brewer concedes that our chief dialectical activity is 
unifying our lives (based on our conception of how best to live them, which, in the end, 
presupposes ideals, and ultimately some notion of self-perfection). And again, for 
Levinas, a focus on the development of self-perfection is antithetical to ethics.  
2. What if I do not feel compelled by the other? The second salient critique of 
Levinas is what is often referred to as the challenge of egoism or moral skepticism. The 
skeptical questions that are posed to Levinas are: what if I do not feel compelled by the 
other? Can we not be indifferent to the other? And why should we not reject the other? 
Especially if, echoing Ricoeur, the other is the type of master who wants to be 
surrounded by slaves. 
	 218	
First, this critique of Levinas mirrors the critique of voluntarism/ethical 
intuitionism as sketched by Christine Korsgaard in The Sources of Normativity. In her 
text, based on a series of lectures, Korsgaard hunts for a justification of moral obligation, 
which, by her account, is simply a variation of the call for the examined life. The chief 
question she is interested in (the normative question) is: how are moral obligations 
normative? ‘Normative’ here refers to the binding force of the moral law. Another way of 
putting this question is: why should we be moral? Which she thinks spawns from our 
being self-conscious reflectors (as we saw in Prichard, reflection cannot help but ask 
why?). For Korsgaard, this question becomes pressing when the demands of moral 
obligation require a taxing sacrifice on the part of the agent—a sacrifice that makes them 
question why they have to do what they do not want to do. Although a proper account of 
her argument exceeds the scope of this project, her Kantian-inspired answer is that 
obligation is normative not because it is grounded in the apprehension of some objective 
truth about objective values, but because of the reflective structure of consciousness, i.e., 
human nature. Human nature (including the structure of reason) is normative given the 
authority we have over ourselves (that is, the way we confer reasons for action), i.e., the 
two selves that constitute who we are: 1) the current me and 2) the projection of myself 
that I must live with. And if we violate moral obligation we violate ourselves as members 
of human nature.130  
So, how does this relate to this relate to the moral skeptic’s critique of Levinas? 
By Korsgaard’s account, the second (problematic) answer that we find to the normative 
question, is that of moral realism, which asserts that legitimate moral authority is real 
																																																								
130 It perhaps goes without saying that her answer clashes with Levinas, as she grounds morality in 
reflective self-consciousness. 
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(whether it is a procedure or a fact), and is something that we experience, but it is not 
something that we can explain. Obligation is simply there, part of the nature of things, 
and although you cannot prove that it is real (because it is self-evident), you can rebut 
skeptical arguments. Prichard is a clear example of this type of answer to the normative 
question, stressing that it makes no sense to ask the normative question because the 
answer begs the question, as the conclusion is presupposed. Moral obligation is, 
therefore, intrinsically normative, forbidding future questions.  
For Korsgaard, the trouble with this position is that it hinges on confidence, i.e., I 
find it self-evident, so it is in fact self-evident—and the fact that you do not find it self-
evident does not mean I have to prove it to you (because it is not the kind of thing you 
can prove). Moral confidence is unable to answer the legitimate question of how these 
obligations are normative, and ends up rendering the normative question an illegitimate 
one. (To which Korsgaard replies: normative concepts clearly exist because, as self-
conscious reflectors, we inevitably face normative problems.)  
With this in mind, as well as the various resonances we have traced between 
Levinas and Prichard, it seems clear that Levinas could also fall prey to this critique. 
Levinas is providing a descriptive, albeit ethically charged account of reality, suggesting 
that morality is always and already the case, which could be understood as: “well, you 
have either experienced the call of the other or you haven’t. And until you do, you will 
remain in your dogmatic amoral slumber.”  
That being said, what Levinas provides (that rational intuitionists do not) is an 
answer to the question of how morality is normative, albeit not by way of argumentation 
(conclusions following from premises). Levinas is not appealing to logic, and is 
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ultimately challenging that model of justification in morality, as it involves having a 
particular conclusion in sight and getting there by whatever means-premises possible. For 
Levinas, this method inevitably remain deaf to what falls outside of its conclusion, as the 
‘executive order’ (one’s presuppositions) governs the whole enterprise—leaving one 
committed not only to what follows, but what can be known in advance. Levinas’s 
answer turns instead to 1) a phenomenology of sensibility, i.e., the basic structure of 
receptivity-exposure-openness that we all share, which serves as a primordial mode of 
being-for-the-other; to 2) conversation, which also denotes a primordial mode of being-
for-the-other—another mode of sensibility—that each and everyone one of us 
experiences, insofar as we exist; and to 3) metaphysical desire. As we saw in Chapter 4, 
the concrete reality of our exposure to the other and desire for the other is the source of 
all phenomena whatsoever—including conscious thought. Our existence begins with us 
responding, as responsible. For Levinas, it is reflective reason that issues moral doubt of 
both the senses and desire (am I really my brother’s keeper? What is Hecuba to me?), but 
the skeptical question is inevitably a response to a former position of moral regard: that 
is, acknowledging the ‘call’ of morality and, rather than living out the desire to ‘obey’ it, 
evaluating whether or not you should.  
This is to say that for Levinas, morality is normative in the sense that our 
existence is such that the unknown—what is outside of ourselves as reflectively self-
conscious—calls us, and ignites desire, whether we like or not. As we saw in Chapter 4, 
enjoyment is a testimony of this, language is a testimony of this, and the very fact that we 
provide reasons is a testimony of this. Desire is necessarily ignited from without, and 
paralleling (albeit opposite of) what Korsgaard suggests about reflective endorsement, 
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desire is normative in the sense that we do not have authority over ourselves. We are 
affectively pulled by the good; this is a basic feature of our existence. And if we ignore or 
attempt to extinguish desire altogether, we would in fact cease to be—or would be such 
in a way that we alienate ourselves from what animates us in the first place. And although 
valuing my own humanity (my capacity to set ends, reflectively endorse those ends) does 
not necessitate that I value the humanity of others, valuing desire necessarily involves 
valuing the other, as desire is always for the other.  
Second, as was briefly discussed in Chapter 3, the question of how we can gain 
certainty about the normative authority of the other (because otherwise we are left with 
innate, ‘magic’ feelings that either compel us or not) is innovatively addressed by Claire 
Katz, who suggests that moral education is the giant elephant in the room when we ask 
these questions. Katz’s point is that we do not emerge into the world as adults with a 
prefigured set of values. And echoing what we saw in Chapter 2, moral cultivation is at 
least theoretically part of education in general, and our orientation toward desire (again, 
an incontestable feature of our existence) has everything to do with the way we have been 
taught to understand it (e.g., being taught to deny it). This is to reiterate that the question 
of whether I am my brother’s keeper only has meaning if one has already supposed that 
oneself is the only object of concern for itself. Only in this hypothesis (that the ego is the 
only concern for itself) is it incomprehensible that the other would concern me, or that I 
would need to hunt for reasons to justify helping my neighbor, or to act from duty.  
That being said, Korsgaard raises a very important point. The normative question 
is legitimate in the sense that it arises because we have normative problems. Which 
suggests that we have been educated in such a way that has led us to value, above all, 
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ourselves: that is, our respective projects, our success, our individual pursuits of 
happiness, etc.. In light of this understanding, it is reasonable to ask the normative 
question: why should I substitute my interests for the sake of someone else? Key here is 
that education is fundamental to the formation of a subject that is not simply living for 
itself. The ethical subject is taught and developed—and the teaching relation is itself 
normative. The normative force comes from developing young people who are ‘trained’ 
to hear what is always and already outside of their reflections.  
As Katz puts it (invoking Levinas’s work on Jewish education),131  Anglo-
American culture prizes a specific sort of scientific knowledge—certainty in the sense of 
conclusions necessarily following from certain presuppositions—above everything else. 
As a testimony to this point, while giving a teaching presentation at Harvard in 2017, I 
asked the audience what they think happiness is, and the first answer I received was 
‘security’. And this ended up being the answer that the audience almost unanimously 
agreed on. If security (understood as certainty about our safety) is the end that we seek, 
the impetus will of course be to avoid to risk and danger. And to avoid risk and danger, 
we need to calculate—carefully weighing pros and cons. This is how we maximize the 
sought-results. And in order to calculate well, we need to act with as much certainty as 
possible, avoiding as many potential missteps as possible. In other words, we need to 
know before we do, which implies that we are not willing to undertake anything without 
knowing everything—or at least not without knowing at much as possible.132 This is the 
prudent way to proceed if security is what we seek. As Katz puts it, to act otherwise is 
																																																								
131 As Katz points out, before writing Totality and Infinity, Levinas taught high school students at the École 
normale Israélite orientale in Paris, and eventually became the director of the school in 1946 when he 
returned after WWII.  
132 Katz, Levinas and the Crisis of Humanism, 92.  
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understood to be childish. Paraphrasing Levinas, Katz points out that our culture is a 
culture that is in a hurry to live, but impatient to feel. And proceeding this way makes it 
easier to ignore the things that affect us from without: principally, other people, but also a 
host of perceived ‘dangers’ that are endemic to life—perhaps above all, death.   
Third, can we really be indifferent to the other in the sense of being utterly 
unaffected by the other? This is an interesting question, because Levinas’s claim is that 
we cannot be utterly indifferent to the other, no matter how hard we try. We can attempt 
to 1) mute the ‘noise’ outside of us (e.g., putting on headphones to avoid contact with the 
homeless, absorbing ourselves in our cell phones to ignore a conversation, changing the 
channel when a ‘save the animals’ ad comes on, etc.); 2) to avoid contact with the 
‘others’ who fall outside of our pre-approved circles (e.g., subscribing to media outlets 
that bend toward our political preferences, wanting a wall to be built in a town bordering 
another country, concentrating homeless communities in spaces outside of spaces the 
general public frequents, etc.); 3) to isolate ourselves from the communities that we 
belong to (e.g., moving away from home to a new city to be anonymous, or getting a 
fresh start in a new work environment, etc.): or 4) to deny that we cannot predict what the 
future holds, (e.g., planning out every detail of our career trajectory, obsessing over ant-
aging products, avoiding facing the fact that each of us will die, etc.).   
While these efforts are not completely futile (we can get very good at ignoring 
things), the point is that each of these efforts is a response to or ‘privation’ of what is 
always and already the case. We are not, for reasons detailed in Chapter 4, impervious to 
the other. And the way in which the other never fails to seize our attention is a result of 
the fact that we desire to be affected by the other. (At least initially, we welcome what is 
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other.) The point to be underlined is that each of these efforts concedes being affected 
by—and in most cases being afraid of—the other. For instance, xenophobic behavior is 
the result of being afraid of the diverse others surrounding you, unsure of what they might 
do, because they are different. But the undeniable fact remains: the others surround you. 
Or to give another example, we may do everything in our power to avoid the inevitability 
of death by being vigilant with doctor’s visits, eating healthy, and exercising, but still end 
up with a terminal cancer. Again, the fact remains that the future is unknown and 
something will always get in the way of a smooth execution of any plan—the way in 
which the plan will unfold is never 100% in your control. The unpredictability of the 
other (as unknown, what is not represented to consciousness) is precisely what gives rise 
to fear, and fear provokes a mode of calculative being that perpetually strives for security. 
The other plagues consciousness’s attempt to shape the future. And quoting Levinas, the 
other is the future. The question reflective self-consciousness faces is whether or not to 
project desired states of affairs and attempt to bring them into being by whatever means 
possible. 
This gives rise to an important question. In absorbing ourselves in the other, 
aren’t we (unethically) ignoring other others? The answer is yes, and Levinas addresses 
precisely this point by way of his account of justice. As far as ethics is concerned, one is 
completely enraptured by the other at the expense of other others. Justice marks the work 
of attempting to measure among incommensurables, divvying up our resources. We of 
course cannot feed every mouth, and we do in fact have to consider ourselves, but again, 
for Levinas, this is the work of practical reason, whose measuring activity cannot help but 
be self-interested—seeking particular outcomes. That being said, as we saw in Chapter 4, 
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the work of justice involves striving toward coherence and order, but inevitably having 
that ordered disrupted in a way that requires perpetual re-evaluation and re-consideration. 
Order is always interrupted by something that falls outside of the given order’s logic, so 
to speak. For example, creating laws to protect the rights of a particular group of 
disenfranchised people, only to realize that that law does not protect certain others, 
necessitating a revision of the existing law or a construction of a new law to protect the 
others.  
Fourth and finally, why shouldn’t we reject the other? Especially if the other 
appears to be ‘evil’, e.g., the Nazi? This point is particularly controversial, and the 
answer is not only unpalatable, but one that Levinas himself struggled with (as evidenced 
in his critical attitude toward Heidegger’s affiliation with National Socialism). The 
question we face is: what type of otherness should one be open to and what type of 
otherness should one be closed to? And on what grounds?133  
My initial attempt at a Levinasian answer would be that, ethically speaking, there 
is no ground for moral judgment. If openness is to be open, one cannot discriminate in 
their openness to otherness. Ethics is radical openness to the other (full stop). And again, 
measuring among the incommensurable particulars (you, me, him, her, they) is the 
problematic work of justice. And this requires the laborious work of hearing, weighing, 
and ordering all points-of-view—even those of X (insert force of ‘evil’ here). Disordered 
as they may be, the Nazi has reasons, too, and those reasons need to be heard, 
understood, and challenged. Echoing Levinas, communication is not the auto-affection of 
																																																								
133 George Heffernan posed this pertinent question to me in response to a paper I wrote on Heidegger and 
Levinas on language, and I find it salient, as it probes the uncomfortable dimension of providing an ethics 
that is truly beyond good and evil.  
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certainty. To communicate is indeed to open oneself, but the openness is not complete if 
it is on the watch for recognition and acceptance (of one’s own truth values). As we learn 
from Hannah Arendt, in a tyranny, free speech is one of the first things to go. The only 
activities permitted in a tyranny are those that reiterate the current ideology. There can be 
nothing new, nothing other. For ethics, at least as Levinas depicts it, there must be, at the 
very least, a standard of listening. And it seems that a lack of discrimination in what is 
heard is the risk of democracy (contra tyranny). This is unsettling, but key is that the 
possibility of new understandings requires suspending disbelief, so as to truly hear what 
the other has to say. The possibility of encountering a new perspective or experiencing a 
shift in understanding is ethics, and the only way for this is to happen to refuse to believe 
that the other is evil.134  
The question that follows from this is: is this refusal (to believe that the other is 
evil) an act of the will? It seems clear that within a Levinasian schema, it cannot be. If I 
will myself to believe something other than I do, it is up for debate as to whether I 
wholeheartedly believe it (beyond a rational justification). This is to say that the grips of 
belief are not simply rational, but are also affective—and what we are affected by is not a 
product of free will, but simply happens to be the case or not. To assume that the other is 
not evil involves being exposed to the other, which involves deposing oneself of one’s 
pre-established certainties. Or put differently, this involves letting go of assumed 
knowledge because there must be something that you are missing—something that has 
fallen through the cracks, something more to be understood (in the position of the other). 
It is worth pointing out that this cannot simply involve finding a common ground with 
																																																								
134 For a thought-provoking conversation on this topic (as it relates to the abortion debate), listen to Krista 
Tibbet’s interview with Frances Kissling on “What Is Good in the Position of the Other.”  
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someone you are diametrically opposed to (as this suggests there is a degree to which you 
will not budge), but rather gaining a deeper understanding of each other. To seek 
understanding, rather than knowledge, is to assume the priority of understanding a 
different position, rather than having one’s own position be understood. The most 
difficult aspect of this ‘deposing’ of oneself is being honest about the fact that we do not 
have the answers to everything. If we are honest with ourselves and able to listen to what 
is outside of ourselves, our convictions (i.e., our orderings of reality) will always be 
undone by the unanticipated and unforeseen: by the other. Orderings of reality (essences) 
can only cover so much. There are always other perspectives to be heard; essence is 
always undoing itself.  
In Levinas’s words, ‘the saying’ (difference) always finds a way to undo ‘the 
said’ (essence). And there is something arbitrary to ordering in the sense that orderings 
are based on the preferences of the one who orders. This is to say that if order—
coherence, law—is primarily based on taste (what one likes, enjoys), it seems clear that 
there is not only room for other perspectives, but that there are always new tastes to be 
explored and enjoyed. For instance, you may love ice cream and be committed to 
exclusively ordering ice cream for dessert, until you go to dinner with someone who 
loves pie and tries to convince you to give pie a shot. Although pie is new, unknown, and 
not ice cream, you have no idea whether or not you will like it. The only way to find out 
is to suspend your prejudices and give it a try.  
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5.2 WHAT IS THE GOOD? SELF-DISRUPTION & AFFECTIVE UNITY 
This project has been elucidating the significance of what I will now call ‘self-disruption’ 
in ethical development. ‘Self-disruption’ refers to the experience of being torn away from 
self-concern by something other than oneself. ‘Self-concern’ refers to the self’s 
attachment to its projects and plans—including the future self that it seeks to produce, a 
preservation of its current identity. And ‘ethical development’ refers to the process of 
understanding how to flourish. My claim is that this insight, inspired by Levinas’s 
ethical-metaphysics, is implicit within 1) Kant’s account of the moral self, 2) Aristotle’s 
account of the virtuous soul, and 3) the teleological account of the self that we find in 
contemporary virtue ethics.  
But what exactly does it mean to be disrupted or torn away from self-concern in 
each of these distinct accounts? Before addressing this question, it is important to first 
define which ‘self’ we have in mind, and to then underscore an important distinction. The 
self of self-concern is the imperative issuing self that we encountered in Chapter 1, the 
isolated and production-oriented self that was challenged by contemporary virtue ethicists 
in Chapter 3, and the reflectively self-conscious self that was undermined by Levinas in 
Chapter 4. This self is marked by a mode of being that is governed by the will—a self 
that confers imperatives (to itself), self-consciously reflecting on those imperatives 
(based on what it wants) and acting in light of those imperatives with the aim of bringing 
a particular state of affairs into being. No matter how murky the representation of itself 
may be, the self of self-concern is a self that identifies and thus represents itself to itself. 
It is a self that makes itself an object of concern for itself.   
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The important distinction I have in mind is clearly expressed in Kant’s delineation 
between two modes of issuing imperatives to oneself, i.e., categorically and 
hypothetically, which parallels, albeit building upon the distinction that we find in 
Aristotle between absolute ends and instrumental ends. This distinction is between ends 
sought for their own sake, and ends sought for the sake of something else. Crucial is that 
morality (in the case of Kant) and virtue (in the case of Aristotle) belong to the former. 
And each of the abovementioned accounts is marked by an attempt to emphasize the 
ethical significance of the former, so as to move away from what is best understood as 
consequence-driven decision-making model. Kant identifies this mode of practical 
thinking as outside the scope of morality, and while Aristotle and contemporary 
Aristotelian virtue ethicists do not admonish instrumental goods in the same way that 
Kant does, they underscore that human flourishing hinges on doing things for their own 
sake—i.e., giving oneself over to unimpeded activity, ‘self-sufficient’ in the sense that 
nothing is lacking, as one is channeling all of one’s appreciative attention—or better, 
desire—into the present activity.   
Kant’s moral self. As we saw in Chapter 1, Kant describes the immoral self as a 
self whose will is governed by hypothetical imperatives. That is, principles of action that, 
above all, seek to secure projected ends in the future. This is a will that is governed by 
self-conceit. For Kant, it is in the experience of respect that self-conceit is affectively 
disrupted, and one is presented with the option of doing something for its own sake or of 
doing something for the sake of self-interest. Key is that the experience of disruption is 
not simply that of prohibition (thou shall not do X), but the experience of a different type 
of desire: that is, the desire for the moral law, here synonymous with acting from duty, 
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‘obeying’ the moral law, and acting for the sake of humanity. The disruption of self-
conceit discloses the good will, which is free from projected, hypothetical ends, and is 
honest about what is and is not in its control. For Kant, self-disruption is vital to ethical 
development in that it is only when we interrupt self-interest’s projections—what we seek 
to acquire in the future, based on our conception of pleasure and pain—that we fully 
identify with our authentic, moral self, i.e., a self that is not an island, but rather one 
among other members in the moral community. This disruption is the ‘effect’ (or perhaps 
better, ‘affect’) of encountering the moral law in the other, and experiencing the 
simultaneous desire for the other’s freedom and yours. Kant would admittedly not use the 
term ‘desire’, but as was illustrated in Chapter 1, for Kant, we do in fact desire to be free, 
and our freedom entails the freedom of the others. In the case of Kant, to aspire to the 
good is to heed the good will—unifying activity and purpose, thus obeying the moral law 
for its own sake.   
Aristotle’s ethical self. Because there is no will or ‘reflectively self-conscious 
individual’ for Aristotle, and voluntary action, by Aristotle’s account, is best understood 
as being able to do what is in our power to do (free from external constraints), self-
disruption is here understood a bit differently and requires more justification.  
My hypothesis is that self-concern, within Aristotle’s schema, would amount to a 
mode of being that involves the experience of having conflicting desires (e.g., being 
enraged and wanting to scream at someone, but simultaneously recognizing that it is 
perhaps not prudent to do). Or put differently, self-concern is a way describing the 
experience of being at war with oneself. That is, being concerned with the preservation 
and perpetuation of certain pleasures, while resisting or wanting to avoid future pain. As 
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we saw in Chapter 2, aspiring to the good involves immersing ourselves in the activities 
that we desire (by nature), and that are good for their own sake. This means that these 
activities are pleasant in themselves, unimpeded by ends outside of the activity itself—
especially anticipations of the future. This point is crucial. It is worth recalling that 
eudaimonia is self-sufficient in the sense that nothing is lacking, which is to say that there 
is no more to be gained beyond one’s present state. The virtuous soul is not seeking 
anything beyond what she is experiencing. The only thing she ‘seeks’ is to augment, 
deepen, and enrich her present mode of being, i.e., to keep on being what she is.  
Moreover, the pleasure that accompanies Aristotelian virtue—the lack of pain or 
internal strife that completes virtuous activity—requires unity. But in what sense? Is it in 
the narrative sense that Macintyre offers, which amounts to a form of coherence? I want 
to propose that it involves unity in another sense. That is, in a sense that we find in 
Levinas’s account of becoming more and more singular qua less and less reflectively 
self-conscious. Key for Aristotle is that the virtuous soul is a soul that is not pulled in 
opposing directions (caught between conflicting desires). Every aspect of the soul is in 
harmony; each part is doing what it ought to do, heeding reason’s desire. I would suggest 
that this type of unity is best understood as ‘affective unity’, as one is not paralyzed 
among options, caught between incommensurable goods, but is rather devoting oneself 
entirely to a given activity for the sake of the activity itself. It seems fair to suggest that 
pleasure is the experience of wholeheartedly giving oneself over to what one is doing: 
being enthralled, absorbed, and engrossed.  
To better understand how Aristotelian virtue involves self-disruption and how 
self-disruption relates to affective unity, it is helpful to describe (phenomenologically) the 
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experience of what Aristotle calls ‘moral weakness’ (akrasia). By Aristotle’s account, 
what is distinct to the morally weak soul is that it is torn between two or more courses of 
action—inhibited from taking the ‘virtuous route’ because of the projected pain involved 
in the activity if one were to partake in it. Consider, for example, the decision of whether 
to be honest with your current partner (who you are living with) about the fact that you 
are not in love with them anymore. You feel like the two of you are going through the 
motions, you find yourself apathetic about everything, and it seems your mental health 
and physical health are deteriorating. But there is still a strong sense in which staying 
with your partner and not being honest about how you feel appears to be more pleasant. 
You two have a certain rhythm, and you can count on the comfort of stability: everyday 
is very predictable (even if unfulfilling). There is also a strong sense in which the very 
idea of being honest seems painful—above all, because it involves a huge amount of 
uncertainty, how it will be is unpredictable, and as projected, it seems painful. Key is that 
moral weakness is marked by the experience of being affectively torn, divided into (at 
least) two: namely (as Korsgaard delineates it), the self that you currently are, and the 
future self that you hope to be. You clearly do not desire to be in the relationship you are 
in, because you do not love your partner anymore, but you are afraid, stifled, paralyzed 
by the anticipated pains that (may or may not) come with being honest with them, and 
thus entering a new, unpredictable mode of being.  
To bring this back to self-disruption, the important takeaway is that flourishing 
requires a disruption to your current understanding of how things are, e.g., which things 
are pleasant and which things are painful. Thus, disrupting your current understandings of 
things—that is, disrupting your current identity—is vital to ethical development, as it 
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requires opening yourself to what is new, unpredictable, unanticipated: what is other than 
your current self. Virtue, unlike moral weakness, involves a unification of desire. The 
soul is not spliced into more than one, but is affectively unified: confident about what one 
desires, therefore pouring ‘all of itself’ into the present, open to whatever will be (which, 
from the standpoint of reflection, is unknown). In the example above, this would involve 
being honest, as this is what you ultimately desire, for its own sake—and thus 
disregarding your preconceptions about what may be painful about the process, 
conceding that in the end, you cannot predict the outcome.   
In addition to this, as we saw in Chapter 2, for Aristotle, others are the condition 
for the possibility of virtue, and are perhaps best understood as the vital ‘disruptions’ that 
facilitate these shifts in our understanding of things. This is the role of friends and of 
moral education in the state—the latter shaping the desires of the youth by training them 
to love and celebrate their rational principle (Aristotelian ‘self-love’), thus cultivating an 
orientation toward unpredictability and indeterminacy (the other) that teaches them to not 
only deliberate with confidence, but to find ‘tranquil freedom’ in this activity. This trust 
in oneself is a necessary condition for being hospitable to, and thus vulnerable before, 
new data, and is nurtured by and through friendship and education. Echoing Aristotle, 
friends and moral educators are the mirrors by which we are able to observe and 
understand the nature of our actions. As mirrors, friends and moral educators are those 
who disrupt our current understandings of things by asking us questions, demanding 
reasons, challenging us to think otherwise.  
Contemporary virtue ethics’ teleological self. Within this same vein, 
contemporary Aristotelian virtue ethics is marked by an effort to salvage the significance 
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of activities that are good for their own sake in the 20th-century, in hopes of undercutting 
the reigning production-oriented understanding of the self. As we saw in Chapter 3, this 
culminates in Brewer’s account of dialectical activity-desire, i.e., our intrinsic desire to be 
riveted, absorbed, engrossed, caught up in what we are doing—forgetting about 
ourselves, not getting in our own way. As Brewer stresses, echoing Aristotle, friendship 
(loving another) is the paradigmatic case of appreciative attention. Love provides the 
architecture of dialectical activity and its associated desire. It is a mode of being for 
something other; the self is disrupted and engrossed in the other, as is in the case, for 
instance in conversation. As Brewer puts it, dialectical desires are attention-arresting 
modes of appreciation of something wholly other, “serving to remove us from the 
condition of distraction, and in particular from that most banal and obsessive of human 
distractions, the self.”135 The important point here is that aspiring to the good does not 
consist in bringing about or producing projected deliverables, but rather being present to 
what one is doing—so much so that one cannot reflect on the activity as it is happening, 
as this would pull one’s attention toward reflective representations or images of the 
activity. Self-reflection is disrupted as one engages in the present activity, utterly opening 
oneself to the unanticipated. 
In summary, what is essential to each of these accounts is that goodness involves 
a disruption of reflective self-consciousness, which in turn involves a unification of 
desire. Crucial is that when we are affectively unified in this way, we are not only no 
longer caught between conflicting desires, but are completely divested of ourselves (think 
of falling in love). We are not participating in the ordering of phenomena, we are not 
																																																								
135 Brewer, The Retrieval of Ethics, 64.  
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organizing, measuring, judging, and bringing to coherence to disparate moments. And we 
are no longer consciously identifying ourselves. We are instead arrested—in Levinas’s 
terms, chosen and held hostage by the good—which involves the extraordinary forgetting 
of death. That is, being imprudently exposed in the sense that the self has lost concern for 
itself and the preservation of its current identity: unsure about where it is headed, 
delivering itself over to something different.  
The good thus signifies the disruptive activity that provokes the simultaneous 
shedding of calcified truths (i.e., our current convictions) and the cultivation of new 
understandings. The antithesis to the good would be the resistance to such exposure, or as 
Levinas puts it, to prioritize the fear of death (and the hope of escaping any and every 
end) over the fear of war (identifying everything and anything as a means to self-
preservation). This involves the steadfast work of preserving one’s current sense of self 
(identity) and its values (what it likes), and seeking to produce the self that one seeks to 
become in light of one’s current understanding of who one is now, e.g., I want to be a 
doctor and make X amount of money each year, and to be married to a successful 
husband with two children. Thus, one effectively constructs a narrative for oneself based 
on what is presently certain, projecting that what is certain now (e.g., I value money, 
marriage, and building a family) will remain certain in the future. And in so doing, one 
inevitably closes off the possibility of new desires and values, operating under 
hypothetical imperatives that find means to secure pre-figured ends in the future based on 
one’s current values and convictions (or rather, one’s current understanding of pleasure 
and pain).  
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The question of narrative coherence. Given everything that has been said thus 
far, the question that inevitably follows is: is the above-sketched notion of the good 
incompatible with the notion of the good as that toward which we are on a unified, 
narrative quest, i.e., happiness?136  The answer is of course no, but I do want to 
underscore a few important points.  
If we recall the conclusions that we reached in Chapter 3, Macintyre’s 
reclamation of narrative identity is a way of working us (in the Anglo-American West) 
out of the context-less situation in which we find ourselves: isolated, results-oriented 
individuals, who have become affectively detached from the welfare of the community at 
large. Inspired by Aristotle, Macintyre reminds us that we are in fact contextualized 
selves (always and already embedded in, and thus identifying with, a rich web of 
narratives) on the way to happiness. Again quoting Macintyre, “The unity of human life 
is the unity of a narrative quest.” We are on the way to becoming one: that is, a unified, 
coherent story—‘ending’ with happiness. Brewer ultimately follows suit, stressing that 
we only grasp the value of an activity upon recognizing and understanding its place in a 
full and flourishing human life; living a good life is the most comprehensive dialectical 
activity: everything that we do is for the sake of eudaimonia.  
The point that I want to underscore here is that this only becomes incompatible 
with goodness as self-disruption if our conception of happiness is one that involves a pre-
figured sense of the state of affairs that we seek to bring into being based on what we 
																																																								
136 It is worth flagging an interesting movement within contemporary psychology that challenges the 
following twin claims: 1) each of us constructs and lives a narrative-story (this is our identity), and 2) that 
each of us must possess a full and explicit narrative picture of who we are to fully develop as people. (I am 
here paraphrasing from Galen Strawson’s 2008 text, “Against Narrativity.”) I am grateful to Ana Hurka-
Robles for pointing me toward her research on this movement, which suggests that for some, constructing a 
narrative identity (as advised in therapy) is contrary to living well—provoking both depression and anxiety.  
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identify with now (our evaluative outlook). This is clearly distinct from eudaimonia as 
Aristotle or contemporary virtue ethicists envisions it, but it is worth considering that our 
current results-oriented and anti-contemplative habits and tendencies make it quite 
difficult to get out of a productive, results-oriented worldview. Even the language that we 
find within virtue ethics seems to point toward a notion of the good life as crafting a 
coherent story: providing order to what might otherwise be understood as a series of 
unrelated moments, and successfully achieving a particular end. This is to say that, given 
our orientation in the Anglo-American West, we almost cannot help but understand 
happiness as something to be achieved, a state of affairs that we bring into being. And 
again, this is not necessarily a problem in itself, but becomes a problem if we become so 
married to a particular result—a predetermined order of things—that we close our selves 
off from anything other than our self-constructed programs, agendas, narratives, 
identities.  
The worry here is that projecting a representation of what happiness might entail 
based on what we currently know to be the case can all too easily turn into an impulse to 
achieve happiness at all costs (even war), which—if the neoaristotelian diagnosis is 
correct—amounts to some form of self-preservation. To self-preserve is to seek to secure 
one’s identity, as is it. What inevitably accompanies this mode of being is a resistance to 
uncertainty, a fear of change—which is, most fundamentally, anxiety before the 
unknown. And why? Because in committing to self-preservation, which aims for future 
security, one cannot help but stick to the imperatives that might yield secure results. This 
is less risky, less dangerous, and more conducive to comfort.  
	 238	
 With this in mind, the crucial point is that the fear of failing to preserve oneself is 
antithetical to ethics—antithetical to the good in its attempt to resist change, i.e., resist 
the other. As has been argued in the preceding chapters and above, goodness involves an 
openness to the shattering of one’s current convictions, and the shattering of one’s 
projections based on those convictions, as this involves conceding that there is always 
something that fails to meet the eye: a residue that prevents us from having a god’s eye 
view of things. Hearkening to Levinas’s notion of justice as our inevitable search for 
order subsequent to disruption, it is here that we can find a way in which happiness is not 
at odds with the good as self-disruption. We can of course set goals, standards, and ideals 
to be attained, insofar as we recognize that those orderings will inevitably be undone 
(perhaps entirely). This is not only okay, but good. And not good in the sense of 
something that can be known or defined (essence), but good in the sense of giving 
ourselves over to our the intrinsic desire that leads to the deposing of self-concern.  
5.3 A FINAL WORD ON MORAL PHILOSOPHY’S RELATION TO MORAL 
CULTIVATION  
The trouble we are left with is: if the good (here understood as self-disruption) has 
nothing to do with the will, but is something that we do in fact desire, how can we aspire 
to be disrupted? To at least begin to address this question and bring this project to a close, 
I want to briefly focus on what we mean when we employ the commonplace aphorism 
that “perfection is the enemy of the good”—in light of an understanding of goodness as 
self-disruption.  
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Typically what we mean is that holding ourselves to a particular standard of 
perfection, or better, to an expectation of what ought to be achieved can stifle our ability 
to ‘be good’ in the sense that it can paralyze you (e.g., not being able to finish a project 
because it is not ‘good enough’, or not dancing because you haven’t mastered the steps). 
Implicit is that ‘perfection’ involves trying to get something ‘right’, to produce something 
that ourselves and others approve of, and, above all, to fulfill certain pre-figured 
expectations. Setting standards of perfection is the enemy of the good in the sense that it 
stifles activity, halting us in our efforts. And not just in the sense of inhibiting the 
execution of a particular task, but in the sense of letting oneself—specifically one’s 
projected expectations for oneself and what one ought to achieve for oneself—get in 
one’s way. With ‘affective unity’ in mind, it is worth stressing again that it is only by 
way of splicing ourselves into two (the self as it is now and the self to be attained in the 
activity) that we are able to get in our own way, because there are two of us.  
 To build on this point, I want to very briefly address the claim that our age (the 
21st-century in the Anglo-American West) is an age of anxiety, most tangibly in the sense 
that young people are more and more frequently finding themselves paralyzed in the 
sense that was just described. The New York Times Magazine recently issued an excellent 
feature titled, “Why are more American teenagers than ever suffering from severe 
anxiety?” (October 11, 2017). ‘Severe anxiety’ here refers to an inability to deal with 
failure (imperfection)—to the point of being reclusive, unable to attend school, unable to 
act without ‘certainty’ about what is to come. As the article stresses, this is ultimately the 
result of locating value in achievement. Echoing what was established above, the chief 
virtue that corresponds to value so construed is self-perseverance: preserving oneself 
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from harm. The article does a brilliant job of illustrating that anxiety, plaguing more than 
half of our undergraduates in the United States, is best defined as the overactive fight or 
flight response that perceives threats where there often are none—an overproduction of 
what ifs when standing before the future. And despite the fact that we are all anxious to 
some degree, as anxiety helps us detect danger, our culture’s obsession with achievement 
and fulfilling self-imposed expectations has fostered an epidemic of overachieving 
perfectionists plagued by a crippling fear of failure—which is, more fundamentally, a 
fear of the pain associated with rejection and inadequacy. The article aptly describes the 
‘crippling’ dimension of anxiety as a dread that the moment of ‘being able to stop 
because you have finally achieved enough’ will never come.137 That one will never be 
enough, never be perfect.  
Perfection is, therefore, the enemy of ‘the good’ in the sense that perfection—here 
synonymous with achieving expectations—inhibits us from straying from what we think 
we know is best, or from going against the agenda or expectations we set for ourselves 
(our self-legislation), or from inadvertently arriving at new understandings. Perfection 
inhibits us from taking risks, which in turn inhibits us from exposing ourselves to 
unexpected things: that is, from disrupting ourselves. The trouble that young people face 
today is an unwillingness to venture outside of their comfort zones, habituating a lack of 
resilience in the face of the unexpected, rather than the welcome of exposure, confidence 
before the unanticipated. 
To return to the question above: how can we aspire to be disrupted (that is, to get 
out of our own way), especially if it is not a product of the will? Reiterating what was 
																																																								
137 For more, see Benoit Denizet-Lewis, “Why Are More American Teenagers Than Ever Suffering From 
Severe Anxiety?” The New York Times Magazine, October 11, 2017.   
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discovered in Chapter 4, the work of philosophy, which is ultimately the work of justice 
(in Levinas’s sense of the term), is most essentially conversation, which involves offering 
concepts (essences), so as to dig deeper—justifying and undoing them with no pre-
determined end in sight. Justice ought to be understood as the movement back and forth 
between the disruption and re-collection, actualized in conversation. Philosophy’s task, 
therefore, is to safeguard thinking from the delusion that truth has been discovered once 
and for all. That is, to break proposed identifications of truth up, to contest that order—to 
refuse to take it for granted, even at the risk of uncertainty. If philosophy is understood as 
the activity that begins in the sort of wonder that seizes one from oneself, disrupting 
one’s concern for oneself, and ultimately driving one to justify, organize, bring clarity to 
that disruption (one’s justificatory state), then philosophy is the work of justifying or 
revealing one’s justificatory state in conversation, and not resisting the uncertainty that 
accompanies the breakup of a particular mode of self-legislation, as this uncertainty is 
what allows for the possibility of an existential shift, a new way of understanding things, 
a new mode of being, and an excise of the old. This amounts to welcoming, in hospitality, 
the death that necessarily accompanies birth, change.  
Crucial is that these shifts in understanding are birthed from communication, 
conversation, which involves listening to (rather than turning away from) what is always 
and already most proximate to us: the other. Philosophy’s task is to remind us that self-
disruption is the work of the good. And with Prichard’s critique of modern moral 
philosophy in mind, it seems clear that this is legitimate mode of moral philosophy.  
While we cannot will shifts in our moral understanding in precisely the same way 
that we will ourselves to do or not do something (e.g., go to the gym), because it requires 
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something other than ourselves, we can engage in experiences that occasion moral sense, 
listening to others—embracing the ‘passivity’ that sits at the heart of conversation. We 
can converse. Or in Levinas’s terms, we can celebrate sensibility, which is nothing other 
than our perpetual exposure to what is outside of ourselves; to be is to be for the other.  
Within moral philosophy in particular, especially as educators in the humanities, 
we can seek to instill an appreciation for goodness so construed by provoking our 
students, disrupting their current understandings, habituating conversation (listening to 
what is otherwise than certain to ourselves, no matter how uncomfortable it makes us), 
and then do the same for ourselves (engage in conversations) when we get a little too 
cozy in our convictions, self-constructed narratives, and projections, as there is always 
something that fails to meet the eye: this ‘something’ being the good. To understand 
moral philosophy in this way (as a form of moral cultivation) is to ensure that philosophy 
remains the love of wisdom (sophia), rather than the love of knowledge (episteme). 
Instilling this sort of appreciation for self-disruption begins the process of reclaiming 
courage as a virtue: that is, courage in the sense of welcoming the unknown, confidently 
facing the new. Moreover, instilling this sort of appreciation for self-disruption also 
teaches us how to value, nurture, and habituate a mode of being in which the self (and its 
preservation) is not the only object of concern for itself. Given what we know about our 
anxious youth in the Anglo-American West, the time is ripe for this work.  
With Platos’s Phaedo in mind, it seems clear that philosophy is in fact a 
preparation for death—or better, learning how to welcome death, to welcome learning, to 
welcome suffering. The point that I want to underline here is that philosophy is not only 
preparation for death in the sense of preparing for the end of our physical existence, but 
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more broadly, preparing for death in the sense of preparing for change. Or in Aristotle’s 
terms, preparing for the world of coming-to-be—the ebb and flow of things coming in 
and out of existence, including our convictions and understandings. To prepare for death 
qua change is to foster resilience, recognizing that exposure to the other is the best way to 
vanquish fear.138 The crucial insight that we find in Levinas is that this precise exposure, 
which sits at the very heart of our being, is the ‘source’ of moral sense: our desire for the 
other. To resist exposure—or as Levinas puts it, to be duped by morality—is to attempt to 
deny reality in a way that is not only self-defeating (as the other is always and already 
most proximate to us), but in a way that is in fact anxiety inducing, as we attempt to 
control what is out of our hands. It seems clear that we owe it to ourselves to heed reality 
as it is, celebrating our exposure to the other by, perhaps first and foremost, celebrating 
the self-disruptive experience of conversation, and learning to appreciate that the 






138 Quoting Vigilus Haufniensis in The Concept of Anxiety: “Whoever is educated by possibility remains 
with anxiety; he does not permit himself to be deceived by its countless falsifications and accurately 
remembers the past. Then the assaults of anxiety, even though they be terrifying, will not be such that he 
flees from them. For him, anxiety becomes a serving spirit that against its will leads him to where he 
wishes to go. Then, when it announces itself, when it cunningly pretends to have invented a new instrument 
of torture, far more terrible than anything before, he does not shrink back, and still less does he attempt to 
hold it off with noise and confusion; but he bids it welcome, greets it festively, and like Socrates, who 
raised the poisoned cup and shuts himself up with it and says as a patient would say to the surgeon when 
the painful operation is about to begin: Now I am ready” (159).  
139 These conclusions are indebted to extensive conversations with my friend, colleague, and primary 
thinking partner, Vicente Muñoz-Reja, who has not only helped refine my thinking in general, but has 
helped me parse and more fully understand the relation between thinking, willing, knowing, time, pleasure, 
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